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Preface
Traditionally, the focus in economic research has been on explaining changes in behavior
as reactions to changes in constraints like prices, information, taxes, costs, and incen-
tives. Situational factors have been put center stage, and identification of treatment
differences has been the predominant goal, which is why economics provides powerful
methodological tools to achieve this aim. However, this point of view builds on the
assumption that preferences are stable and homogenous, which implies that behavior
changes can be fully explained by changes in the environment. Thus, for a long time,
differences in preferences were discarded as non-explanations; a position that is neatly
summarized in the infamous paper “de gustibus non est distputandum” by Stigler and
Becker (1977), who argue that it is sensible to treat tastes as stable and similar among
individuals. Their conclusion is that then, “one does not argue over tastes for the same
reason that one does not argue over the Rocky Mountains – both are there, will be there
next year, too, and are the same to all men.” (Stigler and Becker, 1977, p.76).
While challenging the neoclassical notion of rationality by introducing non-standard
preferences to economic models, the focus of behavioral economists largely remained
on situational constraints. In fact, some of the most influential behavioral economists
take the rather extreme standpoint that economic preference parameters or personal
traits neither possess predictive validity, stability, nor causality. Instead, they believe
behavior to be almost entirely determined by constraints and incentives (see the dis-
cussion in Almlund et al., 2011). This position can be traced back to the beginnings of
behavioral economics as a movement: To enhance the arguably narrow view of neoclas-
sical economics on human motivation (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Camerer, 2004), behavioral
economists explored the neighboring field of psychology, thereby being influenced by
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the predominant spirit of the time in psychological research. While the exploration of
individual differences in personality had been an important domain in psychology from
the start, early accounts focused on the reductive trait-based approach. The fundamen-
tal assumption of this approach – that behavior is stable over time and situations – was
only challenged with the influential monograph by Walter Mischel (1968), who stressed
the importance of situational determinants of behavior. In light of popular behavioristic
reasoning at that time, the ensuing person-situation debate left the field in limbo for the
following decades. As a consequence, the subsequently predominant view in psycho-
logical research was that of experimental social psychological approaches focusing on
the importance of the situation. Thus, the situational focus of behavioral economics re-
flects the development in psychology at the time which has influenced how economics
view individual heterogeneity. As Richard Thaler puts it, “[t]he great contribution to
psychology by Walter Mischel [. . . ] is to show that there is no such thing as a stable
personality trait.” (Thaler, 2008).2
By now, however, personality psychology has emerged again as a thriving research field,
and economic scholars from different fields have also started to argue that integrating
individual heterogeneity with respect to preferences and personality is meaningful to
further economists’ understanding of incentives as it enlarges the way economists de-
scribe the world (Borghans et al., 2008; Rustichini, 2009; Almlund et al., 2011). This
significance is established by the existence of pronounced heterogeneity and its pre-
dictive power for economic outcomes. More specifically, compelling evidence for pro-
nounced heterogeneity has been brought forward, not least by behavioral economics
scholars themselves, for instance in research on social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt,
2006) or risk preferences (Bruhin et al., 2010). While personality traits have been
linked to important outcomes like life and job satisfaction, occupational choice and
performance (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Ozer and Benet-Martînez, 2006; Mueller and
Plug, 2006; Heineck and Anger, 2010; Moffitt et al., 2011; Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011;
Caliendo et al., 2014), economic preferences like risk and social preferences have pre-
2 This is a rather extreme conclusion to draw from the person-situation debate, and most psychologists
would not agree (Bowers, 1973). It stresses the rigorous position early behavioral economists took.
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dictive power for these outcomes as well (Dohmen et al., 2008, 2009, 2011). In addi-
tion, economic preferences and personality traits have been argued to be complemen-
tary (Becker et al., 2012).
This dissertation consists of four essays that all incorporate this general notion while
exploring different aspects and utilizing different methods. In Chapter 1, the gen-
eral point is made that individual heterogeneity in traits and preferences might give
rise to complementarities for human-resource management (HRM) practices, which in
turn constitute an explanation for persistent productivity differences between seem-
ingly similar firms. In contrast, Chapters 2 to 4 focus on different facets of individual
heterogeneity and their impact on various economic outcomes: In Chapter 2, the role
of intrinsic reciprocity for dynamic contracting is investigated. Chapter 3 focuses on
the role of individual heterogeneity in personality traits on contribution behavior in a
public goods context, and Chapter 4 explores the role of heterogeneity in beliefs on
competitiveness. To provide a comprehensive picture, the chapters make use of vari-
ous methods including theoretical modeling, econometric analysis of survey data, and
laboratory experiments.
Chapter 1, which is joint work with Florian Englmaier, is an overview article in which
we stress the relevance of complementarities of HRM practices for explaining persistent
productivity differences across organizations. We do so by drawing on the literature on
strategic human-resource management and incorporate an additional aspect into the
debate: by introducing individual-level heterogeneity in preferences among employ-
ees, insights from behavioral economics point to an additional dimension of potential
complementarities. To illustrate these central points, we first give an overview of the
concepts of complementarities and HRM practices before focusing on empirical meth-
ods to study both. Here, we concentrate on the World Management Survey (Bloom
et al., 2014) on the one hand and insider-econometric studies (Ichniowski and Shaw,
2003) on the other hand, which constitute two broad approaches to investigate the
complementarity of HRM practices. Based on this, we then proceed to show how in-
sights from behavioral economics can inform the analysis. To this end, we develop a
simple agency model illustrating how social preferences influence the design and effects
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of incentive schemes. More specifically, in a hidden-action principal-agent framework
with limited liability, we show that the principal is able to reduce the incentive intensity
and the wage bill when contracting with a more reciprocal agent and illustrate that the
composition of the workforce and the effect of HRM practices are interdependent. In
addition, we investigate how auxiliary HRM practices can strengthen this interaction.
We broaden our central argument by discussing other behavioral sub-fields that are also
suited to inform research on complementarities. Finally, we give an outlook on further
research.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Matthias Fahn and Anne Schade, focuses on the
role of reciprocal behavior in employment relationships. In this paper, we address the
question if and how two predominant explanations for reciprocal behavior, inherent
preferences for reciprocity and repeated interaction, interact. Developing a theoretical
model of a long-term employment relationship, we first show that reciprocal prefer-
ences are more important when an employee is close to retirement. At earlier stages,
repeated interaction is more important because relatively more future rents are avail-
able to provide incentives. Intrinsic reciprocity is only formally used in contracts in the
last stages of the employment relationships when future rents are too small to make
repeated interaction feasible. Preferences for reciprocity still affect the structure of an
employment relationship early on, though, because of two reasons: First, preferences
for reciprocity effectively reduce the employee’s effort costs. Second, they allow to
relax the enforceability constraint that determines the principal’s commitment in the
repeated interaction. Therefore, reciprocity-based and repeated-game incentives are
dynamic substitutes, but complements at any given point in time. We test our main pre-
dictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and find evidence
for a stronger positive effect of positive reciprocity on effort for older workers and for
workers that are close to retirement.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Michael Schüßler and Daniel Mühlbauer, our
aim is to investigate factors that influence sequential contribution decisions in a public
goods context. Following the notion that organizations often face public good dilem-
mas, we use a real-time provision-point mechanism to explore the process of achieving
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cooperative equilibria in the laboratory. We develop and test two related sets of hy-
potheses. First, we discern how institutional changes (i.e., step return, availability of
real-time information) influence contribution behavior in the lab. Second, by drawing
on models of collective behavior, the theory of mixed-motive social dilemmas, and per-
sonality psychology, we test the link between individual heterogeneity (i.e., personality
traits, distributional preferences) and the probability to contribute early or late. We
find that while step return influences group success, availability of information about
the behavior of fellow players only has an influence in combination with the former.
In addition, individuals’ distributional preferences as well as conscientiousness and ex-
traversion help to explain the observed contribution sequences.
In Chapter 4, I investigate whether two mechanisms leading to biased beliefs about suc-
cess, overconfidence and competition neglect, influence decisions to enter competitive
environments. I use a controlled laboratory setting that allows to elicit belief distribu-
tions related to absolute as well as relative overconfidence to study it comprehensively.
In addition, my setting allows me to introduce systematic variation in the possibility
for competition neglect. Studying these two mechanisms simultaneously is especially
relevant as both overconfidence and competition neglect potentially lead to the same
behavioral pattern, namely excess entry. However, for de-biasing, it is essential to know
whether individuals overestimate their chances of success because they overestimate
their performance in absolute terms or relative to others, or because they do not realize
that they face a selected set of competitors. With this in mind, I let individuals decide
whether they want to enter a competition in a real-effort experiment while eliciting their
beliefs with respect to their own and others’ performance as well as their winning prob-
ability. I introduce two treatment variations: First, some participants receive detailed
performance feedback addressing absolute and relative overconfidence before making
their decision. Comparing entry decisions of individuals who have received feedback to
those who have not enables me to investigate whether overconfidence plays a role for
selection into competition – if there is a difference between those groups, it does. Sec-
ond, I vary whether the competition group consists of all potential competitors or only of
individuals who also chose to compete. Here, finding no difference in entry between the
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groups implies that decision makers fail to adjust their decisions to the selected sample,
thus exhibiting competition neglect. I find that there is systematic heterogeneity in per-
ception biases, with low-performing individuals overestimating their own performance
and their chances of success while underestimating performance in the competition
group, while the opposite is true for high-performing individuals. While these biases
in performance beliefs are ameliorated by feedback, individuals persistently disregard
the composition of the competition group they face. Investigating determinants of en-
try decisions to tackle the key question of this paper whether competition neglect and
overconfidence influence entry into competition, I find that both influence individuals’
decisions. However, choices are closely tied to previous performance and assessments,
and there are no gender differences.
All four chapters in this dissertation are self-contained: they can be read autonomously
as they all contain an independent introduction and discussion. The appendices and a
joint bibliography are provided after the main text.
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Chapter 1
Complementarities of HRM Practices: A Case
for a Behavioral Economics Perspective∗
1.1 Motivation
One of the most important developments in the study of firms in economics and man-
agement has been the increasing availability of firm-level micro-data and the ensuing
emphasis on firm heterogeneity. Newly available large and detailed data sets have pro-
vided strong evidence for enormous and persistent heterogeneity of firms (and workers)
over a range of dimensions, even in narrowly defined industries. These observations are
starkly at odds with theoretical predictions and are commonly referred to as “persistent
productivity differences” (PPDs) across firms (cf. Syverson, 2011). Theory predicts that
competitive forces will induce firms to quickly adopt innovations, only leaving room for
short-term heterogeneity, but not for the persistent patterns that emerge in the data.
Indeed, PPDs are evident even in seemingly uniform industries without room for dif-
ferentiation, with high competition and with minor frictions. While these differences
are quite impressive for developed countries like the U.S., where a firm at the 10th per-
centile of the productivity distribution generates only half of the output that a firm at
the 90th percentile is able to generate with the same input (Syverson, 2004), they seem
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Florian Englmaier which has already been published under
the same title in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (Englmaier and Schüßler,
2016). Reprinted with permission from Mohr Siebeck Tübingen.
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to be even more pronounced for countries like India and China, where the average total
factor productivity differentials between the 10th and 90th percentile are larger than
1:5 (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
In fact, researchers have come up with several explanations that include, for instance,
differences in input quality (e.g., Abowd et al., 2005), learning-by-doing (e.g., Benkard,
2000), or differences in management practices (e.g., Bloom et al., 2014); however, even
when controlling for these facts, there still remains substantial variation (see Syverson,
2011). From the perspective of firms, increasing productivity and thus ensuring to be
(and stay) on the upper tail of the productivity distribution can be seen as a central goal,
which gives rise to the question of how that can be achieved. By drawing on the litera-
ture on strategic human resource management (SHRM), we argue that complementary
human resource management (HRM) practices are an important part of the answer
and thus also important for understanding PPDs. Specifically, strategic management
in general has been traditionally focused on how to achieve a sustained competitive
advantage, which can be depicted as the antecedent of PPDs (Baron and Kreps, 1999;
Lockett and Thompson, 2001). Besides that, the notion of complementarities is essen-
tially the same as the notion of fit, which is a prominent theme in SHRM: while internal
fit points to the fact that the implementation of matching practices can yield convex re-
turns, external fit makes the same claim for taking into account external contingencies
(Kepes and Delery, 2007).
In this paper, we want to build on this idea and incorporate an additional aspect into
the debate on complementary effects of HRM practices as a possible mechanism for
bringing about PPDs. Behavioral economics highlights additional dimensions of po-
tential complementarities by introducing individual level heterogeneity in preferences
among employees. Assuming that firms can recruit from a heterogeneous labor force
has stark consequences for complementary effects of HRM practices and can result in
fundamentally different systems of practices; e.g., recruiting workers with strong social
preferences, much authority, little monitoring, and relatively mute explicit incentives
vs. recruiting workers with no social preferences, very formalized processes with little
authority and relatively strong explicit incentives. These starkly different systems of
8
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practices may yield comparably high returns as long as they are tailored to the compo-
sition of the workforce. Thus, considerations based on behavioral economics give rise
to substantially richer interactions.
We give a brief summary over different views in SHRM in Section 1.2 before focus-
ing on two macro-level approaches to measuring the impact of HRM practices used in
organizational economics: the world management survey (WMS) and “insider econo-
metrics" studies (cf. Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). In Section 1.3, we then demonstrate
what behavioral economics is able to contribute by making a case for focusing more on
micro-foundations. We do this by developing a simple model introducing agents with
social preferences to the standard principal-agent framework, relating our insights to
empirical findings, and posing new questions. Building on these, in Section 1.4, we
describe what we identify as an empirical agenda and conclude.
1.2 Review of the Literature
This section comprises of two parts: first, we aim at a brief, concise explanation of the
general view on complementarities and HRM practices; then, we provide an overview
of empirical methods to study complementarities of HRM practices.1
1.2.1 Concepts
Complementarities
As Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) point out, complementarities can be thought of as
a set of interrelated decisions a firm has to take in order to function properly. Assume
for example a firm follows a low-cost strategy; then, subsequent decisions concerning
1 It is important to note that this article is not meant to be an exhaustive overview of the extensive
literature on the World Management Survey, insider econometric studies, or on complementarities
of HRM practices. We rather provide a brief summary of these literatures to act as a background for
developing our main argument – that behavioral economics insights can contribute to the study of
complementarities of HRM practices – and based on that sketch a research agenda. Almost necessar-
ily, in doing so we paint a subjective picture and brazenly over-represent own work throughout the
paper. For excellent reviews see, e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw (2013), Bloom et al. (2014), or Jackson
et al. (2014).
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the acquisition of and the investment in human capital depend on this strategy. It can
be assumed that the decisions to keep hiring and training costs low are indeed comple-
mentary to the strategy decision. Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1994) describe the general
pattern of practices being complementary when “using one more intensely increases
the marginal benefit of using others more intensely” (Hölmstrom and Milgrom, 1994,
p.973).2
Obviously, this way of thinking can be applied to a variety of situations. As shown
in the example above, in organizational economics, thinking about complementarities
between organizational decisions or practices has proven useful for explaining predom-
inant practice patterns as systems of complements that then appear together (see Bryn-
jolfsson and Milgrom, 2013, for a concise treatment of complementarity in organiza-
tions).
Strategic Human Resource Management and The Impact of HRM Practices
In a similar vein but largely unnoticed by economists, scholars in SHRM have been in-
vestigating the impact of HRM practices on organizational-level outcomes in general
for more than 20 years (Huselid, 1995; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Becker and Huselid,
2006). In this still ongoing discourse, increasingly sophisticated theoretical formula-
tions have been proposed (e.g., Delery, 1998; Gerhart, 2007; Jiang et al., 2012).3 In
general, three different theoretical approaches addressing the link between HRM and
firm performance have been proposed: the universalistic, the contingency, and the con-
figurational approach.
In early work, an universalistic perspective has been taken which follows the proposi-
tion that there exists a relationship between the adoption of particular HRM practices
and increased organizational performance (Delery and Doty, 1996). Assuming homo-
geneous organizations, an adoption of those “best practices” is expected to increase firm
performance independent of any contingencies (Huselid, 1995). In principle, the litera-
2 Aside from this insightful and straightforward intuition, economists have defined complementarities
with mathematical precision using the concept of supermodularity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).
3 See Jackson et al. (2014) for a discussion of this literature.
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ture building on the World Management Survey also adopts an universalistic approach.
In contrast, the contingency approach suggests that HRM practices should be aligned
with important contingency factors such as labor markets, competition, or firm strate-
gies. Organizational performance is assumed to be fostered by the interaction between
the external fit to contingencies and the set of HRM practices in place (Delery and Doty,
1996). Accordingly, the use of HRM practices lacking this external fit may result in am-
biguity, which in turn reduces organizational performance (Schuler and Jackson, 1987;
Schuler, 1989).
Lastly, the configurational approach assumes that HRM needs complex alignment with
both external and internal contingency factors such that complex and idiosyncratic sets
of practices at different levels originate (Delery and Doty, 1996). The underlying as-
sumption of this perspective is that the use of a coherent system of mutually reinforcing
HRM practices has greater effects on organizational performance than the sum of each
individual practice effect (cf. the literature following the insider econometrics approach,
e.g., Ichniowski et al., 1997). Note that this notion of complementary practices and syn-
ergies is almost identical to the idea of complements in organizational economics and
in line with the formal definition of supermodularity. Furthermore, the notion of com-
plementary HRM practices has also been raised and discussed by economists (Pfeffer,
1994; Baron and Kreps, 1999; Lazear and Shaw, 2007).
1.2.2 Empirics
After having discussed the general view on complementarities and HRM practices, we
now focus on giving a brief overview of empirical approaches to identify complemen-
tarities and their role in explaining firm productivity.
As already described in the preceding paragraphs, there is a plethora of theories in
SHRM on complementary HRM practices. However, although theorists keep on empha-
sizing the importance of an (internal) fit of different practices, direct empirical tests
remain scarce (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Gerhart, 2007; Kepes and Delery, 2007).
Throughout this section, our main focus is on economic approaches.
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Traditionally, case studies on single firms have been used to build a firm intuition about
underlying mechanisms in the complementarity-productivity relation – prominent ex-
amples include cases like Lincoln Electric’s business methods and incentive design (Berg
and Fast, 1975) as well as specific changes like the introduction of digital imaging
technologies (Autor et al., 2002) or of an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system
(McAfee, 2002).
However, as this approach can be misleading because of lacking generalizability (Bryn-
jolfsson and Milgrom, 2013), several other methods have been used to systematically
study these effects. In the following, we focus on two broad approaches, namely the
WMS and insider econometrics studies.
World Management Survey
Over the last decade, the WMS, a survey run by a team of researchers around Nicholas
Bloom and John Van Reenen, has led to numerous important insights to explain PPDs
across firms. In particular, the WMS explores how “good” management practices can
explain firm heterogeneity and focuses on monitoring, targets, and incentives, to ex-
plore the impact of management practices on firm productivity in different sectors and
countries; for an overview, see Bloom et al. (2014).4 In closely related work, these
authors have documented complementarities between (what they argue constitute)
“good” management practices and more general firm investment behavior, namely in
IT (Bloom et al., 2012). They document that good management in the above sense
makes IT investments more profitable and show that a significant share of the produc-
tivity advantage of US firms over European firms can be explained by IT usage together
with “better” management.
Although some of the heterogeneity across firms can be explained by the insights pro-
vided by WMS data, a lot of unexplained variance is left. This drawback is illustrated in
4 While the WMS proper is a compilation of a large number of semi-structured telephone interviews,
starting out as cross-sectional but recently also building up a panel component, the correlational
evidence from the WMS is recently corroborated by smaller randomized control trials (RCTs); see,
e.g., Bloom et al. (2013).
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Figure 1.1: Residual plot of log(sales) on average management scores
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Notes: The figure plots the residuals of a regression of the log number of sales on the log
number of employees, a key performance measure used by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007),
and the average z-standardized management scores of the surveyed firms. Data are gener-
ously provided at: www.http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/. The figure is based on own
calculations.
Figure 1.1, which is based on the data used in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), and plots
the residuals of a regression of the log number of sales on the log number of employees,
one of the performance measures used by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), against the
average z-standardized management scores of the surveyed firms. As the observations
scatter widely around the regression line, the average management score still seems to
be a noisy measure, even when controlling for firm size. Hence, to generalize from this
picture, a lot of unexplained variation is left to be explained.
Concerning HRM practices, an important drawback is that the WMS focuses on a specific
set of HRM practices rather than depicting the whole system of HRM practices of a
firm. Furthermore, only mere correlative patterns are observed which are not able to
depict complementarities or internal fit, but only show which practices tend to be used
together. Hence, even if the WMS data are helpful in explaining some of the variation
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in productivity, substantial amounts of PPDs remain unexplained. A particular aspect
of HRM practices that is not at the center of the WMS but that might matter a lot, is
their complementarity. The study of these complementarities has been at the center of
insider econometrics studies, covered in the next section.
Insider Econometrics
Insider econometrics studies aim at identifying the performance contribution of bundles
of HRM practices more closely (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). This within-firm work
has suggested that the specific combination of complementary HRM practices enhances
productivity. Aimed at producing empirical estimates of the value of alternative HRM
practices, numerous studies in this field indicate that various innovative practices are
complements. The defining characteristic of a wide range of studies that can be summa-
rized as belonging to the insider econometrics literature – see, for example, Ichniowski
et al. (1997); Lazear (2000); Hamilton et al. (2003); Shearer (2004); Bandiera et al.
(2007, 2009); Wolf and Zwick (2008) – is that they use highly detailed, production-line
specific data to tie HRM practices like pay-for-performance schemes, work teams, cross-
training, and routinized labor-management communication to productivity growth. In
sum, these insider econometrics studies show that factors other than incentive pay are
also important determinants of firm productivity.
1.2.3 Interim Conclusion
While both WMS as well as Insider Econometrics have been concerned with the impact
of management practices on organizational performance, their focus is quite different:
the former concentrates on measuring (aspects of) management quality, showing cross-
sectional correlations with productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), while the latter
focuses on investigating within-firm data suggesting that human resources components
of management (HRM) can affect productivity in a complementary fashion (Ichniowski
et al., 1997). Despite a common interest, it is important to note that the underly-
ing model of measurement as well as the theoretical rationale differ to some extent:
whereas the WMS assumes additive index building with different practices causing a
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higher order factor termed management quality, insider econometrics claim that those
practices exhibit interaction effects. As Jiang et al. (2012) argue, those effects can be
either negative (deadly combinations) or positive (fruitful combinations), which corre-
sponds to the economic notion of complementarities. We argue that albeit WMS has
been an influential and important step, from our perspective it is highly unlikely that
those practices act virtually independent from one another as assumed by additive in-
dexing. Moreover, we support the claim put forward by SHRM scholars as well as by
the researchers advocating the importance of complementarities in organizational eco-
nomics that those firms which manage to adapt practices that are complementary to (or
fit their) external and internal environment are able to establish a sustained competitive
advantage and, in turn, PPDs arise.
Still, specific knowledge is fairly limited, last but not least because the traditional case
study approach as well as the correlational approach based on WMS data and insider
econometrics studies are challenged by identification problems, unobserved heterogene-
ity and reversed causality being prominent ones (see Becker and Huselid, 2006; Bryn-
jolfsson and Milgrom, 2013, for a detailed discussion). To date, only few studies use
approaches like panel data, natural and designed experiments that address this problem
(e.g., Athey and Stern, 2002).
In addition, there is still little understanding of the microfoundations of the effect of
complementary HRM practices. Hence, for the remainder of this paper, our approach
is to focus on two functional areas of HRM and the practices within those that have
traditionally been of great interest to economists: incentive design (compensation and
benefits) and hiring (recruiting). Using these, we develop a simple model and use it as
proof of concept to illustrate that enriching theory with behavioral concepts and sound
microfoundations of individual behavior helps to better understand complementarities
of HRM practices. In addition, we emphasize the idea of individual heterogeneity be-
tween workers and argue that those differences play an important role for how comple-
mentarities between practices come to life and persist.
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1.3 What Can Behavioral Economics Research Contribute?
After having defined our topic and briefly summarized some evidence in the previous
section, we want to develop our argument that behavioral economics research allows
us to gain additional insights by highlighting an additional dimension of potential com-
plementarities: employees’ heterogeneous preferences interact in non-trivial ways with
the design of incentive schemes and the choice of HRM practices more generally. This
indicates a case for jointly analyzing recruiting and the organizational choices of firms.
Generally, most of the empirical literature in organizational economics so far does not
focus on how recruiting and as a consequence the matching of types might interact
with other HRM practices. This omission is reasonable from a neoclassical viewpoint
as these factors can to a large degree be separated from optimal incentive design. To
illustrate this line of reasoning, think of worker heterogeneity: ability has been a stan-
dard dimension of heterogeneity that has been considered in the literature. Every firm
wants, ceteris paribus, to hire more able workers. The firm then solves its contracting
problem conditional on the characteristics of its workforce. Adding heterogeneity in
risk attitudes, however, leads to a somewhat more advanced problem, as the optimal
intensity of incentives is now affected by the risk attitudes of the given employee pool
(cf. Bandiera et al., 2015b). In both of these cases, ability and risk attitude heterogene-
ity lead to differences in incentive heterogeneity, but do not affect the structure and
nature of organizational choices in a broader sense – while there might result changes
in slopes, the general structure of incentives is not changed. Thus, recruiting of workers
and incentive or organizational design can be (and have been) treated largely sepa-
rately.
However, in contrast to that, much research has been conducted in behavioral eco-
nomics in the course of the last two decades that indicates that this clean separation of
effects might not be a correct representation of reality, but that recruiting and match-
ing of types interact with other HRM practices like incentive schemes. For instance,
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) develop a theoretical model assuming workers who are het-
erogeneous with respect to their intrinsic motivation and show how incentive schemes
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can help to attract motivated workers in this setting, and Jones et al. (2014) conduct
an experiment and a field study to point out that employer signaling of corporate social
performance might be a cause for selection and sorting effects of employees in firms.
Based on these insights, our goal in the remainder of this paper is to highlight how com-
plementary effects of HRM practices and interactions with heterogeneous social prefer-
ences matter and how these can be studied. We focus on social preferences within an
organizational context, and show how these preferences influence the optimal use of
HRM practices by developing a simple, illustrative model introducing reciprocal pref-
erences into the principal-agent framework based on Englmaier and Leider (2012a) in
Section 1.3.1. We see this model as a proof of concept that behavioral economic insights
can be helpful for explaining facts and patterns in the study of HRM practices and PPDs.
Of course, this is only a small piece of what behavioral economics research has to offer
and there are numerous other areas that can be fruitfully included in the study of or-
ganizations. We provide a discussion on the general mechanism behind it as well as a
variety of other particularly fruitful topics in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.1 Social Preferences: an Illustrative Model
Social preferences are a good choice to offer a proof of concept for the role behav-
ioral economic insights can play in studying heterogeneous preferences of agents and
how they influence the optimal configuration of HRM practices. Some evidence point-
ing to this conclusion has been made by scholars studying these preferences.5 First,
there are numerous laboratory experiments indicating that social preferences matter in
organizational settings; recently, various researchers have begun to take the question
of how reciprocity matters in workplace interactions to the laboratory. Cabrales et al.
(2010) find that heterogeneous social preferences, measured in standard lab tasks, are
a significant predictor of choices for firms and workers in a multi-stage labor market
experiment, and Bartling et al. (2012) directly relate to the idea of complementary sys-
5 Together with other kinds of non-standard preferences like time preferences (present bias) and risk
preferences (reference-dependence), social preferences have been researched most intensely in the
field of behavioral economics (DellaVigna, 2009). Fehr and Schmidt (2006) or Camerer and Weber
(2013) provide extensive reviews of this line of research.
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tems of HRM practices and show that both work attitude and labor market competition
are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems in an exper-
imental labor market. Englmaier et al. (2014) investigate one-shot labor relations in
the lab and are able to show that employers take into account heterogeneity of workers
in the productivity as well as in the social preference dimension. In their setting, firm
profits are highest when employing reciprocal workers. Two complementary studies
conducted by Englmaier and Leider (2012b,c) explore determinants for the existence of
the gift-exchange mechanism both in the laboratory and in the field and show that con-
text matters for the viability of gift exchange: in both settings, the reciprocal reaction
of workers is dependent on how much the manager benefits from extra effort.
Second, there are also a few attempts to investigate this relationship in real-world set-
tings using administrative and firm level data, which usually use survey questions to
measure reciprocal inclinations. For instance, Leuven et al. (2005) propose reciprocity
as explanation for why firms overinvest in general and specific training compared to
standard theory predictions and show empirically that training investments are greater
when the workforce is reciprocal using the NIPO Post-initial Schooling Survey, a cross-
sectional survey with a representative sample of the Dutch population. Dohmen et al.
(2009) explore the link between reciprocal preferences and behavioral labor market
outcomes and show with data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (G-SOEP) that
positive reciprocity is related to high wages, high effort, and life success in general.
Huang and Cappelli (2010) demonstrate that screening for “work ethic” is related to the
prevalence of less monitoring, more teamwork, less employee turnover, higher wages,
and higher firm productivity in US census data. Englmaier et al. (2016) use personality
tests in recruitment as a proxy for a reciprocal workforce and show that this is linked
to wage generosity, provision of non-pecuniary incentives, team work, and higher firm
productivity in general using data from the UK Workplace Employment Relations Study
(WERS). However, although all of these studies provide excellent starting points for
future research, they all build on cross-sectional data and cannot identify causal effects.
Summing up, there is ample evidence from the lab as well as the field indicating that
social preferences matter in organizational settings. Hence, in the remainder of the
18
COMPLEMENTARITIES OF HRM PRACTICES
section, we develop a simple agency model incorporating reciprocal inclinations on the
side of the agent to illustrate how behavioral economics can inform the analysis.
Base Model
Following Englmaier and Leider (2012a), we consider a simple binary principal-agent
framework where both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral. There are two states
of the world that are characterized by two possible outcomes, q1 and q2, with q1 < q2
and qi > 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. The agent can choose between two actions, aL and aH , with
related costs c(aL) < c(aH). The probabilities of the principal’s outcomes are conditional
on the action taken by the agent: Pr(q2|aj) = πj ∀j ∈ {L,H}, where πH > πL, which
implies that the higher outcome is a better signal for high effort. Hence, the principal’s
expected return is given by ER(aj) = (1− πj)q1 + πjq2 ∀j ∈ {L,H}.
We assume that effort is not contractible; hence, wages can only be paid conditional
on outcomes. Thus, the principal offers the following contract to the agent: (w, b, â),
where w denotes a secure wage payment (a salary) for the agent in every state of the
world, b an additional bonus that is paid in case that outcome q2 is realized and â
represents a non-binding request for an action.6 This request reflects the performance
level expected by the firm that is known to the worker (e.g., through job descriptions
or a code of conduct) and serves to fix the agent’s beliefs about the principal’s intended
generosity; see the discussion below and in Englmaier and Leider (2012a).
The agent has an inherent concern for reciprocity η with η ∈ [0,+∞). To focus the
analysis, we assume here that this type η is publicly observable.7 His utility from taking
6 When developing the model in the following subsections, we always discuss optimal wages, as is
common in agency models. As the model is formulated in utility terms, however, note that these are
to be interpreted broadly and might include multiple ways of transferring utility to employees. A
discussion of this is provided in Section 1.3.2.
7 If we assume instead that firms have access to a noisy signal on η upon hiring, there are two types
of errors that might arise: either an in fact suitable, say reciprocal, applicant is mistaken to be non-
reciprocal and is not hired, or a non-reciprocal applicant is mistaken to be a reciprocal type and is
hired by a firm that has its HR systems geared towards employing reciprocal types. If, because the
employment relationship is long-term, the worker continues to mimic a reciprocal type, our conclu-
sions are not affected. If not and the worker starts to take advantage of the low-powered incentive
environment, additional measures like having an intense probation period seem particularly impor-
tant in such reciprocity-based settings. Even if these do not work, as long as the initial signal upon
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action aj when â is requested is given by
U(aj, â) = (1− πj)w + πj(w + b)− c(aj)
+ η [(1− π̂)w + π̂(w + b)− c(â)− ū]ER(aj).
As is evident from the utility function, a reciprocal agent (η > 0) does not only derive
utility from the wage payment as is common in agency models (first part of utility
function), but also from internalizing the principal’s welfare (third part). This part of
the function represents the case that reciprocal utility is “triggered” when the proposed
wage scheme provides the agent with a rent in excess of his outside option ū. In the
simple case of our model, ū is assumed to be fixed exogenously. For simplification, we
also assume that ū = 0, c(aL) = 0, and define c(aH) = c.
Benchmark Case Trivially, when assuming that effort is contractible, the first best so-
lution is implemented by any wage scheme compensating the agent for his effort costs
c. Furthermore, without further restrictions, it can easily be shown that the principal
can induce a risk-neutral agent to exert high effort for first-best costs, even when effort
is not contractible.8
The properties of the optimal contract are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1. Under hidden action, the risk-neutral principal proposes the following
contract to the risk-neutral agent:
w = − πL
∆π
c < 0, b =
c
∆π
, and â = aH .
In doing so, she can induce the agent to exert aH at first-best implementation costBFB(aH) =
c, leaving the agent with no rent. This holds for every η ∈ [0,+∞).
The optimal contract punishes the agent if the low outcome is realized and rewards him
if the good outcome is realized. The intuitive explanation for this result is straightfor-
recruiting is precise, the firm presumably has to be able to live with few “rotten apples".
8 See Appendix A.1 for the exposition of the problem and a derivation of the optimal contract.
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ward: since effort is not contractible, the principal has to align the agent’s interests to
hers. Recall that the agent is risk-neutral; thus, the principal can just structure incen-
tives steeply and transfer risk to the agent without having to compensate him for that.
Note that just as in Englmaier and Leider (2012a), reciprocity does not have an effect
on the optimal contract in the first best; the “standard contract” prevails.
Limited Liability Now, consider the case where the agent is wealth constrained and
thus has to receive a minimal wage in every state of the world that cannot be negative;
more formally, consider w ≥ w ≥ 0. With an additional limited liability constraint
(Innes, 1990) like this, the principal then faces a trade-off between rent extraction and
incentive provision when designing the optimal contract.
The properties of the solution to this problem are summarized in the following proposi-
tion.9
Proposition 1.2. Under hidden action with limited liability (w ≥ w ≥ 0), the risk-neutral
principal proposes the following contract to the risk-neutral agent:
w1 = w, b =
c
∆π
− η∆ER
∆π + η∆ERπH
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)
, and â = aH .
In doing so, she can induce the agent to exert aH , but only at implementation cost
BSBη (aH) = c+
∆π
∆π + η∆ERπH
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)
.
The agent’s utility is then
U(aH) = (1 + ηERH)
[
∆π
∆π + η∆ERπH
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)]
.
First of all, note that this collapses to the standard case if η = 0. Hence, the standard
case is nested in our model. Comparing the optimal contract for selfish and reciprocal
agents reveals that BSBη>0(aH) < B
SB
η=0(aH); i.e., the principal can implement aH at lower
cost with a reciprocal agent. In both cases, the principal has to pay a rent due to wealth
9 See Appendix A.1 for the exposition of the problem and a derivation of the optimal contract.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the wage schemes
Notes: The figure depicts the exemplary first best contract (lower dashed line), the second
best contract for a selfish agent (parallel dashed line above the first best line) and the second
best contract for a reciprocal agent (dotted line).
constraints of the agent; however, while this rent is “lost” on a selfish agent, it serves as
an additional incentive for a reciprocal agent. This is also reflected in the bonus pay-
ment b, which is lower for reciprocal agents as the (non-zero term comprising of the)
limited liability rent, weighted by a term reflecting reciprocity η and effectiveness of re-
ciprocal behavior ∆ER, can be subtracted. The intuition for the smaller expected wage
bill in this case is straightforward: the wage differential for the reciprocal agent can
be smaller because the positive rent provides an additional motivation to the reciprocal
agent. More formally, bη>0 < bη=0.
The three cases of the exemplary first best contract, the second best contract for a selfish
agent and the second best contract for a reciprocal agent in comparison are illustrated
in Figure 1.2.
Comparative statics. To see what happens to the wage differential if the principal is
faced with a more reciprocal agent, we take the derivative of the optimal b with respect
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to η:
∂b
∂η
= − ∆π∆ER
(∆π + η∆ERπH)
2
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)
< 0.
Hence, the principal can offer a lower b to a more reciprocal agent, which is a rather
intuitive result.10 Subsequently, the expected wage bill for employing the agent also
decreases in η.11 This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3. b is decreasing in η and ∆ER. As a consequence, the expected wage bill
BSBη (aH) is also decreasing in these factors.
Interim conclusions. To sum up, in a hidden action principal-agent framework with
limited liability, we can show that the principal is able to reduce the incentive intensity
and the wage bill when contracting with a more reciprocal agent.
Note that even in this simple model, it is possible to immediately see that there are
different strategies for firms to combine complementary HRM practices in hiring and
incentive design: if a firm manages to attract a reciprocal workforce, it can implement
several reciprocity-based practices (e.g., little explicit incentives, generous treatment,
job security, little monitoring) while if it attracts non-reciprocal workers, the system op-
timally geared to this looks starkly different (e.g., internal competition, steep incentives,
close performance monitoring). While these two firms, due to the use of complemen-
tary practices, look starkly different (some might say one appears well managed and
the other badly managed), they might be relatively comparable in terms of profitability.
10 Also, since the increase in the principal’s expected revenue due to choosing aH rather than aL, ∆ER,
is always multiplied with η in b, the same holds true if the value of effort increases for the principal.
11 Considering the limit case η → ∞, we can show that for an infinitely reciprocal agent, the principal
could even induce high effort aH for first best cost:
lim
η→∞
BSBη (aH) = lim
η→∞
[
c+
∆π
∆π + η∆ERπH
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)]
= c
which equals BFB(aH).
23
COMPLEMENTARITIES OF HRM PRACTICES
Other HRM Practices in the Model Framework
In their seminal textbook, Milgrom and Roberts state that “[. . . ] important features of
many organizations can be best understood in terms of deliberate attempts to change
the preferences of individual participants [. . . ]. As a result, organizationally desired
behavior becomes more likely.” They continue to argue that this “is clearly an element
of leadership [. . . ] and it has much to do with practices of organizing semi-permanent
groups of workers and encouraging them to interact socially as well as at work.” (Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1992, p.42). While Milgrom and Roberts then continue down the
neo-classical route, positing a selfish, rational actor framework, with the progress made
by behavioral economic research we can begin to more carefully study the content of
their statement. In this spirit, we include the possibility for HRM practices to influence
reciprocal behavior in our model by modifying the reciprocity parameter η.
Without tapping into the vast nature versus nurture debate in detail, it can be stated
that the assumption of stability of preferences in economics and of personality traits in
psychology has been heavily challenged in recent years (Woods et al., 2013). Albeit the
trait approach of personality has been the prevalent paradigm for the last eighty years, it
is being criticized by scholars putting characteristics of the situation at center stage (e.g.,
Mischel and Shoda, 1995). In economics, the assumption of stable preferences has been
scrutinized as well (see, e.g., Bowles, 1998). In light of all those issues, we argue that
preferences that matter most in the work context may at least to a degree be subject
to change by HRM practices in a firm. For instance, specific aspects of work design,
like fostering intense team work, may affect preferences, in particular, strengthen pre-
existing social preferences.
When conceptualizing how one could incorporate HRM practices in the relatively gen-
eral model framework outlined above, one can think of several different ways to do so,
each with different theoretical and empirical implications. Here, we focus on ways of
influencing the employee’s reciprocal motivation, η, by HRM practices like team build-
ing, empowerment, or delegation of decision rights. In a similar vein, Pfeffer (2007)
stresses that there are certain types of high-commitment HRM practices that serve to
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activate reciprocal motivation. These include investments in training, information shar-
ing, or decentralized decision making as signals of trust. As a consequence, we have to
think of η as consisting of two parts – the agent’s inherent concern for reciprocity, η1, as
well as a second malleable part that can be influenced by HRM, η2. Depending on how
these two factors interact, different predictions can be derived from the model.
To fix ideas, consider a multiplicative model: η = η1 × η2.12 For simplification, we
assume that the agents’ preference types are known. We substitute η in Proposition 1.2
and derive comparative statics by taking the derivative of the optimal bonus payment:
∂b
∂η2
= − η1∆π∆ER
(∆π + η1η2∆ERπH)
2
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)
< 0.
Here, the interplay of the two reciprocal factors is complex, which can be seen when
considering the second and cross-derivative:
∂2b
∂η22
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2η21∆π (∆ER)
2 πH
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= −∆π∆ER (∆π − η1η2∆ERπH)
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While the former is globally positive, the latter is only positive for a threshold value
of η1η2 > ∆π/∆ERπH , i.e., for a sufficient amount of reciprocal motivation already
present. This hints at a separation of cases – below the threshold, investments in η2 will
hardly reduce the bonus payment necessary and are thus not profitable for the firm,
while investment for levels above the threshold pay off. To illustrate this relationship,
consider the situation that the firm has the opportunity to implement a training program
that is known to increase η2 from 1 to 1.5, but that has implementation costs of $ 1,000.
Note that the investment decision cannot be made without considering the level of η1:
when it is small, the optimal bonus payment will only decrease by a small amount
that does not exceed $ 1,000. For a large enough η1, however, the increase of η2 by
12 See Appendix A.2 for an additive modeling, η = η1 + η2, and the discussion of its implications.
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Figure 1.3: Optimal bonus dependent on η in multiplicative model
Notes: The figure depicts the optimal bonus as function of η1 and η2, the parameters captur-
ing the innate reciprocal inclination of a worker and the HRM policies targeted at increasing
this reciprocal inclination towards the firm, for a multiplicative formulation η = η1 × η2.
0.5 will result in a bonus decrease that exceeds $ 1,000 – in the former case, the firm
optimally does not invest, while in the latter case, it does, although the effectiveness of
the training itself has not changed. In this way, a higher level of η1 increases marginal
returns from investing in η2, which reflects the complementarity definition given above.
This relationship is also depicted graphically in Figure 1.3.
It is evident that the firm can foster reciprocal reactions of their employees by investing
into practices that increase η2 as long as the employee has an inherent concern for
reciprocity at all (η1 > 0). Again, it is important to note that the strength of this
influence and hence the decrease of the necessary bonus payment depend on the level of
the agent’s inherent concern for reciprocity. In other words, η1 and η2 are complements
and thus interdependent.
Implications. Modeling employees’ preferences and preference enhancing HRM poli-
cies as complements makes thinking about these investments more complicated (and
interesting). When the ex ante level of overall reciprocal motivation is low, either be-
cause the workforce selected has a low concern for reciprocity or because there are no
other investments in the form of HRM practices, additional investment does not lead
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to significant gains in terms of lower bonus payments for the firm and is hence hardly
profitable. In contrast, when ex ante reciprocal motivation is already above a certain
threshold, gains from increasing investment in either dimension are larger. Phrased
differently, as η1 is related to hiring practices used in personnel selection, these prac-
tices are complementary to practices that directly increase η2. As an application, one
could think of using a selection process focused on screening for reciprocal agents and
utilizing work design to influence reciprocity, for instance, by granting high discretion
(cf. Pfeffer, 2007). This is then optimally complemented by a flat, generous incentive
scheme.
Conclusions from the Model
To conclude and sum up the insights from modeling a simple contracting situation with
reciprocally motivated agents, we have seen that the composition of the workforce and
the effect of HRM practices are interdependent. In this respect, the design of incentive
schemes and the effects from selection and matching cannot be treated separately. This
in turn suggests that those practices are indeed complements yielding potential convex
returns in terms of organizational performance and ultimately explanatory power for
disaggregating PPDs.
Before going on by broadening our focus, we now discuss in what way this model (and
behavioral contracting models in general) can yield testable predictions and thus help
exploring complementarities of HRM practices. Of course, by incorporating individual
preferences, the need to observe both these and individual-level outcomes is evident,
something which is hard to observe in field settings.13 However, in our opinion, this
is an excellent example for a case where there is a clear role for laboratory and field
experiments that make it possible to test specific mechanisms in a clean manner and
to measure individual preferences using behavioral outcomes, which matters especially
when individual heterogeneity comes into play (see Cohn et al., 2015, for an argument
13 However, economic researchers are beginning to incorporate measures for individual preferences
like reciprocity, risk attitudes or patience in large administrative data sets like the G-SOEP (see, e.g.,
Dohmen et al., 2009, 2011), which makes it possible to investigate related questions using field data.
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along these lines). This then, in the spirit of a feedback loop, can inform larger-scale
empirical approaches using administrative data.
1.3.2 Other Aspects
As already stated right at the beginning of this section and hinted at in the last para-
graphs, we use social preferences of workers as an illustrative example to support our
case that behavioral economics has much to contribute when it comes to complemen-
tarities of HRM practices. However, of course social preferences are not the only be-
havioral aspect of potential relevance in this field. Possible topics for future research
incorporating complementarities of HRM practices will involve further areas of behav-
ioral economics research. Besides social preferences, which have probably been studied
most extensively, there are also various other concepts yielding insights that are likely
to matter in this setting. We aim at demonstrating this point by first highlighting that
the general mechanisms we demonstrated cannot only be found for social preferences,
but rather appear to be more general, at least when utilizing a broader interpretation
of the model, and then giving a brief overview of research in other areas in behavioral
economics that we perceive as relevant.
Broader Interpretations of the Model
In the following, we consider some ways in which our framework can be thought of in
a more general way, indicating that we are hinting at a more general pattern. There
are two aspects we want to stress: first, our results can be compared to arguments from
identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005). Second, as already noted above,
despite the fact that the standard agency model incorporates monetary benefits and we
also frame our model in this terms, incentives do not have to be defined as being purely
monetary.
Identity. Although we define the non-standard motivation of agents in our model as the
agent being reciprocally motivated, many of our arguments are parallel to arguments of
the identity literature. For instance, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) also explore the role of
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identity as supplement to monetary compensation by incorporating identity utility that
depends on the deviation from norms and ideals. They derive a result that is similar
to ours: being an insider leads to a reduced wage differential. When relating their
model to the workplace, the authors explicitly define that the dichotomy of insiders and
outsiders can be thought of as the dichotomy of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in
management. Here, modern approaches like investments in corporate culture aim at
aligning the goals of workers with those of the firm, essentially trying to shift workers
from being outsiders to being insiders.
In a more general sense, our formulation – based on Englmaier and Leider (2012a) – like
the identity formulation of Akerlof and Kranton (2005), the model incorporating trust
by Sliwka (2007), or the theoretical formulations incorporating motivated agents (e.g.,
Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Cassar, 2014), can all be thought of as the utility representa-
tion of workers internalizing the firm’s goals. In this respect, the aspect of motivation
that is influenced by HRM practices, η2 in our model, can be reinterpreted as investment
into category affiliation, or, exactly like in the identity framework, as investments into
goal alignment. The only differences between the models are then the way of thinking
about the underlying mechanism and the underlying inherent motivation of the agents.
Again, differentiating between the explanations and carving out the underlying mecha-
nism is ultimately an empirical task with a clear-cut role for lab and field experimental
investigation.
Benefits. As already briefly noted at the beginning of Section 1.3, narrowly interpreted,
the model (as well as the standard agency model) describes a situation in which a
monetary payment, the wage, is exchanged for effort exertion by the agent. However,
interpreting the model in a broader sense is possible. All the formulations are essentially
set up in utility terms; hence, one could also think about the bonus as any benefit for the
agent generating a utility rent and about effort exertion as everything that is beneficial
for the company, which includes, for instance, retention of the employee.
Again, this way of generalizing the model has numerous empirical implications. Natu-
rally, thinking about the problem in this generalized way means that it loses structure,
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but also again highlights the role of experiments to identify which benefits can substi-
tute for money and which actions of the agent can substitute for effort – and, ultimately,
to clarify the intricate relationship between different types of incentives and benefits (cf.
Oyer, 2008).
Other Areas of Study from Behavioral Economics of Particular Relevance
Besides the aspects of social preferences discussed above, there are also other interesting
areas within the field of behavioral economics that might prove useful for thinking about
HRM practices and possible complementarities.
First, there is an increasing number of papers focusing on different types of non-monetary
incentives in work relations. This includes research on a variety of different aspects, for
example, on the broad area of “respect” (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007). Here, some
authors have focused on exploring the role of spontaneous recognition for employee
performance (e.g., Chen et al., 2010; Bradler et al., 2013; Hoogveld and Zubanov,
2014), which is proposed to work through conformity to a performance norm (Bern-
heim, 1994). Similarly, status incentives in general, i.e., non-pecuniary rewards for
good performance like medals, prizes, awards, or job titles, have gained some interest
in recent research and have been examined both theoretically (e.g., Besley and Ghatak,
2008; Auriol and Renault, 2008) and empirically (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2014; Charness
et al., 2014; Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011; Gubler et al., 2013). Proposed mecha-
nisms for these kinds of incentives to work are that their value is based on scarcity
and the human tendency to crave for social status and recognition (Besley and Ghatak,
2008). Related to that and the literature on tournaments, several researchers have also
been exploring the role of relative rank as a motivator (e.g., Azmat and Iriberri, 2010;
Bandiera et al., 2015a; Barankay, 2011a,b; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2011). Other
topics include job characteristics like perceived meaningfulness of tasks (e.g., Ariely
et al., 2008; Grant, 2008) or (lack of) discretion (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Dickinson
and Villeval, 2008).
Summing up, all of these studies find that there are several other ways for principals to
motivate their workers than pure incentive pay. These “new” HRM tools are of course
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very interesting in themselves, but so far, this area of research is mostly comprised of
studies that look at one tool in isolation without incorporating a whole system of prac-
tices. As with evidence on social preferences, the scope for exploring complementarities
between those practices then is very limited. From our perspective, more comprehensive
studies incorporating whole systems of HRM practices are needed to address possible
complementarities.14
In addition, some researchers have also begun to look into personality traits – mostly the
“Big Five” (agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, extroversion, and openness)
– and find that these also interact with outcome dimensions like inherent motivation
and productivity (e.g., Segal, 2012). As with heterogeneous social preferences, firms’
optimal systems of HRM practices are likely to depend crucially on workforce composi-
tion with respect to these traits.
Furthermore, within behavioral economics in general, there are a few other topics
that we think of as promising. There is an important body of research on time in-
consistent preferences of agents that lead to self-control problems and procrastination
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a,b). Here, one major insight is that sophisticates, i.e.,
those agents who know about their time inconsistency and seek to avoid it, might ac-
tively search for commitment devices, and firms that know about the problem of time
inconsistency might in turn desire to employ sophisticates. As a consequence, offering
commitment devices might be one strategy for achieving this. Examples include up or
out schemes, conditional training or rotation schemes, or gym memberships15, which
can all be interpreted in this way (see Englmaier et al., 2015, for an attempt to cap-
ture this idea theoretically within a long-term employment contracting framework). In
addition, non-standard beliefs like overoptimism and overconfidence might also matter
when thinking about interrelations between HRM practices (see, e.g., Larkin and Leider,
14 Recent exceptions include Bartling et al. (2012) and Kosfeld et al. (2014).
15 This might not seem comparable to the aforementioned practices at first glance. However, gym
membership and attendance have been in the focus of studying time inconsistent behavior in the
field. At the same time, gym memberships are a prime example for non-wage benefits employers are
offering with increasing frequency and attract specific types of workers (cf. Lazear and Shaw, 2007).
See Oyer (2008) for a discussion of factors that influence firms’ benefit choices.
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2012; Sautmann, 2013). However, note that in this areas, as well as in other sub-fields
of behavioral economics research, insights almost exclusively stem from experiments
conducted in laboratory settings, with few firm data available so far. Here, perhaps
even more than in the area of social preferences, it is crucial to push for comprehensive
multi-level field data to understand the prevalence and patterns of practices in the field.
1.3.3 Interim Conclusion
Throughout this section, we have made the point that enriching theoretical models with
behavioral aspects has several important implications for the study of complementary
HRM practices.
Note that, in general, adding agents with heterogeneous, non-standard preferences to
the problem will make the contracting environment become more complicated because
all of these preferences are relatively difficult to measure, while firms’ optimal strate-
gies crucially depend on the composition of the workforce. Hence, HRM practices that
decrease those information asymmetries and in turn increase matching quality are also
a potential source of complementary HRM practices. To achieve this, firms can utilize
various methods – they can screen workers by offering menus of contracts and let them
self-select into occupations, or carefully test and screen applicants. Another method
would be to just ask current employees to suggest fitting applicants, or, in other words,
request referrals. Recently, this mechanism has been receiving increased attention by
several field experiments focusing either on different types of incentives for providing
referrals (Beaman and Magruder, 2012), performance differences between referred vs.
unreferred employees (Pallais and Sands, 2016) or other organizational relevant out-
comes such as turnover (Burks et al., 2015). Summing up, these studies emphasize that
efficient matching of types matters and in turn may be a reason for the use of referrals.
However, the aforementioned studies focus solely on referrals and therefore are silent
about other HRM practices that firms employ. In contrast to that, our model predictions
rely on the interactions between practices, and complementarities seem to be impor-
tant for productivity outcomes. Consequentially, more research that explicitly refers to
the complementarities between HRM practices and the role of screening in general and
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referral hiring in particular is needed.
1.4 Outlook
For answering the more general question how the potential explanatory power of HRM
practices can best be studied, we suggest combining different methods and angles.
Within this general agenda, WMS-style cross-sectional studies are important as they
map correlations and identify effective clusters of practices; to do so, in light of the
above suggested role for behavioral insights, the scope of these cross-sectional studies
has to be broadened to capture a wide set of practices employing a measurement model
to assess potential complementarities. In parallel, insider-econometric style studies help
to provide in-depth insight into what matters in specific firms. In addition to these ap-
proaches, we argue that, in a first step, it is important to develop solid theoretical
models yielding testable predictions, in particular including behavioral constructs. In a
second step, these predictions are tested using both laboratory and field experiments to
establish causality for theoretically suggested mechanisms.
One example for how we envision research on organizations, management practices
and interactions to progress is the Organizations Research Group (ORG)16, an initiative
at the University of Munich with the goal to explicitly study these topics by combining
theory, lab and field experiments, and large-scale survey data. Hence, an important
feature of ORG is the Organizational Observatory (O2), a large-scale survey that aims
at collecting rich primary data on organizations, their structure and design, with an
emphasis on management practices that have not been studied extensively in the WMS,
while striving for comparable data quality by utilizing the same survey methodology.
Already started and being continuously improved, O2 is ultimately planned to have a
panel structure and to combine firm-level data on practices with employee-level data.17
Beyond generating survey data, ORG also has the aim to serve as hub for field exper-
16 http://www.organizations-research-group.uni-muenchen.de/index.html
17 Related to this, we want to stress that there are some other groups of researchers that try to inves-
tigate the same kinds of questions by producing high-quality, detailed data; one example for this is
the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP) that combines firm- and employee-level data (see Kampkötter and
Sliwka, 2016, in this volume).
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iments with and in firms. In combination with method-based training for graduate
students through structured graduate programs like the “International Graduate Pro-
gram Evidence-Based Economics"18, ORG provides expertise for interested firms and
organizations to conduct randomized interventions. Thus, we hope for ORG to be an
integral part of the integrated research on organizations that we envision in the future.
Summing up, by investigating the role of HRM practices for explaining persistent pro-
ductivity differences and exploring the concept of complementarities between them, we
have shown that integrating different research strands and employing different meth-
ods helps to gain new insights and to understand the field more thoroughly. Especially
for the role of complementarities of HRM practices, we have demonstrated how linking
seemingly unrelated results from behavioral economics research on social preferences
can be fruitful for further research in this area. However, by giving an overview of dif-
ferent issues and upcoming topics like determinants of productivity and referral hiring,
we have also highlighted that more research, and especially more comprehensive firm
data, are needed.
To conclude, we briefly sketch the virtuous feedback cycle we envision to evolve be-
tween differing research methodologies. Consider the following example: cross-sectional
studies like the WMS, the LPP, or O2 provide the possibility to relate within-firm patterns
to market-level characteristics like market structure or the intensity of competition. So
far, models on behavioral aspects have been largely silent on this topic that is likely
to have important effects on internal organization choices, which is why we hope that
empirical findings from these surveys will stipulate theoretical research. Again, this
theorizing will generate new predictions that have to be tested empirically. Here, ex-
perimental studies have the role to causally establish hypothesized mechanisms, while
insider econometrics studies and new modules in surveys can again help to identify
practices and complementarities among them.
18 http://evidence-based-economics.de/home.html
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Chapter 2
What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal
Provision of Incentives over the Course of Ca-
reers∗
2.1 Motivation
Humans reciprocate. They repay kindness with kindness and hostility with hostility.
Several possible explanations exist for why individuals display reciprocal behavior, the
most prominent ones being inherent preferences for reciprocity and repeated interac-
tion (see Sobel, 2005, for an overview). Whereas inherent preferences for reciprocity
reflect the idea that an individual can enjoy additional utility when returning favors
he or she has received (based on the gift exchange concept, Akerlof, 1982), repeated
interaction can give rise to reciprocal behavior even if individuals only care about their
own material payoffs. A vast amount of evidence supports both drivers of reciprocal
behavior, however mostly trying to isolate one from the other.
In this paper, we address the questions whether inherent preferences for reciprocity are
also relevant in long-term employment relationships, and if and how they affect rela-
tional contracts, where repeated interaction generates incentives. We show that both
kinds of incentives do interact with each other in an optimal incentive system, and that
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Matthias Fahn and Anne Schade.
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their relative importance depends on the career phase: At early stages, incentives gener-
ated by repeated interaction are more important because more future rents can be used
to provide incentives. At later stages, reciprocity-based incentives become more and
more important and gradually replace repeated-game incentives. However, reciprocal
preferences are still important early on. First, they reduce an employee’s effective effort
costs. Second, they relax the employer’s enforceability constraint which determines its
commitment in the relational contract. Therefore, reciprocity-based and repeated-game
incentives are dynamic substitutes, but complements at any given point in time.
After deriving these – and other – results within a theoretical model, we test its implica-
tions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). As predicted, we find
evidence for a positive effect of reciprocity on effort, and that this effect is stronger for
older employees. These results indicate that reciprocity-based as well as repeated-game
incentives interact in real-world incentive systems.
More precisely, we develop a dynamic principal-agent model with a finite time horizon.
Effort is observable but not verifiable, and yields a verifiable output measure. Standard
spot contracts based on output are feasible, but necessarily associated with a rent going
to the agent. Furthermore, the agent reacts reciprocally towards any voluntary rent,
i.e., any unconditional wage payment. We first show that static spot contracts either
take the form of a standard “bonus contract” (with a wage of zero) or – if the agent’s
preferences for reciprocity are sufficiently strong – of a “reciprocity contract” (with no
bonuses). Next, we take into account that repeated-game incentives based on effort can
also be provided by using a so-called relational contract. Here, the principal promises
a bonus based on exertion of the desired effort level. Because effort is not verifiable,
the principal’s promise must be credible, which is the case if paying the promised effort-
based bonus triggers sufficiently higher continuation profits than refusing to do so. In
our case, this can be achieved despite a finite time horizon, because we assume that
once promises made in the relational contract are reneged on, the agent’s preferences
for reciprocity towards the principal disappear. Therefore, the principal can be punished
for reneging if a reciprocity contract is optimal in a spot relationship – because upon
reneging, she only has the option to use (less profitable) bonus spot contracts.
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Generally, the enforceability of effort in the relational contract is determined by a so-
called dynamic enforcement constraint, which states that the effort-based bonus must
not exceed the difference between future discounted profits on and off the equilibrium
path. This yields a first source of complementarity between relational and reciprocity
contracts because the principal has more to lose from reneging if the difference between
profits generated by a reciprocity contract and the profits generated by a bonus contract
in the last period is larger. Therefore, the relational contract can implement higher effort
if the agent’s preferences for reciprocity are more pronounced. Moreover, there exist
two additional channels how the agent’s reciprocal inclinations amplify the performance
of the relational contract. First, receiving an extra rent effectively reduces the agent’s
effort costs. Therefore, it is optimal for the principal to always pay a fixed wage. Second,
a binding dynamic enforcement constraint is relaxed and more effort can consequently
be implemented with a higher fixed wage. All this implies that incentives triggered
by reciprocal preferences and relational contracts are complements at any given point
in time. However, they are dynamic substitutes in a sense that – as time proceeds –
repeated-game incentives which are utilized by the relational contract are gradually
replaced by reciprocal incentives. This is because the dynamic enforcement constraint is
automatically tightened as time moves on (less remaining periods reduce the difference
between the principal’s on- and off-path continuation profits), and a tighter constraint
amplifies the benefits of reciprocity-based incentives.
The optimal incentive scheme has implemented effort at its highest level in early stages
of the employment relationship, where it remains until the dynamic enforcement con-
straint starts to bind. Then, the principal’s reduced credibility effectively constrains her
ability to pay a sufficiently high effort-based bonus. This decreases implementable ef-
fort, which in turn lets the principal respond with an increase of the fixed wage in order
to mitigate the necessary effort reduction. Overall, however, a binding dynamic enforce-
ment constraint reduces equilibrium effort because implementing an additional unit is
then more expensive with reciprocity-based incentives than with relational incentives.
Therefore, although these two are dynamic substitutes, the substitution is incomplete.
Concluding, once the dynamic enforcement constraint starts binding, effort gradually
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decreases and reaches its lowest level in the last period of the game. The effort reduc-
tion goes hand in hand with a gradual increase of the fixed wage.
We explore the empirical validity of our theoretical results using representative survey
data on ~8,000 employees from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We utilize
the fact that in the 2005 wave of the survey, the SOEP included measures of intrinsic
reciprocity. Our approach follows Dohmen et al. (2009), who use overtime as a proxy
for non-contractible effort and show that reciprocal inclinations are linked to high ef-
fort, high wages, and general life success. Their results hence support the notion that
reciprocal preferences help to enforce effort. However, because the SOEP does not con-
tain information on actual incentives systems, Dohmen et al. (2009) do not explore the
extent to which reciprocal preferences are optimally utilized in a firm’s incentive system
– in particular in interaction with repeated-game incentives. Our model, though, allows
to draw conclusions from observable outcomes on actually used incentive systems, be-
cause we derive that reciprocal inclinations and repeated interaction take on different
roles in different stages of a career. More precisely, we develop the following predictions
in Section 2.3: First, we predict that an individual with stronger reciprocal preferences
is expected to exert more effort, and, second, that effort is decreasing over time. Third,
we predict that the positive effect of reciprocal preferences on effort becomes stronger
over the course of an employment relationship. This prediction directly follows from re-
ciprocal and relational incentives being dynamic substitutes: At later stages of a career,
the incentive system puts more weight on reciprocal incentives, in particular for individ-
uals with more pronounced preferences for intrinsic reciprocity. Therefore, equilibrium
effort responds more strongly to reciprocal preferences later on.
Furthermore, we use the agent’s realized utility levels to derive empirical predictions.
The SOEP contains a measure on an individual’s job satisfaction, which we argue is a
good proxy for utility experienced in the employment relationship. Our model predicts
that more reciprocal individuals enjoy higher levels of job satisfaction, that it increases
over time, and in particular that the positive effect of reciprocal preferences on satisfac-
tion becomes stronger over the course of an employment relationship.
Our empirical analysis, conducted in Section 2.4, largely confirms our model’s predic-
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Figure 2.1: Predictive marginal effects of positive reciprocity
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Notes: The figure plots predicted marginal changes of the propensity to work overtime at
different levels of positive reciprocity depending on age group (left panel) and retirement
propensity (right panel), holding all other factors constant. Error bars indicate 95% confi-
dence intervals.
tions. More specifically, we are able to show that while positive reciprocity generally
has a positive effect on the propensity to work overtime – a result that corresponds to
those reported by Dohmen et al. (2009) –, this effect is much more pronounced for
older workers and workers who indicate that they are close to retirement. For example,
when including an interaction term between reciprocity and a dummy indicating that
an employee is at least 60 years old, we find that the positive effect of positive reci-
procity is much more pronounced for workers above the age cutoff. This is illustrated
in Figure 2.1, which depicts the predicted marginal effects of positive reciprocity on the
propensity to work overtime as proxy for effort in the subsamples.
Furthermore, when estimating the effect of reciprocity on job satisfaction, our predic-
tions are largely confirmed; in particular, the effect of positive reciprocity on job satis-
faction is larger for individuals who are close to retirement.
In Section 2.4.2, we explore alternative specifications. First, we show that our results
are robust to different specifications of the propensity to work overtime, in particular
if only unpaid overtime is considered (our main specifications follows Dohmen et al.
(2009) and includes all forms of overtime). Second, we explore the intensive margin
of effort by using overtime hours instead of only a binary question whether individuals
have worked overtime or not. Finally, we also use data from 2010 and 2015, where
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reciprocity was again included in the SOEP. There, we still observe the expected patterns
and can thus exclude that those are mainly driven by cohort effects.
Finally, note that a specific age cutoff (we use 60 in our main specification) is not crucial
for our results. We present results for a large number of specifications (for different age
cutoffs, overtime measures, or included survey waves). Whereas significance levels
differ among the specifications, all of them indicate that preferences for reciprocity
assume a larger role in later stages of a career.
Before introducing our theoretical model, we now give an overview of literature rele-
vant for our research question.
Related Literature
The deviation from the assumptions of self-interest and greed is one of the most robust,
thoroughly researched, fundamentals in the field of behavioral economics (DellaVigna,
2009). There, inference on intrinsic reciprocity is based on Akerlof’s conceptual idea
of gift exchange, i.e., that employees exert voluntary effort if they feel well treated by
firms (Akerlof, 1982). Seminal work by Fehr et al. (1993, 1998) attempts at testing the
gift-exchange paradigm experimentally and has inspired a plethora of research that es-
tablishes the prevalence of the norm of reciprocity (see, e.g., Camerer and Weber, 2013,
for an overview of existing experimental research). This is important for organizations
because the existence of reciprocal individuals has the potential to influence the em-
ployment relationship in fundamental ways. However, employment relationships are
inherently dynamic, and most of the approaches identifying reciprocal preferences have
been careful in muting all incentives potentially stemming from repeated interaction.
Some recent experimental studies have started to address this issue by disentangling
strategic (i.e., generated by repeated interaction) and intrinsic motives for cooperation.
Reuben and Suetens (2012) use an infinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma to assess the
relative importance of strategic motives and intrinsic reciprocity and find that cooper-
ation is mostly driven by strategic concerns. Similarly, Dreber et al. (2014) find that
strategic motives seem to be more important than social preferences in an infinitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Cabral et al. (2014) conduct an infinitely repeated veto
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game to distinguish between different explanations for generous behavior. They find
strategic motives to be the predominant motivation, but present evidence for the im-
portance of intrinsic reciprocity as well.
Hence, experimental evidence suggests that repeated-game incentives are not only rel-
evant in situations of repeated interaction, but rather seem to be the dominant mode to
support cooperation. However, to understand how cooperation is achieved in long-term
employment relationships, and in particular if and how incentive systems respond to the
existence of reciprocal preferences, real-world evidence is needed. As described above,
Dohmen et al. (2009) use data on individual-level survey measures for reciprocity from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), and show that reciprocal inclinations are
linked to high effort, high wages, and general life success. Moreover, based on a double
moral-hazard problem that can be overcome with promotion incentives for reciprocal
agents, Dur et al. (2010) follow Dohmen et al. (2009) and use data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to show that reciprocal preferences are linked to perfor-
mance appraisals, which serve as a proxy for promotion incentives. Furthermore, ex-
isting papers have linked firm-level proxies for reciprocity, like screening for work ethic
or personality, to management practices and outcomes such as monitoring, teamwork,
wage levels, and firm productivity. These papers provide at least suggestive evidence for
the importance of reciprocity in employment relationships (Huang and Cappelli, 2010;
Englmaier et al., 2016). Conducting field experiments, Bellemare and Shearer (2009,
2011) show that monetary gifts increase effort in a real-world working environment.
The theoretical literature on intrinsic reciprocity can be arranged along the lines whether
reciprocal behavior is triggered by intentions or by outcomes, i.e., whether one coun-
terpart’s preferences for reciprocity can be used strategically. In the already-mentioned
work by Akerlof (1982) – probably the first to formally model the idea of intrinsic reci-
procity – employees are willing to exert additional effort if they are paid more than
the market-clearing wage. Hence, firms can strategically raise wages in order to induce
their employees to work harder. Applying this idea to a moral hazard framework, En-
glmaier and Leider (2012a) show that generous compensation can be a substitute for
performance-based pay. On the other hand, Rabin (1993) argues that the perceived
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kindness of an action should be the driving force to induce reciprocal behavior. He de-
velops the techniques for incorporating intentions into game theory. Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) apply these techniques to extensive games and explicitly account for
the sequential structure of the respective games. Netzer and Schmutzler (2014) show
that if only intentions matter, a self-interested firm cannot benefit from its employees’
reciprocal preferences.
Whereas these two approaches assume that either only outcomes or only intentions
are relevant, there is vast evidence that both aspects matter. Gneezy et al. (2000),
Charness and Rabin (2002), or Falk et al. (2008) (among many others) present results
that can be explained only if both aspects, fairness intentions as well as preferences
for the distribution of outcomes, are taken into account. Falk and Fischbacher (2006a)
develop a theory incorporating both aspects. They assume that an action is perceived
as kind if the opponent has the option to treat someone less kind. Hence, intentions
matter, however reciprocity can also be used strategically.
We build upon these ideas and assume that reciprocity is triggered by a generous wage
and hence can be used strategically. However, intentions matter as well because only
non-contingent payments matter, and because the agent’s inclination to reciprocate dis-
appears once the principal has broken any implicit promise made in the past.
We also contribute to the literature on relational contracts – self-enforcing, dynamic
agreements based on non-verifiable information. Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1989) derive relational contracts with observable effort, whereas Levin (2003)
shows that those also take a rather simple form in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion with respect to effort and the agent’s characteristics. Malcomson (2013) delivers
an extensive overview of relational contracts. Within this broader area, few papers have
started to investigate how relational contracts and social preferences interact: Dur and
Tichem (2015) incorporate social preferences into a model of relational contracts. They
show that altruism undermines the credibility of termination threats which may reduce
productivity and utilities. Contreras and Zanarone (2017) assume that employees suf-
fer when their formal wage is below that of their colleagues. They show that these
“social comparison costs” can be managed by having a homogeneous formal gover-
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nance structure, while achieving necessary customizations through relational contracts.
To the best of our best knowledge, we are the first to incorporate intrinsic preferences
for reciprocity into a relational contracting framework. This allows us to derive specific
predictions with respect to the interaction and relative importance of repeated-game
incentives and reciprocity in an optimal incentive scheme. In light of the somewhat
conflicting evidence on the interaction of the two mechanisms, we show that both are
dynamic substitutes, but complements at any given point in time.
On a more general note, various papers have been investigating how agents with stan-
dard preferences respond to the (potential) existence of reciprocal agents. Kreps et al.
(1982) form the basis for the notion that repeated-game incentives amplify intrinsic
reciprocity (for an overview, see Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). The authors show that
uncertainty about the presence of reciprocal types is enough for selfish types to ratio-
nally imitate reciprocal behavior in a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. An-
dreoni and Miller (1993) and, utilizing gift-exchange games, Gächter and Falk (2002)
present experimental evidence that is in line with this conception. Fehr et al. (2009a)
also make a case for the complementary effects of reciprocal preferences and reputa-
tion. They state that cooperation is usually way more pronounced in repeated than in
one-shot interaction and claim that this is due to selfish types imitating fair types.
We complement these arguments by showing that the positive effect of a long-run in-
teraction on cooperation does not have to rely on signaling, but can also be generated
by the optimal incentive scheme designed for individuals with reciprocal preferences.
2.2 Theoretical Model
2.2.1 Model Setup
Environment and Technology
There is one risk-neutral principal (“she”) and one risk-neutral agent (“he”). At the
beginning of every period t ∈ {1, ..., T}, with 1 < T < ∞, the principal makes an
employment offer to the agent. If the agent accepts the offer, he chooses an effort level
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et ≥ 0, which is associated with effort costs c(e) = e3/3.1 Furthermore, effort determines
the probability with which a positive output – that is subsequently consumed by the
principal – is realized. More precisely, the output is yt ∈ {0, θ}, with Prob(yt = θ) = et.
Below, we will impose further assumptions to always guarantee an interior solution. If
the agent rejects the offer, both players consume their exogenous outside options which
are set to zero for simplicity.
Payments, Information & Contracts
The employment offer includes a prospective compensation package. It consists of a
fixed wage wt and discretionary bonus payments. An output-based bonus bt is supposed
to be paid if yt = θ (it is without loss of generality to assume that no output-based
bonus is paid if yt = 0), an effort-based bonus Bt is supposed to be paid if the principal’s
requested effort level is chosen by the agent.
The output realization yt is verifiable, and formal spot contracts can be used to en-
force payment of bt. Effort can be observed by both parties, however is not verifiable.
Therefore, payment of Bt can only be enforced within a self-enforcing dynamic arrange-
ment, a so-called relational contract. The agent is protected by limited liability, hence
wt, bt ≥ 0 (this assumption is not needed for most of our results).
Note that the agent’s compensation, consisting of wt, bt, and Bt, does not only have
to contain monetary components. It is a rather common perception in the literature on
relational contracts (and beyond) that money is not the only source of motivation inside
firms. For instance, Gibbons and Henderson (2012) conceive an individual’s payoffs
to include “everything that might affect an individual’s experience of his or her job,
including factors such as job assignment, degree of autonomy, status with the firm or
work group, and other intangibles such as feelings of belonging or that one is making a
difference” (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012, p. 1353). In the following, though, we will
stick to the terms wage and bonus payments when referring to the agent’s compensation
to keep descriptions straightforward.
1 We assume this specific functional form for analytical tractability. Other (convex) cost functions
would deliver similar results.
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Preferences and Equilibrium
Provided the agent has accepted the principal’s employment offer at the beginning of a
period t, and denoting the on-path effort level e∗t , the principal’s per-period profits on
the equilibrium path are
πt = e
∗
t (θ − bt)−Bt − wt.
The agent is also risk-neutral and in addition has preferences for reciprocity which are
activated by any non-contingent payment the agent receives and thus seemingly by fixed
wages. However, in general, a relational contract can either use current payments (in
the form of bonuses) or future rents to motivate current effort. We rule out that the
agent’s preferences for reciprocity are triggered by wages paid as a reward for past ef-
fort. It turns out that in our setting it is without loss of generality to assume that only
current bonus payments are used to incentivize the agent. Taking this into account,
the agent’s preferences for reciprocity are indeed activated by all fixed wage payments.
Then, upon accepting the principal’s offer, the agent’s per-period utility on the equilib-
rium path is
ut = e
∗
t bt +Bt + wt −
e3t
3
+ ηwte
∗
t θ.
The parameter η ∈ [0, ∞) captures the agent’s inherent preferences for reciprocity and
lets the principal’s output (potentially) enter his utility. Note that the agent’s preferences
for reciprocity in period t are only activated by wage payments received in period t, and
not by received past or expected future payments. Furthermore, η remains constant
across periods, with one exception. If the principal has promised to pay a bonus Bt
but reneges on that promise even though the agent has exerted the desired effort level,
η drops to zero in all subsequent periods. We discuss our assumptions concerning the
agent’s preferences for reciprocity in the following section.
Finally, principal and agent agent share the discount factor δ ≤ 1, and we can use the
following recursive formulations for players’ discounted payoff streams:
Πt =e
∗
t (θ − bt)−Bt − wt + δΠt+1
Ut =e
∗
t bt +Bt + wt − c(e∗t ) + ηwte∗t θ + δUt+1
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In what follows, we are interested in a subgame-perfect equilibrium that maximizes the
principal’s profits at the beginning of the game, Π1.
Discussion of Assumptions
Before deriving properties of a profit-maximizing subgame-perfect equilibrium, we dis-
cuss our assumptions regarding the agent’s preferences for reciprocity.
Our approach yields a hybrid between outcome- and intention-based reciprocity. On
the one hand, intentions are not formally considered. On the other hand, reciprocity
is only triggered by non-contingent payments and disappears once the principal breaks
a promise. A purely output-based formulation would not contain these two properties.
Therefore, our approach can generally be compared to Falk and Fischbacher (2006b),
where an individual’s reciprocal inclinations depend on outcomes, but also on the avail-
able options one’s counterpart has at hand. This takes into account empirical evidence
that while individuals respond to outcomes, intentions often matter as well (cf. Falk
et al., 2008; Fehr et al., 2009a; Camerer and Weber, 2013).
We also assume that reciprocity only enters the agent’s stage-game payoffs. However,
one might expect reciprocal inclinations to also depend on past events in the employ-
ment relationship. We capture this idea by letting η drop to zero after a deviation by
the principal as a simple way to take a potential history-dependence into account.
Furthermore, reciprocal behavior is triggered by a positive fixed wage (or put differ-
ently, by a wage that is above a reservation wage which is set to zero), and not by the
agent’s actual or perceived rent. This assumption is driven by two aspects: First, there
is evidence (in particular from the lab) that generous wages cause reciprocal behavior
even in the absence of performance-based incentives (cf. Fehr et al., 2009b; Charness
and Kuhn, 2011). Second, incentives often cannot be provided without granting the
agent a rent (for example, if the agent is protected by limited liability as in our case).
We do not want reciprocal behavior being caused by rents that the agent collects in any
case, but only by extra rents that the principal chooses to pay. Again, this relates to the
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idea that also intentions – and not only outcomes – are supposed to matter.2
The reciprocity term in the agent’s utility function also contains θ, and hence the extent
to which the principal benefits from the agent’s effort. This follows evidence pointing
out that an important factor for reciprocity is the agent’s assessment of the value gener-
ated for the principal (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010; Englmaier and Leider, 2012b).
Finally, we focus on positive reciprocity. In Section 2.5, we briefly discuss negative
reciprocity.
2.2.2 Formal Spot Contracts
We first derive a profit-maximizing spot contract and hence omit time subscripts. There,
in order to always guarantee an interior solution, we impose the technical assumptions
θ < 3 and ηθ
2
2
< 1. Besides serving as a benchmark, such a contract will also be offered
in period T , the last period of the game. In a spot contract, it is not possible to enforce
a bonus based on non-verifiable effort, hence B = 0. Therefore, the only means to
provide direct incentives is an output-based bonus b. Indirectly, though, the agent will
also be incentivized by a positive fixed wage w. Because of his inherent preferences for
reciprocity, a positive wage lets the output value also enter the agent’s utility. Then,
the agent’s and principal’s interests become partially aligned. Taking a slightly different
perspective, one might also regard positive values of w and η as triggering a reduction
of the agent’s effective effort to (e∗)3/3− ηwe∗θ.
Given b and w, and presuming he decides to work for the principal, the agent chooses
effort e∗ in order to maximize his per-period utility u = eb+ w − e3/3 + ηweθ. The con-
ditions for using the first order approach hold, hence the agent’s incentive compatibility
(IC) constraint gives
e∗ =
√
b+ ηwθ. (IC)
2 Note that we are not able to use an approach introduced by Englmaier and Leider (2012a). They as-
sume that the principal requests an effort level from the agent, and that the associated rent triggers
reciprocal behavior. Then, consistency between actual and requested effort is required in equilib-
rium. This consistency requirement could not be met in our setting because actual effort would
always be higher than requested effort (it is feasible in Englmaier and Leider (2012a) since they
assume that effort is binary).
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The principal sets b and w to maximize her expected per-period profits π = e∗ (θ − b)−w.
However, she has to take into account that accepting the contract must be optimal for
the agent. This is captured by the agent’s individual rationality (IR) constraint,
e∗b+ w − (e
∗)3
3
+ ηwe∗θ ≥ 0. (IR)
Furthermore, because of limited liability, payments must be non-negative.
Concluding, the principal’s problem is to
max
w,b
e∗ (θ − b)− w,
subject to (IR) and (IC) constraints, and w, b ≥ 0.
As a first result, we show that either only wages or bonus payments are used, not a
combination of both.
Lemma 2.1. Either bonus or wage payments are used to give incentives in a profit-maximizing
spot contract. More precisely, there exists a threshold η > 0 such that b > 0 and w = 0 for
η < η, and b = 0 and w > 0 for η ≥ η.
The proof, as well as all other omitted proofs, can be found in Appendix B.1.
Intuitively, bonus and wage payments are not used together because they are substi-
tutes in the principal’s profit function: For equilibrium effort e∗ =
√
b+ ηwθ, the cross-
derivative of per-period profits π with respect to w and b is negative. Put differently, for
any bonus level the marginal profitability of using a bonus is decreasing in the wage.
Therefore, either a pure bonus contract (b > 0 and w = 0) or a pure reciprocity contract
(b = 0 and w > 0) is implemented by the principal.3 When a reciprocity contract is used,
a higher value of η is associated with lower effective effort costs and consequently also
larger profits. Since the profitability of a bonus contract with a zero-wage is naturally
unaffected by the size of η, a reciprocity contract is optimal given a sufficiently high η.
3 However, note that this result is subject to the specific functional form of the agent’s effort cost
function – with other functional forms, bonus and wage payments might very well be used together.
Still, our further results would not be qualitatively affected in this case.
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Finally, note that profits under the bonus contract (π = 2θ
3
√
θ
3
) are strictly positive.
Therefore, the principal will make an employment offer to the agent in any case.
The positive relationship between intrinsic reciprocity η and outcomes in the reciprocity
contract is summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 2.1. Given η ≥ η and hence a reciprocity contract is used, de∗
dη
> 0, dπ
dη
> 0,
dw
dη
> 0, and dU
dη
> 0.
Proof. Using a reciprocity contract, outcomes are e∗ = ηθ2/2, π = ηθ
3
4
, w = ηθ3/4 and
U = ηθ
3
4
+ η
3θ6
12
, which all are increasing in η.
Finally, note that the agent always receives a rent, that is, U > 0 under both types of
contracts. This is straightforward for the reciprocity, but also for the bonus contract
because of the agent’s limited liability constraint. However, note that even without this
constraint (implying that using a bonus contract, the principal could extract the whole
rent), a reciprocity contract would eventually be optimal because of the associated re-
duction of effective effort costs. In this case, only the threshold η would be larger.
2.2.3 Relational Contracts
Now, we analyze how self-enforcing relational contracts based on effort can be used to
motivate the agent. The principal would generally prefer an effort-based over an output-
based contract because – as derived in the previous section – limited liability requires to
grant the agent a rent in the latter case. Two aspects are of particular interest, namely
the enforceability of relational contracts and whether and how they are affected by the
agent’s preferences for reciprocity. We will explore these aspects in the next subsections
and furthermore derive the properties of a profit-maximizing relational contract.
Preliminaries
Relational contracts are self-enforcing implicit arrangements between economic agents.
They work if the future surplus of continuing a cooperative relationship is sufficiently
large compared to the future surplus without cooperation. Informally speaking, in our
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setting, a relational contract involves a request from the principal to the agent to exert
an effort level e∗t (recall that effort can be observed by the principal), combined with a
promise to pay the reward Bt in return. However, it must be in the principal’s interest
to pay the bonus when supposed to do so, which is specified by a dynamic enforcement
(DE) constraint for every period t,
−Bt + δΠt+1 ≥ δΠ̃t+1. (DE)
Πt+1 describes the principal’s on-path and Π̃t+1 her off-path continuation profits. The
(DE) constraint captures the requirement that future on-path profits must be sufficiently
large compared to future off-path profits so that they offset today’s costs of paying the
bonus. Note that since the period-t output has already been realized and consumed, it is
not included in the (DE) constraint and hence considered as sunk by the principal when
making the decision whether or not to pay Bt. (DE) indicates that a bonus payment is
only feasible if Πt+1 > Π̃t+1, i.e., if future equilibrium play can be made contingent on
the principal’s current behavior.
Generally, relational contracts require a (potentially) infinite time horizon because of
a standard unraveling argument that can be applied once a predetermined last period
exists. Then, the equilibrium outcome in the last period is unique, implying the same
for all subsequent periods. In our case, however, the situation is different if the spot
reciprocity contract is (strictly) more profitable than the spot bonus contract, i.e., if
η > η. In this case, the principal’s behavior in a period t < T affects her future profits
because A) the optimal spot contract is implemented (at least) in period T , and B)
refusing to pay a promised bonus Bt lets η drop to zero. Therefore, the spot reciprocity
contract is not feasible anymore once the principal reneged on a promise, and reneging
is costly if η > η.
In addition, relational contracts are unfeasible once the principal refused to pay a
promised bonus (e.g., Abreu, 1988, shows that an observable deviation should be pun-
ished by a reversion to a player’s minmax-payoff). Hence, after a deviation by the prin-
50
RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND RECIPROCITY
cipal, spot bonus contracts are implemented in every subsequent period,4 and off-path
continuation profits are Π̃t =
∑T
τ=t δ
τ−t 2θ
3
√
θ
3
= 1−δ
T−t+1
1−δ
2θ
3
√
θ
3
.
For η ≤ η, equilibrium profits in period T are unique, hence relational contracts are
unfeasible, and the profit-maximizing spot bonus contract is implemented in every pe-
riod.5 Hence, to keep the analysis interesting, we will from now on assume that
η > η.
This assumption is backed by the data we use for our empirical analysis, where the
variable measuring positive reciprocity is relatively high for most individuals. The as-
sumption also implies that a relational contract does not involve an output-based bonus
bt because it is dominated by using a fixed wage. Therefore, incentives are potentially
given by a non-discretionary fixed wage wt and an effort-based bonus payment Bt.
As mentioned above, we also assume that in a given period t, the agent is only mo-
tivated by period-t payments. This assumption is without loss of generality, for the
following reasons: Generally, incentives in relational contracts can be provided via con-
tingent current or future payments. In a setting like ours, though, replacing contingent
future payments with the equivalent and appropriately discounted current amount does
neither affect today’s profits nor any constraints. Furthermore, sticking to current dis-
cretionary payments simplifies our analysis because the agent’s reciprocal preferences
are triggered only by unconditional payments. If a future wage was paid as a compen-
sation for previous effort, we would have to differentiate between wages that are paid
as a compensation for past effort and those that are not (if any fixed-wage payment
triggered reciprocal behavior, using wages would be effectively cheaper than bonus
payments, making it optimal to back-load wages as much as possible).
4 As those are profitable, subgame perfection implies no termination after a deviation.
5 We assume that no formal long-term contracts based on output realizations are feasible. This can
be endogenized by assuming that the principal is not able to commit to fire the agent. If she were
able to do so, a long-term contract involving a positive termination probability following a number
of low output realizations would yield higher profits than a series of spot contracts (Ohlendorf and
Schmitz, 2012; Fong and Li, 2017). Still, the possibility to write such a long-term contract would
have no qualitative effect on our results, in particular with respect to the impact of the agent’s
reciprocal preferences on a profit-maximizing agreement.
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Incentive Compatibility
The relational contract specifies an effort level e∗t the agent is supposed to exert on
the equilibrium path. He will do so if his (IC) constraint is satisfied. Before stating
this constraint, we have to specify what happens if he deviates in a period t. First, he
does not receive the period-t bonus Bt. Second, we assume that after a deviation by
the agent, the reciprocity parameter is not reduced but remains at η, and third, that
continuation play is not affected by the agent’s behavior. The second assumption is
not crucial for our results, but it seems more realistic to presume that the degree of
the agent’s reciprocal preferences only depends on the principal’s behavior. It implies
that if the agent deviates, he does not necessarily deviate to an effort level of zero.
The third assumption, however, is important because the agent’s rent under a sequence
of (spot) reciprocity contracts might be higher than under a relational contract (see
below). Therefore, if the agent’s behavior affected continuation play, and in particular if
a deviation triggered a breakdown of the relational contract, the agent might be tempted
to deviate in order to enjoy the higher rent of a sequence of reciprocity contracts in the
future.
Concluding, for any off-path effort level ẽt, the (IC) constraint equals
Bt + wt −
(e∗t )
3
3
+ ηwte
∗
t θ ≥ wt −
(ẽt)
3
3
+ ηwtẽtθ.
Subgame perfection implies that if the agent deviates, he will select an effort level
ẽt = argmax (−e3/3 + ηwteθ), i.e., ẽt =
√
ηwtθ. Hence, the (IC) constraint becomes
Bt −
(e∗t )
3
3
+ ηwte
∗
t θ ≥
2
(√
ηwtθ
)3
3
. (IC)
This implies that an (IR) constraint for the agent is automatically satisfied because his
per-period rent, Bt + wt − (e∗t )3/3 + ηwte∗t θ, is non-negative given the (IC) constraint.
Also note that e∗t ≥ ẽt (because Bt ≥ 0).
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The Complementarity of Relational and Reciprocity-Based Incentives
In this section, we derive some first results and show that reciprocity-based incentives
also improve the performance of the relational contract.
To simplify the principal’s problem, note that the (IC) constraint must bind in any profit-
maximizing equilibrium. If it did not bind, the bonus Bt could be slightly reduced,
which would increase profits and relax the (DE) constraint without violating the (IC)
constraint. This allows us to plug Bt = (e∗t )
3/3 − ηwte∗t θ + 2/3
(√
ηwtθ
)3 into the (DE)
constraint, which yields
(e∗t )
3
3
− ηwtθe∗t ≤ δ
(
Πt+1 − Π̃t+1
)
− 2
3
(√
ηwtθ
)3
. (DE)
The enforceability of relational contracts is generally determined by a comparison of to-
day’s effort costs with discounted future payoffs (compared to future deviation payoffs).
Only if the latter are large enough, they are sufficient to cover today’s costs of exerting
effort. Here, two additional terms enter which are implied by the agent’s preferences for
reciprocity; first, reciprocal preferences reduce the necessary bonus payment to achieve
a certain effort level e∗t ; second, if the agent deviates, he still selects a positive effort
level given the wage is positive.
Concluding, for η > η, the principal’s problem is to maximize
Π1 =
T∑
t=1
δt−1πt,
subject to a (DE) constraint for every period t, and subject to wt ≥ 0 ∀ t.6
The equilibrium is sequentially efficient, hence the problem is equivalent to maximizing
πt = etθ − Bt − wt = etθ −
(
(e∗t )
3/3− ηwte∗t θ + 2/3
(√
ηwtθ
)3) − wt in every period t,
subject to the relevant constraints.
After generally addressing the enforceability of a relational contract, we will now ana-
6 Note that in period T , the (DE) constraint equals (e
∗
T )
3
3 − ηwT θe
∗
T ≤ − 23
(√
ηwT θ
)3
, which for e∗T =√
ηwθ (the agent’s effort in a spot reciprocity contract) is trivially satisfied.
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lyze the relationship between reciprocal and effort-based incentives. To do so, we first
abstract from issues of enforceability. Put differently, we assume that the (DE) con-
straint does not bind, i.e., is satisfied for the principal’s preferred effort level and derive
respective effort and wage levels. Note that this situation is equivalent to one where
formal contracts based on effort would be feasible.
Lemma 2.2. Assume the (DE) constraint does not bind in a period t < T . Then, setting a
strictly positive wage is optimal.
Lemma 2.2 implies that even if the principal is not restricted in setting her preferred
effort-based bonus Bt, she still decides to pay a strictly positive fixed wage (which
amounts to wt = (η2θ3 − 1)2 /4η3θ3), and the agent receives a rent. This is because the
agent’s concern for reciprocity reduces his effective effort costs, but only in combination
with a strictly positive wage wt. The agent’s effective effort costs are (e∗)3/3 − ηwe∗θ,
and implemented effort e∗t = (1 + η
2θ3) /2ηθ is also strictly larger than the “standard”
first best without reciprocal preferences,
√
θ.7 In the following, we will refer to the
implemented effort and wage levels for a non-binding (DE) constraint as first-best levels.
At these first-best levels, the costs for the principal to implement one additional unit of
effort are the same when using relational as when using reciprocity-based incentives,
and those costs are equal to the principal’s marginal benefits.
in a next step, we explicitly take the enforceability of relational contracts into account
and assess how the agent’s preferences for reciprocity affect outcomes with a binding
(DE) constraint.
Lemma 2.3. Assume the (DE) constraint binds in a period t < T . Compared to the
situation with a non-binding (DE) constraint, the fixed wage is larger and implemented is
effort smaller.
Besides reducing effective effort costs, a fixed wage also relaxes the principal’s (DE)
constraint by reducing the bonus that must be paid to implement a given effort level.
7 The condition
(
1 + η2θ3
)
/2ηθ >
√
θ is equivalent to
(
1−
√
η2θ3
)2
> 0, where the strict inequality
holds since η > η also implies η2θ3 > 1.
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Therefore, if the (DE) constraint binds (i.e., it does not hold for first-best effort), the
fixed wage is larger than when it does not bind.
All this implies that relational and reciprocity-based incentives are complements at any
given point in time. Reciprocity-based incentives reduce effective effort costs. Further-
more, they relax the (DE) constraint and therefore allow to enforce more effort within
the relational contract. In the following, we will explore how this interaction evolves
over time.
Relational and Reciprocity-Based Incentives as Dynamic Substitutes
In this section, we derive conditions for when the (DE) constraint actually binds, and
in particular how this relates to the tenure of the employment relationship. This allows
us to characterize how the optimal use of relational and reciprocity-based incentives
evolves over the course of the employment relationship.
Generally, the (DE) constraint might or might not bind in any period t < T , depending
on discount factor δ, reciprocity parameter η and productivity θ. Furthermore, the (DE)
constraint becomes tighter in later periods.
Lemma 2.4. The principal’s dynamic enforcement constraint might or might not bind in
period T − 1. More precisely, for any discount factor δ, the (DE) constraint holds for
first-best effort and wage levels if η is sufficiently large. For any values η and θ, the (DE)
constraint does not hold for first-best effort and wage levels if the discount factor is suffi-
ciently small.
Furthermore, Πt−1 − Π̃t−1 > Πt − Π̃t for all t ≤ T .
The principal’s commitment in a relational contracts is given by what she has to lose
given she deviates. If the discount factor is small, she cares less about a potential
reduction of future profits and is therefore less willing to compensate the agent for
his effort. Furthermore, a larger reciprocity parameter η increases future profits on
the equilibrium path (by more than future off-path profits), and furthermore reduces
today’s effective effort costs (by more than first-best effort goes up). The second part of
55
RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND RECIPROCITY
Lemma 2.4 states that the difference between on- and off-path continuation profits goes
down over time. The intuition for this is driven by two aspects. First, the remaining
time horizon and therefore the periods in which profits can be generated is reduced as
time elapses. Second, this triggers a re-enforcing effect because implementable effort in
a period is increasing in the difference between on- and off-path continuation profits.
Since ΠT − Π̃T > 0, the (DE) constraint allows to implement a larger effort level in
period T − 1 than in period T . Therefore, per-period on-path profits in period T − 1
are larger than in period T (whereas per-period off-path profits are the same in every
period), and implementable effort in period T − 2 is even larger than in period T − 1.
Hence, the (DE) constraint in earlier periods is less tight than later on.
Lemma 2.4 implies that if the (DE) constraint binds in a given period t̃, it will also bind
in all subsequent periods t > t̃. If it is slack in a given period t̂, it will also be slack
in all previous periods t < t̂. This allows us to derive the following effort- and (fixed)
wage-dynamics.
Proposition 2.1. Equilibrium effort is weakly decreasing over time and equilibrium wage
weakly increasing, i.e., e∗t ≤ e∗t−1 and wt ≥ wt−1. Both inequalities hold strictly if and only
if the (DE) constraint binds in period t.
Furthermore, e∗t < e
∗
t−1 and wt > wt−1 imply e
∗
t+1 < e
∗
t and wt+1 > wt, whereas e
∗
t+1 = e
∗
t
and wt+1 = wt imply e∗t = e
∗
t−1 and wt = wt−1.
Proposition 2.1 states that the profit-maximizing equilibrium is characterized by a down-
ward sloping effort and an upward sloping wage profile. As long as the future is suffi-
ciently valuable for the (DE) constraint not to bind, both are time-invariant. Once the
(DE) constraint binds, the principal cannot credibly promise her preferred bonus pay-
ment anymore. On the one hand, this reduces equilibrium effort. On the other hand,
the principal responds with a wage increase which increases equilibrium effort – directly
due to the agent’s preferences for reciprocity, and indirectly because it relaxes the prin-
cipal’s (DE) constraint and allows her to request more effort from the agent. However,
the effort increase caused by the higher wage does not fully compensate for the effort
reduction caused by the binding (DE) constraint because the costs of implementing an
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additional unit of effort are now larger with reciprocity-based than with relational in-
centives. As time proceeds, the (DE) constraint becomes tighter and tighter (Lemma
2.4). Hence, relational incentives are gradually substituted by reciprocity-based incen-
tives (fixed wage ↑), with the substitution however being incomplete (effort ↓).
2.3 Predictions
In the previous sections, we derived the properties of a profit-maximizing long-term ar-
rangement for an agent with given reciprocal preferences. Now, we will explore to what
extent the agent’s preferences for reciprocity affect his effort choices over the course of
his career. This allows us to generate several comparative statics and consequently a
number of testable predictions.
2.3.1 Effort
First, we derive a general result concerning the effect of an individual’s reciprocity on
effort. I our model , the effect of a larger η on effort is unambiguously positive irrespec-
tive of an individual’s career stage.
Prediction 2.1. More reciprocal individuals exert more effort.
Proof. This relationship holds in any period: For periods t < T and η > η, ∂e
∗
t
∂η
=
η2θ3(1+λDEt)−1
2η2θ(1+λDEt)
> 0. For period T and η > η, ∂e
∗
T
∂η
= θ
2
2
> 0. Finally, for η ≤ η, ∂e
∗
t
∂η
= 0 in
all periods t.
This prediction follows from our result that reciprocal and relational incentives are com-
plements at any given point in time. There, providing incentives becomes cheaper if η
goes up, hence more effort is implemented.
The next prediction picks up the results stated in Proposition 2.1 and refers to the
dynamics with respect to effort.
Prediction 2.2. Effort is lower in later stages of a career.
Proof. This immediately follows from Lemma 2.1.
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Next, we explore how η affects incentive schemes and consequently outcomes at differ-
ent stages of an individual’s career. Prediction 2.3 yields the main result of this paper:
Prediction 2.3. The positive effect of reciprocal preferences on effort becomes stronger over
the course of the employment relationship.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 2.4, where we show that λDEt increases over time, and
∂e∗t
∂λDEt∂η
= 1
2η2θ(1+λDEt)
2 > 0.
Prediction 2.3 follows from reciprocal and relational incentives being dynamic substi-
tutes. When an agent approaches the end of his employment relationship, the incentive
system puts more weight on reciprocal incentives, hence the role of η is intensified.
Therefore, the reduction of incentive costs caused by a higher η is more pronounced
and equilibrium effort reacts more strongly.
2.3.2 Utility
In the following, we derive predictions concerning the agent’s utility. In the empirical
section, we test these predictions using survey measures on an individual’s job sat-
isfaction. This section is also supposed to capture potential interactions between an
individual’s inherent preferences for reciprocity and his or her compensation. Although
the SOEP contains measures such as “monthly wage” or “annual salary”, those are in-
complete if an individual’s total compensation also contains non-monetary components,
like career concerns, job assignment, status, feelings of belonging, that one is making a
difference (see Gibbons and Henderson, 2012, p. 1353), or discretion over decisions8.
However, all these aspects are supposed to increase an individual’s satisfaction with his
or her job, therefore the respective measure – and the agent’s utility as the theoretical
counterpart – seems better suited.9
8 This has been observed by Cyert and March (1963) and later taken up by Li, Matouschek, and
Powell, who state that “payments within organizations often take the form of promises about future
decisions and decision making rather than monetary transfers” (Li et al., 2017, p. 218).
9 Note that Dohmen et al. (2009) also explore the interaction between reciprocity and satisfaction.
They compare individuals who are satisfied with their jobs with individuals who are not, and find
that the positive effect of reciprocity on effort is only observed for the former (a result we are able
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Our predictions on job satisfaction are collected in the following prediction:
Prediction 2.4.
a. More reciprocal employees are more satisfied with their jobs.
b. Job satisfaction increases over time.
c. The positive effect of reciprocal preferences on satisfaction becomes stronger over the
course of the employment relationship.
The proof of Prediction 2.4 can be found in Appendix B.1.
Generally, agents’ larger utility is higher if one unit of effort is implemented by reciprocal
rather than by relational incentives. The intuition for Prediction 2.4 is then similar to the
intuition underlying Predictions 2.1–2.3: In any period t, reciprocity-based incentives
are more important for larger values of η, therefore the agent also is better off in this
case. Furthermore, because reciprocity-based incentives assume a larger role later on,
the positive effect of η on an agent’s utility becomes stronger over time.
Having established these predictions, we now turn to evaluating them empirically.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
To explore our predictions, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
The SOEP is a yearly panel survey that is representative of the German population and
goes back to 1984. It contains a wide range of questions on the personal and socioeco-
nomic situation as well as labor market status and income of respondents. We use the
same data set as Dohmen et al. (2009) and largely keep their empirical specification
for the sake of comparability, however are particularly interested in exploring how the
to replicate). Our model would also predict such an outcome if unsatisfied agents were regarded to
have had a bad experience with their employer, and in particular perceive the latter to have reneged
on the relational contract (after which η drops to zero). But our model also allows to go beyond this
rather straightforward prediction, and assess the on-the-equilibrium-path implications of observing
different satisfaction/utility levels.
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existence of intrinsic reciprocity affects dynamic incentive systems. Our focus on em-
ployment relationships lets us restrict our analysis to a subsample of all SOEP respon-
dents and only consider employees. This excludes individuals who are unemployed,
retired, self-employed, in compulsory military or community service, or in training and
education. We further exclude employees below the age of 25 and above the age of
65 to avoid sample selection issues due to endogenous retirement decisions, leaving us
with a sample of 9,221 individuals who participated in the 2005 wave of the survey.
For our purposes, the 2005 wave is of particular interest as it contains a total of six
questions that are designed to capture individual reciprocal inclinations. Note that this
measure has also been included in the 2010 and 2015 waves of the SOEP; however, as
those do not include other measures that we regard as important for the relation to our
theoretical model, for example retirement propensity (see below), we decided to use
these waves only for additional analyses, which can be found in Section 2.4.2.
The reciprocity items developed by Perugini et al. (2003) capture what they define as
a personal norm of reciprocity, that is, to what extent an individual has internalized
the norm of reciprocal behavior. Participants are asked to rate how well six statements
(three for positive, three for negative reciprocity) apply to themselves on a seven-point
Likert scale.10 The item average then determines each person’s strength of reciprocity.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of positive and negative reciprocity among survey
participants, revealing that while there is quite some variation in negative reciprocity,
positive reciprocity is strongly pronounced.
It is important to note that positive and negative reciprocity constitute different traits.
This is supported by the observations that the correlation between the two is rather
low (p = .052), that the traits have different determinants (Dohmen et al., 2008), and
that the six items can be represented by two distinct orthogonal principal components
(Dohmen et al., 2009). In our study, we focus on the effects of positive reciprocity and
10 Specifically, the items measuring positive reciprocity are “If someone does me a favor, I am prepared
to return it”, “I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before”, and “I am
ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before”, while the items “If I suffer
a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost”, “If somebody puts
me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her”, and “If somebody offends me, I will offend
him/her back” are meant to capture negative reciprocity.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of negative and positive reciprocity
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Notes: The figure plots the distribution of negative and positive reciprocity for the 9,221
employee respondents of the 2005 SOEP wave who answered all six reciprocity questions.
The individual inclination for negative and positive reciprocity are calculated by taking the
average of the three questions that are targeted at the respective dimension.
discuss this choice below, in Section 2.5.
To study the effect of positive reciprocity on (non-contractible) effort, we use overtime
work as proxy for the latter (following Dohmen et al., 2009). More specifically, overtime
is a binary variable indicating whether the employee has worked overtime hours in the
month preceding the interview or not. Two aspects are important. First, this measure
does not exclude the possibility that an employee is compensated for working overtime,
which one might argue does not capture our notion of non-contractible effort. However,
effort in our model does not only capture actual working time, but also other aspects
that benefit the firm and are costly to the employee, such as flexibility in one’s working
arrangements. Therefore, even if overtime is compensated, it can very well include
non-contractible aspects of effort. Moreover, in Section 2.4.2, we replicate our results
using unpaid overtime as the dependent variable, as well as overtime that cannot be
accumulated in a work-time account. Second, the overtime measure is binary, whereas
one might argue that our predictions are better addressed by analyzing overtime hours
(i.e., the intensive margin). This is taken care of in Section 2.4.2 as well by exploring
the effect of reciprocal preferences on overtime hours. Finally, we rule out that our
results are entirely driven by cohort effects. There, we include later waves of the survey
that also include the reciprocity measure and conduct a panel analysis.
61
RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND RECIPROCITY
2.4.1 Main Results
Reciprocity and Effort
We first examine the effect of reciprocity on effort. We do so by estimating cross-
sectional regressions and controlling for several other influence factors. In detail, our
controls include gender, age, years of education, full-time and part-time work experi-
ence, tenure in the recent position (all included in a Mincer-type fashion), a dummy
variable for part-time employment, and indicator variables for industry sector, firm size,
and occupational status. To estimate the effect of reciprocity on the propensity to work
overtime, we employ a logit specification with standard errors clustered at the house-
hold level. Column (1) of Table 2.1 gives the results of a regression of the binary de-
pendent variable indicating whether the employee has worked overtime in the month
preceding the interview on reciprocity and the set of controls. Our results confirm Pre-
diction 2.1 (and are similar to those of Dohmen et al., 2009) – the propensity to work
overtime is increasing in the degree of positive reciprocity.
Next, we test Prediction 2.2 and explore how effort evolves over time. In particular,
we examine the effect of age on the propensity to work overtime. Assessing the net
relationship in the regression in column (1) of Table 2.1, the age coefficient in the effort
regression is negative and significant, indicating that the propensity to work overtime
is decreasing with employee age, confirming Prediction 2.2. Figure 2.3 further explores
the relationship between employee age and effort by depicting a local polynomial re-
gression of the residual variance of overtime on age, thus illustrating the adjusted, non-
linear relationship between the two variables. It can be seen that the pattern largely
overlaps with the linear regression line with a few small exceptions at the lower and
upper end of the age continuum.
Having explored the impact of positive reciprocity and age on overtime, we now turn
to our central question: how is the effect of positive reciprocity on effort changing over
the course of an employment relationship? To approach this, we modify the estimation
equation used so far by adding an interaction term of positive reciprocity and a dummy
variable indicating proximity to the last periods of an employment relationship. In
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Table 2.1: Effect of reciprocity on effort
(1) (2) (3)
DV: Overtime (Y/N) Overall
Age Retirement
cutoff propensity
Positive reciprocity 0.0176*** 0.0184*** 0.0175***
(0.00641) (0.00643) (0.00642)
Age (in years) -0.00785***
(0.00166)
Age ≥ 60 -0.0812**
(0.0332)
Age ≥ 60 # Reciprocity 0.0838***
(0.0317)
Retire = 1 -0.0690**
(0.0291)
Retire # Reciprocity 0.0551**
(0.0278)
Observations 7,019 7,019 7,019
Pseudo R2 0.0691 0.0679 0.0677
Notes: Estimations are based on the 2005 survey wave of the SOEP. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses clustered at household level. Table reports marginal effects at the mean
calculated after logit regressions, with marginal effects for interactions reflecting the differ-
ence in slope for reciprocity between the groups. Reciprocity score standardized. Controls
include years of education, gender, years of full time and part time work experience (lin-
ear and squared terms), a dummy for part-time employment, job tenure in current position
(linear and squared), indicator variables for industry sector (services, agriculture, energy
or mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, transport, bank or insurance) and firm size
(less than 100, 100-199, 200-1999, more than 2000 employees), and an indicator variable
for occupation status (white collar, blue collar, public sector). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Figure 2.3: Local polynomial smooth of effort on age
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Notes: Figure plots a linear fit and local polynomial smooth of the residual variance of the
propensity to work overtime on age. Estimations are based on the 2005 wave of the SOEP.
accordance with our model predictions, a positive interaction coefficient would indicate
that reciprocity is indeed more important in later stages.
As a first approach, we create a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is
at least 60 years old. We argue that this subgroup is sufficiently close to the last peri-
ods of their employment relationships such that an insufficient future surplus restricts
the enforceability of the relational contract (or, in more technical terms, such that the
(DE) constraint binds), thus making intrinsic reciprocity relatively more important. Es-
timation results are reported in column (2) of Table 2.1. It can be seen that while the
influence of reciprocity on the propensity to work overtime is positive for all workers,
the positive relationship is significantly more pronounced for workers above the age
cutoff, as indicated by the positive marginal effect of the interaction. Thus, it seems
like the positive effect of positive reciprocity on the probability of working overtime is
mostly driven by older workers, confirming Prediction 2.3. Note that these results are
qualitatively robust to choosing other age cutoffs. Figure B.1 in Appendix B.2 depicts
the estimated interaction coefficients for varying cutoffs. It can be seen that the inter-
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Figure 2.4: Predictive marginal effects of positive reciprocity on effort
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Notes: The figure plots predicted marginal changes of the propensity to work overtime at
different levels of positive reciprocity depending on age group (upper panel) and a high vs.
low propensity to retire within the next two years (lower panel), holding all other factors
constant. Estimations are based on the 2005 survey wave of the SOEP. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals.
action coefficient is increasing in the cutoff value for age and that there is a jump at age
60, indicating that there is a more pronounced difference for this cutoff.11
To further illustrate this result, the upper panel of Figure 2.4 plots the predictive marginal
effects of positive reciprocity on the propensity to work overtime (i.e., the expected
propensity to work overtime depending on reciprocity score, holding all other influence
factors constant) calculated separately for workers who are younger than 60 and those
11 Of course, while we present results for one specific age cutoff throughout this section, we are aware
of the fact that this constitutes a somewhat arbitrary choice, and keep other possible cutoffs and
specifications in mind throughout. Generally, the overall pattern of interactions at different cutoffs
is as expected from our model (i.e., while the influence of intrinsic reciprocity is always more pro-
nounced for relatively older people, the difference between the groups becomes smaller in size when
the division is made earlier).
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who are at least 60 years old. While the effect of reciprocity on the propensity to work
overtime seems overall positive, it is substantially more pronounced for employees who
are at least 60 years old. This further confirms the main intuition of our model, namely
that intrinsic reciprocity mostly matters near the end of employment relationships.
However, even though there is an officially regulated age for retirement in Germany,
there might still be differences in individual retirement ages, and thus age might only
be a noisy proxy for the stage of employees’ careers. To address this concern, we utilize
an additional question from the SOEP that asks employees how likely it is that they
are going to retire within the following two years. This results in a binary variable
that takes on the value of one if the respondent indicates that his/her probability of
retiring within the following two years is at least 50 percent. We use this variable as an
alternative dummy for the interaction with positive reciprocity. The estimation results
can be found in column (3) of Table 2.1. It is evident that this alternative specification
produces similar results to generating the dummy based on age: again, the marginal
effect of positive reciprocity is significant, but the interaction is as well, indicating that
the positive relationship between intrinsic reciprocity and effort is more pronounced
among among employees who expect to retire within the following two years. Once
more, we further illustrate our finding by plotting the predictive marginal effects of
positive reciprocity on effort separately for low and high retirement propensity in the
lower panel of Figure 2.4. It can be seen clearly that while the slope of both curves is
positive, it is much steeper for employees with a high likelihood of retirement.
To sum up, assessing influences on propensity to work overtime among our sample of
German employees, we find that positive reciprocity is positively related to overtime
(confirming Prediction 2.1). While the propensity to work overtime decreases with age
(confirming Prediction 2.2), the positive effect of reciprocity on overtime is stronger for
employees towards the end of their careers (confirming Prediction 2.3).
Reciprocity and Job Satisfaction
To explore the effect of reciprocity on an employee’s job satisfaction as reflected in Pre-
diction 2.4, we make use of a survey question asking employees to rate their overall
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job satisfaction.12 We regress job satisfaction from the 2006 survey wave on reciprocity,
controlling for age and our usual control variables. The reason for taking job satisfac-
tion from the subsequent wave is to address concerns of reverse causality. Note that
we do not control for an individual’s (monetary) income because it constitutes a sub-
stantial part of the agent’s utility (together with other, non-monetary, components of an
employee’s compensation package which we cannot observe).
The results shown in column (1) of Table 2.2 indicate that reciprocity indeed influences
job satisfaction as the marginal effect of positive reciprocity is positive and significant.
Next, we explore the development of job satisfaction over time by examining the effect
of age. Analogous to the relationship between age and the propensity to work overtime
shown in Figure 2.3, Figure 2.5 depicts a local polynomial regression of the residual
variance of job satisfaction on age to illustrate the adjusted, non-linear relationship.
Here, it is evident that while in our theoretical model, job satisfaction increases over
time, the relationship between job satisfaction and age in the data is not approximated
very well by a linear relationship. Indeed, it seems like job satisfaction is more or less the
same for workers under the age of 50 to then first decrease and subsequently increase
to its highest level.
Having explored the overall effect of positive reciprocity and age on job satisfaction, we
now again add an interaction term between reciprocity and a dummy variable indicat-
ing that the individual is at least 60. Column (2) of Table 2.2 presents the results of this
estimation. It can be seen that the marginal effect is positive but not significant. The
same holds when we use retirement propensity as indicator variable for the interaction,
as can be seen in column (3) of Table 2.2. Nevertheless, we also explore different cutoff
values by depicting the interaction coefficients resulting from employing our specifi-
cation and varying the age cutoff. As can be seen in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.1, the
marginal effects are positive and relatively constant in value for cutoffs above 53, but
the confidence intervals become much wider as the cutoff approaches 60, which is prob-
ably why we are only able to qualitatively detect the pattern predicted by our model.
12 The question is “How satisfied are you with your job?” and is to be rated on a scale from 0 (totally
unsatisfied) to 10 (totally satisfied).
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Table 2.2: Effect of reciprocity on job satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
DV: Job satisfaction Overall
Age Retirement
cutoff propensity
Positive reciprocity 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.165***
(0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0271)
Age (in years) -0.00748
(0.00657)
Age ≥ 60 0.390***
(0.149)
Age ≥ 60 # Reciprocity 0.122
(0.152)
Retire = 1 -0.267*
(0.140)
Retire # Reciprocity 0.205
(0.145)
Observations 6,218 6,218 6,218
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.029 0.029
Notes: Estimations are based on the 2005 survey wave of the SOEP. Job satisfaction is taken
from the 2006 wave. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at household level. Table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Reciprocity mea-
sure standardized. Controls include negative reciprocity, years of education, gender, years of
full time and part time work experience (linear and squared terms), a dummy for part-time
employment, job tenure in current position (linear and squared), indicator variables for in-
dustry sector (services, agriculture, energy or mining, manufacturing, construction, trade,
transport, bank or insurance) and firm size (less than 100, 100-199, 200-1999, more than
2000 employees), and an indicator variable for occupation status (white collar, blue collar,
public sector). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 2.5: Local polynomial smooth of job satisfaction on age
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Notes: The figure plots a linear fit as well as a local polynomial smooth of the residual
variance of job satisfaction on age. Estimations are based on the 2005 survey wave of the
SOEP. Job satisfaction is taken from 2006.
However, when setting the cutoff to 52, 53, 54, 55, or 56, for instance, the interaction
effect is significant. Therefore, provided job satisfaction is regarded as a proxy for the
total utility an individual enjoys from his or her job, Prediction 2.4 is largely confirmed.
Recall that the results in this section are supposed to also capture the effect of reci-
procity on compensation (which naturally assumes a large part of the utility stemming
from employment). We do not include an analysis of the interaction between reciprocity
and compensation because only its monetary part, which captures just a limited part of
an individual’s total compensation, is available in our data. Analyzing these, we see that
an individual’s annual labor income is increasing in the degree of positive reciprocity as
predicted by the theoretical model. Furthermore, also in line with our theoretical ap-
proach (which would predict total compensation, the sum of wage and bonus payments,
to go down over time), an individual’s annual labor income is decreasing with age and
particularly low above the age threshold. The effects of reciprocity for individuals above
the cutoff and for those who expect to retire soon, however, are not significant.13
13 Results are available from the authors upon request.
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2.4.2 Robustness
Having mostly confirmed our predictions, we now show that our empirical results con-
cerning effort are robust to different specifications. We first apply different overtime
specifications and show that our results still hold. Then, we make use of data from two
subsequent SOEP survey waves that also include reciprocity measures to verify that our
results are not driven by cohort effects.
Unpaid overtime as effort measure
Up to now, we have – for the sake of comparability – relied on the same overtime mea-
sure as Dohmen et al. (2009). Since this measure also includes compensated overtime,
one might question whether it is a good proxy for non-contractible effort. Thus, we
rerun our main analysis using only unpaid overtime as a dependent variable. Doing so,
our results are even more pronounced: for both the age cutoff and retirement propen-
sity interactions, the main effect of positive reciprocity is positive but insignificant while
the interaction terms are significant, indicating that the positive relationship between
reciprocity and unpaid overtime is driven by workers who are relatively close to retire-
ment. In addition, we use an even more restrictive overtime measure that only accounts
for overtime that is neither compensated monetarily or non-monetarily (e.g., through
work-time accounts). While the coefficients are not significant, they still point in the
right direction. In sum, the overall picture provides further evidence for our main result.
The full regression table and the predicted margins of the interactions can be found in
Table B.1 and Figure B.3 in Appendix B.1.
Overtime hours
So far, our analyses have focused on the extensive margin of effort, i.e., whether em-
ployees have worked overtime or not. To further explore the influence of reciprocity
on effort, we look at the intensive margin of overtime work by exploring the number
of total and unpaid hours of overtime worked. This implies that our empirical measure
of effort now is not binary anymore and therefore even closer to the continuous speci-
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fication used in our theoretical model. Here, we estimate negative binomial models to
account for the fact that we are now utilizing overdispersed count data and otherwise
stick to our empirical strategy of estimating the overall effect of reciprocity and age be-
fore including interactions with age group and retirement propensity. Overall, we find
that the pattern predicted by the theoretical model is also visible when we account for
additional time spent at work as all interactions are positive, indicating that reciprocity
has a stronger positive influence on the amount of overtime hours for workers who are
at later stages of their careers. The full regression results can be found in Table B.2 in
Appendix B.1.
Panel structure
While we have focused on the 2005 SOEP wave so far, the survey measures of reciprocity
have been included in the SOEP questionnaire in the years of 2010 and 2015 as well.
Note that, because there is some turnover among survey participants in every year,
only 53% of the 2005 respondents participate in the 2010 wave, and 33% of them
participate in the 2015 wave. Furthermore, in these additional survey years, not all
variables that we use for our analysis have been included again, retirement propensity
being one example. However, we are able to rerun our main analysis of the effect of
positive reciprocity on overtime using data from all three waves.14
Theoretically, positive reciprocity is supposed to be a stable trait and any variation over
time spurious. The SOEP data support this presumption as the intraclass correlation
coefficient, a measure of consistency between more than two measurements, equals
0.418, which can be interpreted as fair (Cicchetti, 1994) – in particular taking into
account the time distance between the waves, and that the SOEP contains self-reported
measures. In addition, when we evaluate changes in positive reciprocity between the
waves, we see that about 77% of changes are smaller than 1, and that the mean of
changes is not significantly different from zero.
14 In contrast, we are not able to do the same for job satisfaction as the 2016 measures are not available
yet. As we take job satisfaction from the subsequent year to avoid issues with reverse causality, we
are not able to use the 2015 data.
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We estimate a random effects regression and a pooled logit regression.15 The results are
shown in Table B.3 in Appendix B.1. To account for cohort effects, we included birth
year dummies in the panel estimations. First, if we stick to the age cutoff of 60, we
find that we still see the expected patterns: Positive reciprocity has a significantly pos-
itive influence on the propensity to work overtime, while age has a negative influence.
The interaction between being above the age cutoff and positive reciprocity is positive,
even though insignificant. If we change the age cutoff to 55, though, the interaction
coefficient is positive and significant.
To further explore the available data, we finally estimate the arguably most general
specification. There, we not only include all three waves, from 2005, 2010, and 2015,
but also use overtime hours as introduced in the previous section. The results can be
found in Table B.4 in Appendix B.2. Here, the interaction coefficients are positive and
significant at the 1% level for total as well as for unpaid overtime hours. These patterns
are robust for changing the age cutoff from 60 to 55.
To sum up, we are able to replicate our main result when focusing on unpaid overtime
instead of overtime in general, using overtime hours instead of a binary measure, as
well as including two additional waves of the SOEP. This indicates that our results are
not due to cohort effects, but indeed driven by the optimal design of incentive systems
for employees with reciprocal preferences.
2.5 Discussion & Conclusion
We have shown that repeated-game incentives and preferences for positive reciprocity
can interact in intricate ways. The two are dynamic substitutes, but complements once
a specific point in time is considered. We have provided strong empirical support for
this notion. No matter which specification we apply, the effect of reciprocity is always
15 We refrain from estimating a fixed effects regression although it would enable us to isolate within-
person effects. The reason is that we would need to focus on employees who switch age categories
between 2005 and 2015 because only those have variation needed for using a fixed effects approach
which gets rid of all stable effects. Furthermore, recall the turnover among survey participants in
every year. Therefore, this procedure would only leave us with about 800 observations.
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positive, and this effect is more pronounced for individuals who are relatively close to
retirement – only significance levels differ. We think that this outcome is remarkable
given the self-reported nature of the survey data we use.
We have not pursued the question of how negative reciprocity affects an optimal dy-
namic incentive scheme, though, and did this for two reasons. First, positive and nega-
tive reciprocity seem to describe quite different personality traits (recall that the corre-
lation between the two only equals 0.052). Second, while the general positive effect of
positive reciprocity on outcomes is well established and also straightforward from a the-
oretical perspective, the same is not true for negative reciprocity. There, the interaction
is rather ambiguous.
On the one hand, the effect of negative reciprocity on effort and profits is negative if
we assume that it is triggered by a fixed wage that is below a given reference wage. For
example, assume that we give up the limited liability constraint and set this reference
wage to zero. Then, the optimal spot contract still takes the form of either a bonus
or a reciprocity contract, only the threshold η is different than in our main analysis.16
Negative reciprocity negatively affects the bonus contract, because the fixed wage is
generally negative in this case in order to extract the agent’s rent. The reciprocity
contract and the relational contract contain a positive fixed wage and consequently
are not affected by negative reciprocity – hence the impact of the latter on effort and
profits is negative on average. This negative effect is the dominant presumption in the
literature (for a theoretical investigation, see Netzer and Schmutzler, 2014), and can
also be found in the data (Dohmen et al., 2009).
On the other hand, negative reciprocity might also positively affect a relational con-
tract. Right now, η drops to zero after a deviation by the principal. Instead, we might
assume that η does not necessarily drop to zero, but that the reduction is a function
of the agent’s negative reciprocity. If a larger degree of negative reciprocity implies a
bigger reduction of η (following a deviation by the principal), it would actually allow to
implement a higher effort level (and increase profits) – because the principal’s outside
16 Omitting the limited liability constraint rather increases η (because using a bonus contract does not
make it necessary to grant the agent a rent anymore), whereas negative reciprocity reduces η.
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option would go down accordingly, and consequently increase her commitment in the
relational contract. This positive effect would now be more pronounced for younger
employees where incentives are mostly provided via relational contracts.
We think that a thorough investigation of the effect of negative reciprocity on an optimal
dynamic incentive scheme deserves more attention, but leave it for future research.
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Chapter 3
Individual Differences and Contribution Sequen-
ces in Threshold Public Goods∗
3.1 Introduction
As “[s]ome of the most fundamental questions about the organization of society center
around issues raised by the presence of public goods” (Ledyard, 1995, p.112), public
goods games are among the most studied topics in experimental economics in the lab
as well as in the field. Indeed, the plethora of studies in economics and neighboring
disciplines like sociology, political science, or psychology reflects the variety of situations
characterized by the social dilemma inherent in public goods provision: the free-rider
problem. The reason for the persistent interest stems from the fact that abstract features
of the game serve as a metaphor for many economic situations spanning from defense,
public infrastructure, or health to more specific problems in organizational economics
like intellectual property rights or team production (Ledyard, 1995).
The leading paradigm in most of this literature has been to focus on final outcomes,
which is why the public goods situation is mostly modeled as a simultaneous-move
game. Within this general framework, a variety of adaptions have been suggested to
solve the free-rider problem. A non-exhaustive list of those variations includes partner
design, communication, monetary and non-monetary punishment, or heterogeneous
∗ This paper is based on joint work with Michael Schüßler and Daniel Mühlbauer.
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endowments (Chaudhuri, 2011; Zelmer, 2003). While these approaches often alleviate
the free-rider problem and facilitate cooperation, some of the most interesting public
goods in social and organizational reality have a different temporal structure: processes
like team work in organizations or fund raisers have a real-time aspect instead of simul-
taneous contributions.
In arguing that it is crucial to focus on the process of public goods provision instead of
final outcomes, our study contributes to several strands of literature. First, in amelio-
rating the free-rider problem, some experimental public goods studies have started to
deviate from the simultaneous-move setup and introduced the real-time protocol. How-
ever, relatively few studies employed this mechanism, reporting mixed results – while
public goods implementation is enhanced in some studies, others fail to find this effect
(Dorsey, 1992; Goren et al., 2003; Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Oprea et al., 2014).
Second, there has been a growing interest in looking at the effects of (endogenous)
leadership (Dannenberg, 2015; Potters et al., 2005, 2007; Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Sut-
ter et al., 2010). These studies are concerned with exploring if and why individuals
volunteer to make the first move (i.e., leading by example without formal authority),
finding that while having individuals volunteering to go first increases implementation
success, few individuals are willing to do so. However, little is known about the theoret-
ical rationale to explain an individual’s position in the resulting contribution sequence.
Our point of departure is that we are explicitly interested in those sequences. Thus, we
contribute to the literature on the real-time protocol by examining the effect of visible
contributions while not only focusing on the ultimate result, that is, the implementa-
tion of the public good, but also on the process leading to it. We contribute to the
literature on endogenous leadership by exploring who volunteers to go first in a richer
setup where contribution sequences are endogenous.
Third, while economic theory is silent concerning those contribution sequences, the
focus on the role of heterogeneous tendencies to participate in collective action has
long been discussed in sociological theories of collective behavior (Oliver, 1993). For
our purpose, we draw on a specific model, referred to as threshold theory (Granovet-
ter, 1978; Granovetter and Soong, 1983). This theory delivers utility-based arguments
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why some individuals tend towards earlier and others towards later decisions. In fact,
Braun (1994) attributes individual threshold heterogeneity to differences in behavioral
determinants. While he mainly focuses on the benefits, costs, and network properties
of the decision context, individual differences are neglected (Braun, 1995; Watts and
Dodds, 2011). The present study aims at closing this gap between sociological theories
of collective behavior and economic experiments by investigating the role of individual
differences in endogenous contribution sequences in a real-time public goods context.
Fourth and related, we also add to the literature investigating how individual differ-
ences influence behavior in public goods situations. More specifically, several studies
have investigated how heterogeneity in personality (Hilbig et al., 2014, 2012; Zhao and
Smillie, 2015), distributional preferences (Balliet et al., 2009; Dijkstra, 2013; Murphy
and Ackermann, 2014), or risk aversion (Fung et al., 2012; Teyssier, 2012) affect con-
tribution decisions. We build on and extend these studies by measuring participants’
personality traits and distributional preferences and relating them to individual hetero-
geneity in contribution behavior in the real-time public goods game.
Thus, we employ a simple provision-point mechanism in the laboratory and use the real-
time protocol; that is, participants do not make decisions simultaneously, but are able
to freely decide when to make their choice within a given time frame. This way, we are
able to examine the effect of having information about others’ actions on the one hand
while being able to identify individual differences in behavior in these real-time public
goods situations and relate them to personality traits and economic preferences on the
other hand. Indeed, we are able to show that if we provide information about others’
behavior in real time, implementation of the public good is facilitated, at least when
the target is sufficiently difficult to reach. In addition, we find endogenous contribution
sequences, i.e., individuals reacting to real-time information about their fellow group
members. While distributional preferences alone explain participation decisions, the
sequencing of contributions is influenced by a broader array of individual differences.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss related literature by elab-
orating on how individual timing and individual differences are intertwined. Second,
we explain both the laboratory design and procedure. After having presented our main
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experimental results, we discuss their relevance in light of potential limitations. Finally,
we conclude.
3.2 Related Literature
The conflict between individual and collective rationality has drawn the attention of
various research disciplines. Sociologists have long been interested in the formation of
collective behavior, such as social movements (Smelser, 1963; Udéhn, 1993), psycholo-
gists have been studying helping and organizational citizenship behavior (Organ, 1994;
Smith et al., 1983) as well as various forms of mixed-motive social dilemmas (Dawes,
1980; Komorita and Parks, 1995; Lange et al., 2013), and economists have been ex-
amining different versions of inter-individual coordination or behavioral cascades (An-
derson and Holt, 1997; Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995).
Despite important differences, these approaches all tackle the problem of interpersonal
coordination and the conflict between individual and collective rationality (Dawes and
Messick, 2000; Kollock, 1998).
Apart from the more general examples mentioned above, specific applications to or-
ganizational reality have been discussed, arguing that “in fostering cooperation among
employees, managers usually face a public good dilemma” (Bridoux et al., 2011, p.711).
Relevant phenomena of organizational behavior and work group productivity, such as
strategic initiatives (Lechner and Kreutzer, 2011) or organizational task forces (Ger-
sick, 1988), closely resemble those social dilemmas for three reasons. First, strategic
initiatives and organizational task forces evolve along a collective sequence made up of
individual contribution decisions and both require concerted voluntary efforts of the in-
dividuals involved, while not allowing for perfect observability of individual behaviors
without incurring high monitoring costs (Goren et al., 2003). Second and related, due
to their highly interdependent nature, it may be hard to exclude any individual from
enjoying the (long-term) benefits of the public good, while the short-term costs are only
incurred by the cooperating individuals (Bridoux et al., 2011; Lechner and Kreutzer,
2011). Third, their success typically increases with the investments of time and effort
by their members and they are of temporary nature, which means that they typically
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have to be successfully accomplished until a certain deadline, or else fail.
In the following paragraphs we will develop two distinct, yet related sets of hypothe-
ses. First, we will discern how institutional changes influence public goods provision.
Second, we derive a set of hypotheses to explain endogenous contribution sequences.
3.2.1 The Influence of Institutional Changes on Public Goods Provision
Abstract versions of these phenomena described above have been implemented in the
experimental laboratory. In standard experimental public goods contexts, the voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM) has emerged as the dominant way of representing pub-
lic goods provision in experimental studies in economics and psychology (Chaudhuri,
2011; Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003). Under the VCM, all individuals voluntarily decide
to either invest resources in the public account or to keep them in their private account.
Afterwards, all investments to the public account are multiplied by a given factor and
distributed among all individuals, including the defectors. Hence, in this simple game,
keeping all resources in the private account is the individually dominant strategy, while
investing everything in the public account is socially optimal. It has been shown that,
on average, contribution rates under the VCM are between 40% and 60% of the so-
cial optimum, while contributions tend to decrease over repeated periods of the game
(Chaudhuri, 2011; Goren et al., 2003).
As already pointed out in the previous section, to alleviate this prevalent free-rider
problem, several institutional solutions have been proposed. While several variants of
the standard VCM have been discussed in that regard, the provision point mechanism
(PPM) is of particular interest for studying public goods because it is more comparable
to organizational reality, keeping in mind the above-described strategic initiatives and
organizational task forces. We argue that using the PPM enhances both mundane and
experimental realism because it differs from the VCM in two notable features (Abele
et al., 2010; Croson and Marks, 1998; Marks and Croson, 1999).1 First, the public good
1 While the former aims at resembling the real world in an experimental investigation, the latter
is concerned with how well the experimental situation captures the theoretical constructs under
scrutiny (Colquitt, 2008). Most often critique of experimental settings is targeted at low mundane
realism, while experimental realism should be the focus of attention (Highhouse, 2009).
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is not provided unless a given threshold t of contributions is reached (i.e., for a project
to be conducted, a certain number of people need to participate). Second, while under
the VCM contributions to the public account are typically continuously divisible, the
PPM mostly employs all-or-nothing contributions (i.e., team members either participate
in a proposed project or not). More specifically, under the PPM, participants play in
groups of n players where every player has an endowment of E units. Subsequently,
the players choose a contribution level ci ∈ {0; 1}. If t or more players choose to invest
their endowment in the public account, the public good of value G is provided and
every group member receives a reward of G
n
units. Additional contributions do not
further increase the value G. If t is not reached, the public good is not provided and the
contributors lose their investment to the public account. Non-contributors keep their
initial endowment in both cases. Thus, in adding a contribution target to be reached, a
coordination problem arises. Typically, all parameters of the game (n, t, G, and c) are
common knowledge.
However, there are also two notable differences from a game theoretic perspective.
First, in comparison to the VCM, there is not just a single Nash equilibrium for con-
tributing nothing, but additional equilibria for exactly t players contributing exist. Sec-
ond, while in the continuous form everyone contributing is the Pareto efficient solution,
the second Nash equilibrium where everybody is keeping their endowment is not. In
the step-level form, any coordination solution that reaches the provision point is Pareto
efficient (Abele et al., 2010). Consequently, under the PPM, contribution behavior has
been shown to be much more rugged in comparison to the VCM: while overall efficiency
and total contributions are increased, it is found to be more susceptible to changes in
induced value (Rondeau et al., 2005). In addition, contributions do not always decrease
over repeated periods of the game (Abele et al., 2010).
One important driver of contribution decisions to public goods is the value of the pub-
lic good relative to that of the forgone private good, which has been formalized as
marginal per-capita return and demonstrated to influence the provision of linear public
goods. A comparable feature of threshold games is the step return. Empirical results
show that comparing the step returns between games yields comparable results to uti-
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lizing the marginal per capita return under the VCM: a higher step return encourages
contributions (Croson and Marks, 2000). As the step return increases in t, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.1. Implementation rates are lower when the provision point is increased.
Moreover, while most public goods experiments have been conducted under the simul-
taneous protocol of play where decisions are made simultaneously, anonymously and
in private (Chaudhuri, 2011), this does not resemble strategic initiatives and organiza-
tional task forces very well. This because in organizations, individuals normally possess
at least partial information about the decisions of other group members and consider
this information before making their own decisions. As an alternative, the real-time
protocol is better suited to capture the inherent decision sequence of endogenous in-
dividual timing present in organizations. Until now, comparably few studies employed
this mechanism under the VCM and the PPM. Using the real-time protocol, the differ-
ences between coordination and cooperation are unclear and multiple equilibria exist,
which raises the question whether participants are able to coordinate efficiently or not
(Abele et al., 2010; Oprea et al., 2014). While most studies find enhanced implementa-
tion rates, others fail to find this effect (Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 2001; Dorsey, 1992;
Goren et al., 2003, 2004; Kurzban et al., 2001). Those empirical inconsistencies are due
to two reasons: First, the results stem from different games, thereby inhibiting compa-
rability. Second, while most studies on coordination use revocable investments to the
public account (e.g., Leng et al., 2016), we employ irrevocable commitments to avoid
cheap talk (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). Theoretically, it has been argued that continuous
games approximate an array of discrete games with the grid length going to zero (Si-
mon and Stinchcombe, 1989). Thus, this form of repeated interaction should increase
cooperation.2 Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis:
2 Theoretical predictions are difficult at this point because extant reasoning in economics does not
allow for clear-cut hypotheses. However, following social interdependence theory (Abele et al., 2010;
Kelley and Thibaut, 1978), one can argue that if participants are missing any form of information
used to infer the behavior of others, coordination failure is more likely (Puranam et al., 2012).
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Hypothesis 3.2. Implementation rates are lower when individuals have no information
about others’ behaviors.
However, behavior is not only driven by institutional arrangements or incentives, but
also by individual heterogeneity. Albeit being unified in these central building blocks
underlying behavior formation, economists and psychologists differ with regard to how
this heterogeneity is conceptualized. While psychologists use the different facets of
personality (Rabin, 1998; Rustichini, 2009), economists rely on using heterogeneity in
stable and exogenous preferences like risk or time, and have long been skeptical about
the usefulness of those personality dimensions. Albeit they have long questioned their
stability, extant research suggests that these qualms are uncalled-for (Almlund et al.,
2011). Indeed, it has been shown that personality could be a worthwhile adjunct to
experimental measures of economic preferences in increasing predictive power (Rusti-
chini et al., 2012) and are thus complementary (Becker et al., 2012). Adding to that
literature, we argue that while the pertinent situation is a substantial influencing fac-
tor for behavior formation, another focus of our paper is on predicting contribution
sequencing using individual differences, which will be elaborated on in the following.
3.2.2 Explaining Endogenous Contribution Sequences
There has been substantial research to predict public goods contributions under the
VCM using individual differences, which can be either distal or proximal to overt be-
havior (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989). While the former include broad factors, such as
general personality structure (Hilbig et al., 2014; Hilbig and Zettler, 2009), the latter
comprises more specific determinants of behavior like social value orientation (SVO)
(Murphy et al., 2011) or risk preferences (Fung et al., 2012). As mentioned before,
the game-theoretic predictions are fundamentally different under the PPM, yielding
two types of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and thus a coordination problem to solve.
Hence, the role of determining factors is less clear and evidence is scarcer. While us-
ing the real-time protocol of play should mitigate coordination failure, the availability
of real-time information about contributors adds an additional strategic dimension to
the game: moving early can be used to signal a cooperative social norm, but waiting
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for others to move first and updating beliefs about the probability of implementation
with and without one’s own contribution on a rolling basis is also possible. In contrast,
without real-time information about contributions available, subjects have no way of
updating beliefs and less need to behave strategically, i.e., based on what others are do-
ing. In essence, all group members base their decision on less information and thus take
less time to choose whether to contribute or not. Therefore, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.3. The time to contribute is shorter when individuals have no information
about others’ decisions.
In the case of symmetric agents, successful coordination is a stochastic process, as it
is unknown ex ante which people are going to contribute and at which position in the
behavioral sequence (Au and Budescu, 1999). While the role of asymmetric agents un-
der the VCM has been studied extensively (e.g., Reuben and Riedl, 2013), economic and
game-theoretic reasoning has mostly treated this kind of variance in coordination games
as noise (Mäs and Nax, 2016). As such, differential effects of individual heterogeneity
on coordination have only seldom been studied (e.g., Diekmann and Przepiorka, 2016).
However, in sociology and psychology, there exists a broad range of theories specifically
concerned with these processes. Specific variants of such models of collective behavior,
such as bandwagon or hazard models, are often used to conduct research on conformity
behavior, behavioral contagion, or on diffusion of innovation in a business setting (Cen-
tola and Macy, 2007; Oliver, 1993). In psychology and sociology, it is often assumed
that individuals prefer social conformity, equality, or identity affirmation (Ashforth and
Mael, 1989; Simon et al., 2008; Simpson, 2006), while in economics and economic
sociology, the underlying assumption is that information is derived from behavior of
(relevant) others (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Bikhchandani et al., 1998). While those
accounts differ with regard to the driving force behind social interdependence, they are
unified by their basic tenet of proposing that the uptake of beliefs or the adoption of
an innovation depends on other people’s behavior. Therefore, we posit the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.4. There is a cascading process in contribution decisions.
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Figure 3.1: Individual differences, behavioral thresholds, and contribution decisions
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A specific specimen of the broad family of theories described above is the threshold
model of collective behavior (Granovetter, 1978; Granovetter and Soong, 1983). Here,
individual heterogeneity in contribution timing is assumed to manifest as a behavioral
threshold which is defined as “the number or proportion of others who must make one
decision before a given actor does” (Granovetter, 1978, p.1420). As shown in Figure
3.1, some individuals actively contribute very early in the process (i.e., instigators, dot-
ted circles), others may wait and see whether or not any collective movement begins to
form (i.e., moderates, striped circles), while again others may need to see a lot of other
individuals acting before contributing (i.e., reluctant, filled circles). Broadly speaking,
an individual’s behavioral threshold represents that person’s behavioral tendency to
participate in a collective action.
While the original model suggests that thresholds are solely based on cost-benefit cal-
culations and availability of information, it has been pointed out that individual dif-
ferences also drive threshold formation. This way, individuals are assumed to differ
in their behavioral tendency to cooperate because of heterogeneous personality factors,
diverse ideologies or beliefs, varying economic motives as well as differing susceptibility
to conformism. In the context of this paper, we focus on personality factors, as various
studies have related personality to public goods contributions as well as to a broad range
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of work- and non-work-related attitudes and behaviors (cf. Ozer and Benet-Martînez,
2006). While the so called five-factor model has emerged as the most widely used
model of personality (Barrick and Mount, 2012), the HEXACO model is more suitable
for research on social dilemmas (Hilbig and Zettler, 2009; Ross et al., 2003) as it clearly
distinguishes the domains of honesty and agreeableness. This reflects an intensive de-
bate in personality psychology whether the five-factor model should be complemented
with a sixth factor capturing honesty or integrity (Hough et al., 2015). While this gen-
eral issue has not been fully resolved yet, this distinction is important for the present
study because it enables disentanglement of active (i.e., honesty in HEXACO) and re-
active cooperation (i.e., agreeableness in HEXACO), both captured by agreeableness in
the five-factor model (Hilbig et al., 2014). Individuals with a tendency for active coop-
eration are likely to contribute earlier, whereas individuals with a tendency for reactive
cooperation are likely to contribute later because of their rather responsive nature.
Honesty. Honesty “represents the tendency to be fair and genuine with others, in the
sense of cooperating with others” (Ashton and Lee, 2007, p.156). Empirical evidence
shows that honesty is positively related to prosocial behavior, for instance in dictator
(Hilbig et al., 2014; Hilbig and Zettler, 2009) and public goods games (Hilbig et al.,
2012). More specifically, honest individuals are prone to cooperate early when the
decision timing is left to their choice (Hilbig et al., 2013b). Therefore, we propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.5. Honest individuals contribute earlier in the contribution sequence.
Emotionality. Emotionality is typically described as being “vulnerable, sensitive and
anxious”, while individuals scoring low on this trait are rather “fearless, tough, inde-
pendent, and unemotional” (Ashton et al., 2014, p.140). Thus, it is linked to empathy
and attachment (Hilbig et al., 2013a). As empirical investigations have found a nega-
tive link between emotionality and contributions in a public goods context (Clark et al.,
2014; Hilbig et al., 2012), we propose:
Hypothesis 3.6. Emotional individuals contribute later in the contribution sequence.
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Extraversion. Also belonging to the proactivity domain, extraverted individuals show
proactive behaviors and have been described as being outgoing, lively, sociable, talkative,
cheerful and active (Ashton and Lee, 2007). Empirical investigations yielded mixed re-
sults regarding extraversion and behavior in social dilemmas, which has been attributed
to divergent theoretical linkages of social dominance and sociability. While the former
is likely to foster free riding (Zhao and Smillie, 2015), the latter suggests that extraver-
sion enhances contributions to the public good (Clark et al., 2014; Hilbig et al., 2012).
As extraversion has also been found to increase proactive behavior (Onyemah, 2008)
and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) (Bourdage et al., 2012), we propose:
Hypothesis 3.7. Extraverted individuals contribute earlier in the contribution sequence.
Agreeableness. In the HEXACO model, agreeableness is linked to traits like toler-
ance and forgiveness even in the face of being exploited (Ashton and Lee, 2007), as
well as flexibility and patience (Ashton et al., 2014). While agreeable individuals are
also inclined to cooperate, it is a rather reactive form of cooperation (Hilbig et al.,
2012, 2013a; Zhao and Smillie, 2015). Empirical research supports this differentiation,
since agreeableness was positively related to reactive cooperative behavior in ultimatum
games and only weakly related to active cooperation (Hilbig et al., 2013a). Therefore,
we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.8. Agreeable individuals contribute later in the contribution sequence.
Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is seen as “[. . . ] socially prescribed impulse
control that facilitates [. . . ] thinking before acting” (John et al., 2008, p.120). Thus,
conscientious individuals often show traits, such as thoughtfulness, deliberateness, and
planning (John et al., 2008; McCrae and Costa, 1987). Tan and Tan (2008) report
a significant negative (positive) relation between conscientiousness and social loafing
(OCB). While conscientiousness has also been positively linked to individual contribu-
tions in public goods games (Clark et al., 2014; Hilbig et al., 2012), others have found
no correlations to cooperative intentions (Ross et al., 2003). Taken together, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.9. Conscientious individuals contribute later in the contribution sequence.
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Openness. As a trait, openness to experience depicts a person’s artistic or aesthetic
character, her curiosity, or creativity (Ashton and Lee, 2009). Due to the inherent nature
of the measurement of openness in the HEXACO model, it seems not plausible to form a
specific hypothesis. While we include openness in our analysis, this is rather exploratory.
Social Value Orientation. Apart from distal personality traits, behavioral thresholds
should also be influenced by more proximal individual preferences. Under the general
label of social preferences, heterogeneity in distributional preferences has been studied
in a variety of settings in economics (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Psychologists, however,
have measured these preferences as SVO or closely related constructs (e.g., prosocial
values, other orientation, or collective orientation). Building on decomposed dictator
games, SVO offers a more fine-grained approach and has been shown to explain hetero-
geneity in individual behavior in public goods games (Balliet et al., 2009; Murphy and
Ackermann, 2014). SVO measures the relative importance of own and others’ payoffs
(McClintock and Allison, 1989). Typically, specific types (i.e., altruistic, cooperative,
competitive, and individualistic) are identified, which are in turn used to explain indi-
vidual heterogeneity in behavior formation. This way, it has been shown that prosocials
(i.e., cooperative or altruistic types) are more likely to cooperate in social dilemmas
than proselfs (i.e., individualistic or competitive types) (Abele et al., 2010; Balliet et al.,
2009; Bogaert et al., 2008). Albeit SVO has been shown to have a smaller effect in
step-level public goods compared to continuous public goods (Abele et al., 2010), we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.10. Prosocial individuals contribute earlier in the contribution sequence.
Having described the hypotheses, we now turn to the laboratory design and procedures
before we report the results of our study.
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3.3 Experimental Design
The experimental procedure consists of four parts: Upon arriving at the laboratory,
participants were randomly assigned to cubicles. Then, having been introduced to the
general procedures of the experiment, the public goods game was explained in detail by
using neutrally framed instructions.3 After that, participants were asked to answer four
control questions to ensure common understanding of the proceedings of the public
goods game. Arising questions were dealt with by the experimenter in private. The
next stage only started after all 24 participants in a session had managed to answer
all control questions correctly. After that, ten rounds of a public goods game using
the PPM under the real-time protocol were played. In our specific case, participants
faced a PPM as described above with n = 8, G = 3500 tokens, and c = 100 tokens.
After every round, groups were randomly rematched to mitigate reputation effects. To
make strategic behavior and end-of-period effects less pronounced, every round lasted
between 60 and 90 seconds with equal probability of termination in between, thus
leaving it unclear ex ante how long the round would exactly be. For similar reasons,
subjects were not told in advance that there would be exactly ten rounds. In each
round, investment decisions of each player in a group were made known to all others in
real time. Additionally, all subjects were informed that one round would be randomly
selected to become payoff-relevant at the end of the experiment.
To explore the causal effect of institutional changes on our variables of interest, we
used a 2x2 design altering the provision point, the level of information provided to
participants, and a combination of both. While the former could be either low or high
(i.e., t = 5 vs. t = 7), the latter could be either full or none (i.e., full but anonymized
feedback vs. no feedback).4 This yields the different combinations depicted in Table 3.1
to which subjects were randomly assigned.5
After having played ten rounds of the public goods game, two other behavioral measures
3 A translated version of the full instructions can be found in Appendix C.3.
4 We decided to use extreme cases instead of subtler changes to the institutional environment to
receive maximum treatment effects (List, 2011).
5 Due to administrative issues, we conducted twice as many sessions of the Baseline.
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Table 3.1: Overview of the treatment conditions
Information
Full None
Provision Point
5 Baseline No Info
7 High Provision Point Combined
were employed. Specifically, participants’ SVO and risk attitudes were elicited. For
the former we used the slider-measure approach (Murphy et al., 2011) where each
participant has to indicate distributional preferences by allocating a given endowment
between herself and another person. In comparison to older measures of the construct,
this approach does not only yield behavioral types, but the SVO angle, a much more
fine-grained measure on a ratio scale. The participants faced 15 of such decomposed
games yielding a position on a circular plane of all possible allocation-based positions
and defining the SVO (see Murphy et al., 2011, for a detailed description).
Following the approach by Holt and Laury (2002), individual risk aversion was assessed
by having the participants choose between ten pairs of investment options A and B, one
having a greater payoff spread than the other. Basically, the measure allows to identify a
person’s risk aversion by observing the point at which an individual switches to choose
the riskier option B over option A. For example, a person is classified as risk-neutral
when choosing option A for the first four times and then switching to option B, because
then the expected payoff difference between option A and B turns negative for the first
time. In general, the earlier an individual chooses the riskier option B over option A,
the more risk seeking this person is. Again, participants were informed ex ante that one
decision would be randomly selected to determine payoff from this part.
As a last part, participants were asked to fill in several questionnaires. First, the Ger-
man version of the HEXACO-60 personality inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009; Moshagen
et al., 2014) was used. Additionally, besides risk aversion, several control variables were
elicited as collective behavior may also be influenced by other individual characteristics.
Specifically, the controls included participants’ gender and age, their study major, math
89
CONTRIBUTION SEQUENCES IN THRESHOLD PUBLIC GOODS
grade as crude proxy for general mental ability, and measures for generalized trust as
well as positive and negative reciprocity norms. While the former has been extensively
studied as an antecedent of cooperativeness (Ostrom and Walker, 2003), the latter are
also frequently mentioned, since they account for rather reactive forms of behavior
(Chaudhuri, 2011). For example, generalized forms of retaliation for past behavior of
anonymous others may also explain an individual’s behavior over time. These measures
deploy additional control for non-specific retaliation caused by general anger concern-
ing defection of others. For reasons of parsimony, these controls were measured using
three-item scales from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) (Caliendo et al., 2012;
Dohmen et al., 2008). Then, individual payoffs from all parts were determined and all
subjects received their payment in private.
3.4 Results
The experiment was conducted at MELESSA, the experimental laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Munich, in September and October 2015. 360 participants recruited using Orsee
(Greiner, 2015) took part in 15 sessions which lasted about 75 minutes each. The aver-
age age of participants was 25.7 years; the youngest participant was 18 and the oldest
62 years old. The majority of participants was female (60%) and students (90%); 31%
pursued a major in business and economics. All sessions were computerized using the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). During the experiment, participants could earn ex-
perimental points that were exchanged into e at the end. On average, subjects earned
13.71 e, including a show-up fee of 4 e.
In the next section, we present our main results. Our findings are structured as follows:
First, we present descriptive results. We do so by describing our data set and investigat-
ing group-level outcomes before scrutinizing individual-level decisions, which are the
foundation for the macro-level outcomes described before. After that, we turn to test
our hypotheses. We start by looking at treatment effects of the institutional changes
described above. Then, we delineate whether we actually observe cascading in our
data as predicted and test which antecedents may be used to predict the position in the
behavioral sequence.
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3.4.1 Descriptive Results
Information about the descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3.2, while individual
differences and intercorrelations across treatments are depicted in Table C.1 and Table
C.2 in Appendix C.1, respectively. By and large, the patterns we find for our variables
correspond to those in the literature.
Personality was measured on a five-point scale with 60 items (i.e., six dimensions, ten
items each) of the established and validated HEXACO questionnaire (Moshagen et al.,
2014) to assess the extent to which respondents were honest (α = .76), emotionally
stable (α = .76), extraverted (α = .80), agreeable (α = .74), conscientious (α = .77),
and open to experience (α = .69). While there is some variation in internal consistency,
all alpha values are comparable to those reported by Moshagen et al. (2014).6 Figure
C.1 in Appendix C.1 depicts the distribution of scores on the six HEXACO dimensions in
our sample.
Concerning SVOs, our results and distributions are comparable to those reported by
Murphy et al. (2011), who also indicated clustering around the individualistic type and
no representation of purely altruistic individuals. See Figure C.2 in Appendix C.1 for
the distribution of angles in our sample.
Regarding our control variables reciprocity, trust and risk aversion, patterns are also
quite similar to the literature. While positive reciprocity (α = .61) only has questionable
internal consistency, negative reciprocity (α = .77) and trust (α = .74) show accept-
able levels of internal consistency. Compared to Caliendo et al. (2012), who also report
questionable internal consistencies for negative and positive reciprocity and good inter-
nal consistency for trust, our results are in line considering the differences in sample
size.7 As the internal consistency depends on the number of items used and considering
the fact that we include reciprocity and trust only as control variables, this is a caveat,
but should not limit the interpretation of our results in general.
6 Furthermore, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate the underlying factor structure
of the HEXACO model. The results are described in Appendix C.2.
7 A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to evaluate the factor structure (RMSEA = .049, SRMR
= .038, CFI = .987); model fit is acceptable (Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Brown, 2006).
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
Mean SD Min Max Alpha
Honesty 3.30 0.73 1 5 0.76
Emotionality 3.17 0.68 1 5 0.76
Extraversion 3.47 0.65 1 5 0.80
Agreeableness 3.13 0.63 1 5 0.74
Conscientiousness 3.74 0.61 1 5 0.77
Openness 3.64 0.62 2 5 0.69
SVO angle 17.18 12.73 -16 46 –
Risk aversion 6.38 1.52 0 10 –
Trust 3.20 0.90 1 5 0.74
Negative reciprocity 2.55 0.92 1 5 0.77
Positive reciprocity 4.43 0.57 1 5 0.61
Regarding risk preferences, the average participant in our sample is risk averse, while 40
participants showed either an inconsistent choice pattern (i.e., more than one switching
point) and/or failed to choose the higher monetary outcome when confronted with
a choice between 200 points and 385 points with probability one, respectively. As
excluding these subjects from our analyses does not change the results substantially and
risk preferences are a control rather than a variable of interest, we decided to include
all subject in our analysis.
Overall, the independent variables measured in our sample resemble those established
in the literature, encouraging use of all of the variables for further analysis.
Group-Level Outcomes
Before explicitly testing our hypotheses, we give a general description of the group-level
outcomes and how they are shaped by individual contribution decisions. We do so by
describing the implementation rates as well as the mean rate of optimal outcome across
all ten periods.
Figure 3.2 displays the rate of cases out of all group observations in each of the ten
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Figure 3.2: Average implementation rates by treatment
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Notes: Figure depicts average rates of successful (public good provided) and optimal imple-
mentation (threshold reached exactly) by period. Calculations based on 450 groups.
periods in which the public good was successfully implemented (solid line) across all
four treatments (i.e., at least five (seven) out of eight group members contributed their
endowment). It also contains the rate of cases in which the theoretically optimal out-
come (dashed line) was reached (i.e., exactly five (seven) out of eight group members
contributed). Note that due to the way these two measures are constructed, the mean
rate of optimal outcome is a proportion of the total mean implementation rate, which
also includes the cases in which six, seven or even all eight group members contributed.
These cases lead to the implementation of the public good as well, but to a lower total
payoff because the additional contributions are lost. Thus, the upper limit for the mean
rate of optimal outcome is given by the mean implementation rate.
Overall, it is evident that in our setting, the mean implementation rate is quite high. This
rate of successful public good provision is substantially larger than in other experiments
using the PPM (e.g., Croson and Marks, 2000). This indicates that the real-time pro-
tocol sustains cooperativeness in socially complex settings. In general, implementation
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does not seem to become more unlikely over the course of the experiment. Moreover,
most of the participants seem determined to contribute in the first period, resulting in
implementation in all groups, but also in a very low proportion of groups with exactly
five (seven) individuals contributing (i.e., the optimal solution). In the Baseline, im-
plementation rates stay high at all times, while the number of groups that manage to
coordinate efficiently increases. Judging by the graphs alone, differences in availabil-
ity of information about contribution decisions of others seem to have little influence
on the groups’ ability to effectively coordinate for collective success as long as the step
return remains constant (Baseline → No Info). In comparison, only manipulating the
step return seems to affect collective success more strongly (Baseline → High Provi-
sion Point), as these groups’ average implementation rate across all rounds is lower.
When stakes are high for the groups, unavailability of information has a strong effect
on their ability to effectively coordinate for collective success (High Provision Point →
Combined). Moreover, the groups’ coordination ability drops dramatically when simulta-
neously confronted with a lower step return and unavailability of information (Baseline
→ Combined). Although there is some variation over periods, the only treatment with a
clear decline over time is Combined.
While there is more variation in No Info compared to the Baseline, there are still some
groups in the Baseline with excess contributions although subjects should know that they
burn money. To check whether subjects were behaving irrationally, we take a closer look
at seemingly irrational contributions in the Baseline and High Provision Point treatments,
where subjects receive real-time information about whether there are enough contribu-
tions for the provision point to be reached. Out of 1510 observations in the two relevant
treatments, 84 are seemingly irrational (i.e., it was visible there were already enough
contributions for the public good to be implemented), which is a percentage of 5.5%. Of
these contributions, 56 were made more than one second after the provision point was
reached. Thus, only 3.7% of contribution decisions were not in accordance with stan-
dard assumptions. In light of the fact that this is only a very small fraction of choices
and that one could possibly rationalize these choices when non-standard preferences
like inequity aversion are considered, we use all observations for our analysis.
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Individual Contributions
Figure 3.3 depicts the average number of contributors for each treatment across the
ten periods. Notably, albeit the number of contributors fluctuates, it is quite high in
general. While the average number of contributors slightly decreases over time across
all treatments, this does not automatically indicate a negative trend of collective suc-
cess. For instance, in the Baseline treatment, the high average number of contributors
in the beginning (rounds one to three) drops to converge around the optimal rate of
contributors indicated by the dotted line. In addition, the graph provides some sugges-
tive evidence that only in the Combined treatment the number of contributors strongly
decreases below the provision point over time.
Having given a first impression of what our data look like, we now turn to test our
hypotheses in the next paragraph.
Figure 3.3: Average number of contributors by treatment
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Notes: Figure depicts average number of contributions made by period. Dashed line indi-
cates threshold. Calculations based on 360 subjects.
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3.4.2 Test of Hypotheses
Institutional Changes
We now investigate differences in implementation of the public good across the different
treatment conditions described above. While overall average implementation rates are
quite high in all treatments except for Combined (Baseline: 88%; No Info: 84%; High
Provision Point: 77%; Combined: 27%), the patterns described above and depicted in
Figure 3.3 already provide suggestive evidence for Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.2.
The general impressions regarding the group-level success trajectories are supported by
Fisher exact tests comparing the mean implementation rates of the public good across
treatments. In particular, we find significant differences between all treatments ex-
cept for the comparison between the Baseline and No Info treatments. In particular,
the differences between Combined and all other conditions are highly significant (p <
0.001). The difference between the Baseline and the High Provision Point treatments is
significant as well (p = 0.022), while the Fisher exact test fails to detect a significant
difference between the Baseline and No Info (p = 0.453). In addition, we ran a probit
regression predicting implementation success at the group level by provision point and
availability of information. Details can be found in Table C.3 in Appendix C.1. The
results mirror the Fisher exact tests: while a high provision point significantly decreases
implementation success, the coefficient for lack of real-time information is negative,
but insignificant. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 3.1 but not for Hypothesis 3.2.
However, we find a negative and significant interaction effect, indicating that the in-
terplay of a high provision point and no information leads to an additional decrease in
implementation success. Summing up, we find that lowering the step return leads to
lower implementation rates, while removing information about what the other group
members do does not. In addition, the combination of a lack of information and a high
provision point also significantly reduces implementation rates.
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Explaining Endogenous Contribution Sequences
In Hypothesis 3.3, we posited that removing information about group member’s behav-
ior would decrease individual decision timing. In principle, the coordination problem
with the real-time protocol allows for the groups to exhibit different behavioral trajecto-
ries at the individual level, which then may or may not cause similar levels of collective
success. Therefore, in Figure 3.4, we graphically explore individual decision timing.
Figure 3.4: Average timing of contributions by treatment
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Notes: Figure depicts the distribution of time in the period when a contribution was made.
Calculations based on 2,470 observations.
Some features are especially noteworthy when comparing the distribution of individual
decision timing between the treatments with and without available information (i.e.,
Baseline and High Provision Point vs. No Info and Combined). In the treatments with-
out information (No Info and Combined), almost all of the contributions happen within
the first 20 seconds. In the other two treatments (Baseline and High Provision Point),
the underlying pattern is different. In the latter case, a bimodal distribution of individ-
ual decision timing unfolds. Two moderate peaks distinguish very early contributions
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and those made around 60 seconds, which marks the earliest time where each round
could possibly be over according to our design. To explore this further, we compare
the average time to contribute using Mann-Whitney U tests. While there is a significant
difference between the treatments with and without information about others’ behavior
(Baseline vs. No Info: z = 2.32, p = 0.02; High Provision Point vs. Combined: z =
1.96, p = 0.05), this is not the case between the respective treatments with a low and
high provision point (Baseline vs. High Provision Point: z = -0.26, p = 0.80; No Info vs.
Combined: z = -0.66, p = 0.51).
In addition, to get at the difference in distributions between the contribution patterns,
we compare the cumulative distributions of contribution times depending on whether
information on others’ decision is available or not. Figure 3.5 depicts the two functions.
It is evident that the cumulative distribution function of times to contribute with infor-
mation first-order stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution function without
information. Summing up, we find support for Hypothesis 3.3.
Figure 3.5: Cumulative distribution functions of contribution times
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In Hypothesis 3.4, we claimed that there is non-random variation with regard to the se-
quence of decision timing. As explained above, the central notion of threshold models
is that one’s own contribution depends on the number of active others. For our setting,
this implies that there is actually a contribution sequence observable rather than most
contribution decisions being made more or less simultaneously right after the start of
the period. Thus, for the threshold model to be applicable to our setting, we should
observe sufficient variation in the timing of contributions within each round. To explore
this, focus on the left side of Figure 3.4. As already stated above, contributions are
spread over the whole period, with two peaks at the beginning of the period as well as
around second 60, which marks the boundary between the first minute in which there
is still time to contribute and the last 30 seconds in which the round is possibly termi-
nated. The mean time to contribute across all periods is 24.52 seconds with a standard
deviation of 23.26 seconds. This shows that we find considerable variation in contribu-
tion timing, which is also consistent with the assumption of behavioral heterogeneity in
the threshold theory of collective behavior (Granovetter and Soong, 1983). Summing
up, contributions are indeed made sequentially when real-time information about oth-
ers’ contributions is available, providing the prerequisite for the analysis of antecedents
for decision timing.
To subsequently test the rest of our hypotheses, we estimated the effects of personality
and SVO on contribution decisions and contribution order in a regression framework.
The individual behavioral threshold, our main dependent variable, was created follow-
ing Granovetter (1978). We measure an individual’s behavioral threshold “[. . . ] by
the exact number of others who have made a decision before he does” (Granovetter,
1978, p.1440). Thus, for each round, an individual-level variable (obsCon) was cre-
ated, which represents the number of other group member’s contributions to the public
account before the respective individual contributed him- or herself. For example, be-
fore making a contribution, a random individual may have observed nobody in the first
round, two contributions in the second round, four contributions in the third round and
so on. This individual’s values of obsCon would then be 0, 2, and 4, respectively. Thus,
each individual can have a maximum of 10 values for obsCon over the course of each
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session, which can range from 0 to 7 within each round, as all groups contain exactly
eight participants. As this procedure only yields values for cases in which individuals
actually contributed to the public good, our analyses are limited to those cases. When
conducting our analyses, we generally controlled for risk aversion, trust, reciprocal in-
clinations, and several socioeconomic factors.8 In addition, we included period fixed
effects to capture time trends and overall learning in our regressions.
As a benchmark, we start by regressing a binary variable indicating whether an individ-
ual made a contribution or not on our variables of interest and set of controls. Table 3.3
reports the model using the whole sample including treatment indicators in column (1)
as well as separate regressions for each of the four treatments in columns (2) to (5).
Here, it can be seen that an individual’s SVO angle significantly increases the probabil-
ity to make a contribution to the public account, while the HEXACO dimensions turn
out to be non-significant predictors for contribution propensity. Thus, distal personality
measures do not influence contribution decisions on the extensive margin in our setting.
However, as we are primarily interested in the intensive margin, that is, how personality
factors influence contribution order, this is not discouraging per se.
Next, we turn to the exploration of antecedents of contribution order. As obsCon can
take eight possible values, but is an ordinal variable, we employ a panel ordered probit
approach. As with contribution decisions, we report an estimation using all observa-
tions and including an indicator variable for the provision point as well as separate
estimations for the Baseline and High Provision Point treatments. The estimation re-
sults for all specifications are summarized in Table 3.4. Looking at the overall model in
column (1), four predictors turn out to be significant: The treatment indicator is signifi-
cant by design. As predicted, a larger SVO angle, that is, a more prosocial orientation, is
associated with earlier contributions. Interestingly, while the coefficients for both agree-
ableness and honesty-humility turn out to be insignificant, two other HEXACO person-
ality dimensions are significant predictors for contribution sequence: while extraversion
and the number of observed contributions are significantly negatively related, meaning
8 These include gender, age, subject of study, and general mental ability proxied by math grade.
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Table 3.3: Panel probit regressions for contribution decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DV: Contributor Overall Baseline
High Pro-
No Info Combined
vision Point
Openness 6.55e-05 -0.0250 -0.00156 0.0460 -0.0149
(0.0268) (0.0436) (0.0479) (0.0588) (0.0525)
Conscientiousness -0.0374 -0.0358 0.00419 -0.0646 -0.0539
(0.0252) (0.0348) (0.0497) (0.0602) (0.0555)
Agreeableness 0.000234 -0.00553 0.00630 0.0215 0.0372
(0.0275) (0.0450) (0.0569) (0.0643) (0.0603)
Extraversion 0.00903 0.0247 0.00263 -0.0333 -0.0217
(0.0246) (0.0383) (0.0484) (0.0561) (0.0604)
Emotionality 0.0136 -0.0248 -0.0109 0.107** 0.0158
(0.0254) (0.0366) (0.0551) (0.0532) (0.0595)
Honesty 0.0132 0.0718** -0.0119 0.0240 0.0399
(0.0238) (0.0354) (0.0487) (0.0634) (0.0424)
SVO angle 0.00523*** 0.00603*** -0.000656 0.00544* 0.00717***
(0.00114) (0.00175) (0.00225) (0.00299) (0.00273)
High PP = 1 0.0508*
(0.0285)
No Info = 1 -0.0197
(0.0309)
High PP -0.191***
# No Info (0.0616)
Observations 3,600 1,440 720 720 720
Groups 360 144 72 72 72
Wald Chi2 139.1 75.31 45.14 57.12 103
Notes: The table reports marginal effects after panel probit regressions. Controls include
trust, positive and negative reciprocity, risk aversion, gender, age, subject of study, mental
ability, and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.4: Panel ordered probit regressions for contribution order
(1) (2) (3)
DV: obsCon Overall Baseline
High Pro-
vision Point
Openness 0.0581 0.00525 0.155
(0.118) (0.143) (0.214)
Conscientiousness 0.261*** 0.306*** 0.221
(0.0998) (0.117) (0.203)
Agreeableness -0.103 -0.0805 -0.0701
(0.123) (0.131) (0.229)
Extraversion -0.217** -0.345*** -0.0414
(0.109) (0.126) (0.186)
Emotionality 0.0687 0.0560 0.116
(0.0986) (0.111) (0.207)
Honesty -0.123 -0.281** -0.00172
(0.107) (0.139) (0.197)
SVO angle -0.0198*** -0.0243*** -0.0152*
(0.00505) (0.00595) (0.00900)
High PP = 1 0.527***
(0.151)
Observations 1,510 937 573
Subjects 214 142 72
Wald Chi2 60.82 53.39 47.23
Notes: Table shows raw coefficients after panel ordered probit regressions. While all rele-
vant observations are used in column (1), estimation in column (2) uses Baseline treatment
observations only, and column (3) uses High Provision Point Treatment observations only.
Controls include trust, positive and negative reciprocity, gender, age, subject of study, men-
tal ability, and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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that individuals with higher extraversion scores contribute earlier, conscientiousness
has a positive impact, meaning that individuals with higher conscientiousness scores
contribute later in the sequence. Thus, the estimation results partially support our hy-
potheses: while we find support for Hypotheses 3.7, 3.9 and, 3.10, the rest (Hypotheses
3.5, 3.6, and 3.8) cannot be supported. Hence, in our sample, more prosocial individ-
uals are more likely to contribute earlier, indicating lower behavioral thresholds. With
respect to the more distal personality traits, emotionality as well as honesty and agree-
ableness have no impact on contribution behavior. However, we find that extraversion
and conscientiousness influence the propensity to contribute early.
3.4.3 A Closer Look at Behavioral Types
Finally, we take a closer look at different behavioral types to gain further insights into
what might determine contribution behavior in our setting.
First, we rerun our main analysis of contribution order, but exclude all pivotal con-
tributions, because these contributions are strategically fundamentally different from
the others as unlike for every contribution before that, there is no uncertainty about
whether the provision point is going to be reached or not – if the pivotal contribution is
made, the public good is going to be implemented for sure. The results are presented
in column (1) of Table 3.5, revealing a similar pattern to the analysis comprising all
contribution decisions without accounting for their distinct strategic nature. Again, the
coefficients for SVO angle and extraversion are significantly negative, while the coef-
ficient for conscientiousness is significantly positive. Hence, even when only looking
at contributions under uncertain conditions, we still find that individuals with a more
prosocial attitude and more extraverted individuals contribute earlier in the sequence,
while more conscientious individuals contribute later.
Next, we take a closer look at pivotal contributions only, following the rationale ex-
plained above. More specifically, we compare all non-pivotal contributions to those that
directly lead to implementation of the public good using a probit regression. As can be
seen in column (2) of Table 3.5, the propensity of making a pivotal rather than another
contribution is significantly increasing in the degree of conscientiousness of decision
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Table 3.5: Subgroup regressions
(1) (2) (3)
DV:
Uncertain Pivotal Leader
obsCon (Y/N) (Y/N)
Openness 0.0521 0.0190 -0.0247
(0.123) (0.0255) (0.0299)
Conscientiousness 0.182* 0.0581** -0.0626***
(0.101) (0.0227) (0.0243)
Agreeableness -0.0723 -0.0209 0.0201
(0.124) (0.0277) (0.0313)
Extraversion -0.184* -0.0163 0.0383
(0.109) (0.0236) (0.0244)
Emotionality 0.153 0.000157 -0.0495*
(0.0948) (0.0250) (0.0258)
Honesty -0.00538 -0.0289 0.0108
(0.108) (0.0254) (0.0262)
SVO angle -0.0148*** -0.00412*** 0.00344***
(0.00497) (0.00114) (0.00109)
High PP = 1 0.758*** -0.0316 -0.0207
(0.158) (0.0295) (0.0344)
Observations 1,193 1,510 1,510
Number of Subjects 200 214 214
Wald Chi2 56.11 37.15 26.75
Notes: Column (1) shows raw coefficients after panel ordered probit regression, while
columns (2) and (3) depict marginal effects after panel probit regressions. Controls in-
clude trust, positive and negative reciprocity, gender, age, subject of study, mental ability,
and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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makers, while it is significantly decreasing in SVO angle. Thus, more conscientious and
less prosocial individuals are more likely to make pivotal instead of uncertain contribu-
tions to the public account.
In addition, we also explore which factors influence the decision to make the first move
in the group, that is, to contribute before anyone else does. As expected, the coefficients
for SVO angle and conscientiousness depicted in column (3) of Table 3.5 mirror those
for the other obsCon regressions, indicating that individuals with a higher prosocial
attitude and lower conscientiousness are more likely to be first movers. Surprisingly,
however, the coefficient of emotionality is also significant and negative, indicating that
higher scores in emotional stability decrease the propensity to make the first move.
3.5 Discussion
Summing up, our laboratory experiment yields some interesting insights. First, while
implementation success is higher when the provision point is lower, i.e., only five rather
than seven contributing individuals are needed for the public good to be implemented,
availability of real-time information about others’ behavior does not automatically fa-
cilitate efficient coordination and implementation success. While this is somewhat sur-
prising in light of our hypotheses, it is also in line with what has been reported in the
literature in slightly different settings. A specific explanation in our setting might be a
possible ceiling effect: As compared to the literature our implementation rates are very
high, especially when the provision point is set at five contributions. Consequently, the
relatively easy goal of finding these five individuals implies that real-time information
cannot make a big difference in facilitating implementation success. However, we do
find that the combination of a high provision point and a lack of availability of real-time
information leads to a steep decrease in group success. Thus, overall, our results reveal
that the institutional environment matters for group outcomes.
Furthermore, our experiment shows that the coordination problem our subjects face
leads to contribution sequences as predicted by threshold theory. While some subjects
are instigators and actively contribute very early, moderates wait for some collective
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movement to begin, while again others are quite reluctant and need to see a lot of other
individuals contribute before contributing themselves. Furthermore, our results show
that while participation in collective action can be predicted by SVO alone, the sequenc-
ing is influenced by a broader array of individual differences (i.e., conscientiousness,
extraversion, and SVO). Yet, not all of these individual differences affect behavioral
thresholds in the same direction: while extraversion and SVO further individual proac-
tivity, conscientiousness hinders it.
However, the results concerning emotionality, agreeableness, and honesty are somewhat
surprising in light of our hypotheses. While both the theoretical rationale as well as the
empirical results regarding the VCM were convincing ex ante, their applicability under
the PPM seems to be limited. Albeit agreeableness is conceptualized as a rather reactive
trait domain, the context may have suppressed this effect. Moreover, our setting does
not provide extensive possibility to show strong reactions, such as direct punishment of
others or retaliation in future sessions. It might be the case that our treatment interven-
tions were strong enough to override the behavioral tendencies due to distal individual
heterogeneity in personality structure. In contrast to the standard trait-based approach,
other scholars in psychology have been in favor of more complex person-situation in-
teractions (Hough et al., 2015; Mischel and Shoda, 1995, 2010; Schein, 2015). Using
the concept of situational strength, it has been argued that cues provided by the envi-
ronment heavily influence behavior formation (Dalal et al., 2015; Judge and Zapata,
2015). While in strong situations, personality has only a modest influence on overt be-
havior, in weak situations which are unstructured, without salient, or very ambiguous
cues, personality plays a much stronger role (Meyer et al., 2010). This could be the rea-
son why agreeableness cannot explain additional variation in our experimental setting.
A somewhat similar argument can be made for emotionality and honesty. While we
are not able to discern an emotionality and agreeableness effect at all, it is interesting
that the effect of honesty is at least visible in the Baseline of our setting, suggesting an
interaction of situation and personality.
However, our results have to be seen in the light of some limitations that offer vari-
ous opportunities for future research. First, the advantage of controlling for situational
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influences in laboratory settings naturally comes at a cost. Random rematching and
irrevocable decisions rule out within-group learning, coalition building, and retalia-
tion. Future research may use the real-time protocol including revocable commitments
(Goren et al., 2004) in order to extend our results to these decision processes. Second,
we investigate behavior formation when individuals are confronted with all-or-nothing
contribution decisions. Thus, our results are limited to the basic decision of supporting
a project or task by exerting costly effort at all or not. In addition, various forms of
teamwork are characterized by a continuous contribution to the public good, which our
design does not capture. Third, our design does not include heterogeneity of players
with regard to network centrality. It has been reported in the literature on network
effects that bandwagon dynamics can be severely impacted if individual contributions
of central peers in their respective network have larger impact than more distal play-
ers (Chiang, 2007). Fourth, some of our analyses and consequently our implications
are based exclusively on those individuals who contributed to the public good. This
limitation is becaue albeit we are able to tell that the respective behavioral threshold
of individuals choosing not to contribute was not reached, we cannot infer what their
exact behavioral threshold would have been. Fifth, while we take into account that per-
sonality is a more useful explanation of behavior in weak situations than in strong situ-
ations, our treatments may interfere with the situational strength of the social dilemma.
Future studies may directly compare group behavior with weak and strong situational
cues and interact it with the group’s personality mix (e.g., ratio of prosocials). Sixth,
future studies may take a closer look at self-selection of individuals into the respective
situational contexts. The usage of self-selection rather than authority as a means to al-
locate tasks throughout the firm has been argued to be one of the true novelties of new
forms of organizing (Puranam et al., 2014). In order to build implications for practice,
it would be interesting to know if individual differences yield substantial differences for
self-selection. Subsequently, the performance implications of sorting may be analyzed
by comparing self-selected to exogenously selected groups. According to the attraction-
selection-attrition framework (Scheider, 1987) or the person-organization-fit literature
(Kristof, 1996), selection into (and out of) organizations is not a random process. Thus,
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employee self-selection may severely limit an organization’s ability to staff task forces
or project teams with the individuals prone to take lead in contribution sequences. As
Bridoux et al. (2011) point out, a given mix of motives demands for a differential and
nuanced approach regarding the motivational system that needs to be employed to yield
maximum contributions. Finally, our study investigates the general causal effect of insti-
tutional manipulations on contribution behavior. However, we cannot tackle the exact
mechanism responsible for collective results at the individual level. According to Za-
far (2011), the general effect of manipulating information about others’ behaviors may
be due to individuals trying to infer the best choice (social learning), actually gaining
utility from acting alike (social comparison), or wanting to gain a positive self-concept
(social image).
3.6 Conclusion
The findings of this experiment suggest interesting implications for theory development,
practitioners and future research. For practitioners and applied scholars, it is notewor-
thy that institutional factors eminent to the environment or malleable by the individual
manager matter a great deal towards success and efficiency of project teams or strategic
initiatives. It has been shown by the results of our experiment that information provi-
sion about group member’s behavior can significantly facilitate coordination. What is
more, our results support the basic rationale of the threshold model of collective be-
havior. In fact, individuals show substantial heterogeneity in threshold formation when
confronted with the production of a provision point public good with endogenous deci-
sion timing. More importantly, our study provides empirical support for the anecdotal
argument that this heterogeneity may, in part, be caused by individual differences. Fur-
thermore, our study generally supports the notion that heterogeneous motives matter in
the context of collective behavior formation. Given the fact that coordination has been
deemed as one of the central tasks of any organization (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009;
Puranam et al., 2014), those mechanisms should be tested under real organizational
conditions using for example field experiments or insider econometric studies.
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The Influence of Overconfidence and Competi-
tion Neglect on Entry into Competition
4.1 Motivation
Traditionally, in contract theory, the rationale for providing incentives is to align the
interests of principals and agents in order to overcome contracting problems in the
presence of information asymmetries (Hölmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983).
However, this view underestimates the importance of worker self-selection, i.e., that
different types of workers are attracted by different kinds of incentive schemes and
therefore systematically select into different environments. When considering both as-
pects, performance does not only depend on an incentive effect, but also on a sorting
effect (e.g., Lazear, 2000; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Larkin and Leider, 2012).
Selection into competitive environments has proven to be an important factor in many
economic settings like labor markets (based on rank-order tournaments; cf. Dechenaux
et al., 2015) or entrepreneurship (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Findings reveal that
factors other than productivity influence selection into competitive environments (e.g.,
Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Vandegrift et al., 2007; Bartling
et al., 2009; Eriksson et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Balafoutas et al., 2012).
Papers investigating determinants of entry decisions from different angles have identi-
fied several economic preferences that influence entry into competitive environments:
risk aversion and distributional preferences matter as well as heterogeneity in attitudes
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towards competition. Aside from preferences, differences in overconfidence have also
been brought forward as explanatory mechanism. However, in this area, central blind
spots remain as overconfidence comprises different facets that need to be carefully mea-
sured, and alternative mechanisms have not been systematically explored.
First, rather than being a clearly defined mechanism, overconfidence is an umbrella
term containing several different biases in beliefs or, more precisely, errors in perfor-
mance assessments, that have been discussed controversely. Two different facets of
overconfidence identified by Moore and Healy (2008), the overestimation of one’s abil-
ity (overestimation) and the belief to be better than others (overplacement), might play
a role for entry decisions. Different aspects have been emphasized by different litera-
ture streams: while some have focused on overestimation of own ability (the literature
related to Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), others concentrate on relative overconfidence
or overplacement while effectively eliminating uncertainty about own performance (the
literature buliding on Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), with comprehensive approaches
being scarce.1
Second, overconfidence in beliefs has mostly been described as being caused by sub-
jective priors or updating biases like attaching excessive precision to signals (Jehiel,
2016). However, other mechanisms that lead to biased perceptions might play a role
as well. Specifically, it has been argued in research on bounded rationality that indi-
viduals do not realize that others’ actions depend on their private information. This
notion is incorporated in solution concepts like cursedness (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) or
behavioral equilibrium (Esponda, 2008) and has been utilized as driver of biased beliefs
using different terminologies – for instance, Enke and Zimmermann (2017) show that
correlation neglect leads to biased information processing, and Jehiel (2016) derives
overoptimism from selection neglect. Closest to the setting of this paper, Camerer and
Lovallo (1999) identify competition neglect, that is, that individuals tend to neglect
self-selection of (potentially high-performing) others into competition as a potential
mechanism biasing entry decisions. However, since this mechanism has been brought
1 The experiment by Kamas and Preston (2012) constitutes a notable exception as the authors explic-
itly relate to the proposed systematization by Moore and Healy (2008).
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up as a potential cause for excess entry, only a handful of papers have followed up on
it. On the contrary, most studies rule self-selection of competitors out by design, and
systematic identification of the role of this bias for competition entry remains sparse.
This study aims at investigating whether overconfidence and competition neglect influ-
ence decisions to enter competitive environments. I use a controlled laboratory setting
that allows to elicit belief distributions related to absolute as well as relative overcon-
fidence to study it comprehensively while influencing it via performance feedback. In
addition, my setting allows me to introduce systematic variation in the possibility for
competition neglect. Studying these two mechanisms simultaneously is relevant as both
overconfidence and competition neglect potentially lead to the same behavioral pattern,
namely excess entry. However, for de-biasing, it is essential to know whether individu-
als overestimate their chances of success because they overestimate their performance
in absolute terms or relative to others, or because they do not realize that they face a
selected set of competitors.
With this in mind, I let individuals decide whether they want to enter a competition in a
real-effort experiment while eliciting their beliefs with respect to their own and others’
performance as well as their winning probability. To answer my research question, I in-
troduce two treatment variations: First, some participants receive detailed performance
feedback addressing absolute and relative overconfidence before making their decision.
Comparing entry decisions of individuals who have received feedback to those who
have not enables me to investigate whether overconfidence plays a role for selection
into competition – if there is a difference between those groups, it does. Second, I vary
whether the competition group consists of all potential competitors or only of individu-
als who also chose to compete. Here, finding no difference in entry between the groups
implies that decision makers fail to adjust their decisions to the selected sample, thus
exhibiting competition neglect.
The main findings of this paper are as follows: Individuals exhibit pronounced hetero-
geneity with respect to their performance beliefs, with low-performing individuals over-
estimating their own performance and their chances of success while underestimating
performance in the competition group, and the opposite being true for high-performing
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individuals. These biases in performance beliefs are ameliorated by feedback, but the
composition of the competition group is persistently disregarded. Investigating deter-
minants of entry decisions to tackle the key question of this paper whether competition
neglect and overconfidence influence entry into competition, I find that both influence
individuals’ decisions. However, competition entry closely tied to previous performance
and assessments, and in contrast to the literature, there are no gender differences in
beliefs and entry decisions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of
related literature. Section 4.3 presents a simple theoretical framework illustrating the
main argument of this paper that overconfidence and competition neglect lead to the
same behavioral changes while constituting different mechanisms. This is the prerequi-
site of the experimental design, which is presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 describes
and analyzes the experimental results. Section 4.6 discusses and concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
This study relates to several strands of literature. First, there is a wide variety of research
focusing on overentry into markets of entrepreneurs, which are highly competitive en-
vironments (see, e.g., Camerer and Lovallo, 1999, for an early lab experiment). In
this setting, empirical evidence suggests that an entrepreneur’s confidence in his own
skill, ability and knowledge has a crucial impact on new business creation and might
explain the high failure rate of new business owners (Koellinger et al., 2007; Cain et al.,
2015; Bolger et al., 2008). Apart from overconfidence, the neglect of selective entry of
competitors into a market may be a leading cause of failure: Even if an entrepreneur
assesses his skills correctly, he may still be not aware of the fact that his competitors
are not a random sample of the population, but have abilities that are at least as good
as his. The competitors’ skills may be even higher, since their business has survived
years of constant pressure from market powers that drive out non-competitive partici-
pants (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Moore et al., 2007). Competition neglect has been
shown to also matter for market entry decisions in other situations like selling on eBay
(Simonsohn, 2010). However, systematic identification of competition neglect remains
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scarce. Thus, my study contributes to this strand of literature by experimentally varying
the possibility of competition neglect.
Second, entry into competition has been extensively studied from a different angle:
over the course of the last decade, a large number of studies has explored gender dif-
ferences in competition decisions (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011, for an overview).
In particular, one worrying finding is that high-performing women appear to opt out
of competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). Building on the seminal
work by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), who focus on individual-level competition de-
cisions and find a large gender gap, it has been suggested that women show a lower
willingness to engage in competition, a finding that has also been replicated in real-
world occupation settings (Flory et al., 2015). Regarding the mechanisms driving this,
a plethora of laboratory evidence has been produced. At first, differences were mostly
attributed to heterogeneity in attitudes towards competition as well as risk and feed-
back aversion (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). Lately, it has been argued, however, that
differences in beliefs could explain the above-described outcomes. Psychology research
suggests that women exhibit less overconfidence than men, a finding that has been
recently incorporated in economic investigations (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011).
My study thus contributes to the literature on gender and competition by investigating
more closely how biased beliefs about the performances of oneself and the competition
contribute to differences in selection into competition.
Third, my study is related to the literature addressing the potentially benefiting role of
feedback in reducing overconfidence effects (see Arkes et al., 1987, for an early paper
on this). Several papers study how subjects update their relative performance beliefs
and the relation to competition decisions. A general finding is that while there is belief
updating, after noisy feedback, individuals tend to update less than a Bayesian would
(Möbius et al., 2014). For instance, Buser et al. (2016) show that there is heterogeneity
in this conservatism, with women being more conservative than men. Wozniak et al.
(2014) find that providing relative feedback causes more high-performing women and
less low-performing men to select into competition, thus reducing the gender gap in
competition decisions. Berlin and Dargnies (2016) use a setting close to mine (except
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for only giving binary feedback) and show that different aspects of performance matter
for men and women. In contrast to most of this literature, I give full performance
feedback. In this setup, I also see sensible, albeit conservative belief adjustment.
Before going into details of the experiment, I now describe a simple theoretical frame-
work of how overconfidence and competition neglect influence decision making.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
The goal of this section is to stress the central argument of this paper that multiple
causes of biased beliefs leading to biased entry into competition exist that need to be
addressed in different ways: overconfidence and competition neglect. Thus, the model
illustrates how the two mechanisms lead to the same changes in behavior albeit being
conceptually different.
4.3.1 Model Setup
I assume that an individual i can be of two types, θi ∈ {θL; θH}, where θH > θL. θi
represents the productivity of the individual in some task. There are N individuals
who all face an identical game with the following structure that is common knowledge:
First, nature draws the type of all players i ∈ {1, .., N}. Here, type θH is assigned with
probability p. Second, every agent receives a private signal S = θi + ε with ε ∼ N(0, σ2),
which determines the posterior probability qi the individual assigns to being of type
θH .2 Hence, there is individual heterogeneity with respect to posterior beliefs qi. Third,
every individual is facing a choice between two options: to enter a competition or to
receive an individual payment. If competition is chosen, the individual is matched with
a randomly drawn opponent j who has also chosen to compete.3 She receives a piece
rate of pC if her productivity is higher than that of her opponent and nothing otherwise.
If both individuals are of the same type, the winner is randomly chosen. If the individual
2 This structure was chosen to generate continuous posterior beliefs about being of type θH . This has
the advantage that it allows to identify threshold equilibria and analyze comparative statics.
3 Note that I assume here that there is always at least one competitor as allowing for the possibility that
there is none would make the problem more complicated while not affecting the main conclusions.
Furthermore, this case did never occur in the experiment.
114
OVERCONFIDENCE, COMPETITION NEGLECT, AND COMPETITION ENTRY
payment is chosen, a lower piece rate of pNC < pC is received for sure.
4.3.2 Rational Benchmark
Assuming risk neutrality, individual i’s expected utility from choosing competition equals
EC = pC × [qiθH × (0.5qj + (1− qj)) + (1− qi)θL × 0.5 (1− qj)],
where qj = Pr(θj = θH | j enters). In this case, her expected utility equals
ENC = pNC × [qiθH + (1− qi)θL].
The individual decision is made by comparison of the expected utilities in both cases:
if the expected utility from entering the competition exceeds the expected payoff from
the individual payment, the individual enters. Then, she is indifferent between entering
the competition and receiving an individual payoff at
q∗i (s, ξ, qj) =
2− (1− qj)s
ξ[s(2− qj)− 2]− [(1− qj)s− 2]
where s = pC
pNC
> 1 and ξ = θH
θL
> 1.
I focus on the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is characterized as follows:
Proposition 4.1. For any qi and q∗ =
2−(1−qj)s
ξ[s(2−qj)−2]−[(1−qj)s−2] , there exists an equilibrium
in pure threshold strategies where ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, individual i enters the competition if
qi > q
∗, and chooses the individual payoff if qi < q∗.
To establish qi ≶ q∗ as sensible decision criterion, q∗ has to exist, be monotone and
unique. Proofs for existence and uniqueness of q∗ are straightforward. For monotonicity,
I investigate the effects of s, ξ, and qj on q∗ and show that all of them are unambiguous.4
First, the comparative static of q∗ with respect to the piece rate ratio s is
∂q∗
∂s
< 0.
4 The proofs for existence and uniqueness as well as the derivatives and the determination of their
signs can be found in Appendix D.1.
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In terms of the model, this means that as the piece rate ratio increases, the cutoff for
entering the competition decreases. Intuitively, this makes sense as the piece rate ra-
tio is a measure for the relative attractiveness of the competition that increases in the
difference between the competitive and individual piece rates. Hence, as competition
becomes more attractive compared to the individual incentives, the cutoff value de-
creases and more individuals enter the competition. Second, the comparative static of
q∗ with respect to the productivity ratio ξ is
∂q∗
∂ξ
< 0.
This means that as the performance difference between the high type and the low type
increases, the decision cutoff decreases, which makes intuitive sense: as relative pro-
ductivity associated with being of type θH increases, expected utility from choosing
competition rises faster than expected utility from choosing the individual pay as the
piece rate is higher for the former than for the latter. Third, the comparative static of q∗
with respect to the probability that the competitor is of type θH , qj, is
∂q∗
∂qj
> 0.
Thus, the decision cutoff increases in probability that the competitor is of type θH . This
result is intuitive as well as an increase in this probability makes it less likely that the
competition is won. This way, an increase in qj decreases the expected utility from
competition while it does not affect expected utility from individual payment.
4.3.3 Introducing Biased Beliefs
Having established the cutoff value q∗ as an equilibrium, I now introduce overconfidence
and competition neglect and derive predictions how the cutoff and thus the fraction of
individuals entering competition changes. Throughout, I assume full naiveté about
the biases; that is, all players assume that they themselves and all other players act
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according to the rational benchmark.5
For overconfidence, I follow Moore and Healy (2008) and focus on two different aspects,
overestimation of own performance and underestimation of others’ performance, as
both are potential ways to generate overplacement.
First, to introduce a simple notion of overconfidence, assume that the true probability
of being of type θH is qtruei . Rather than having realistic beliefs about own ability, i.e.,
qi = q
true
i , an individual subject to overconfidence believes that qi = q̂i with q̂i > q
true
i .
Then, beliefs that satisfy qtruei < q
∗ < q̂i lead to competition entry even though this is
not payoff-maximizing. This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction 4.1. Overestimation of own performance leads to overentry into competition.
An additional way to introduce overconfidence is via the belief about the type of the
competitor, qj. More specifically, assume that an overconfident agent underestimates
the competition, i.e. qj < qtruej . As already discussed above, the cutoff value q
∗ is
positively related to qj. Thus, if the agent underestimates the probability of facing a
strong competitor, she is also going to underestimate the cutoff value: q∗(qj) < q∗(qtruej ).
This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction 4.2. Underestimation of competitor’s performance leads to overentry into com-
petition.
Second, to investigate the effect of competition neglect on competition choices, the
belief about the probability that the random competitor is of type θH , qj, is central.
Remember that the cutoff value for selecting into competition increases in qj. To un-
derstand how competition neglect influences this value, note that qj is a conditional
probability as the competitor has also made the choice to compete. Assuming rational
agents, qtruej = Pr(θj = θH | j enters) ∈ [q∗, 1]. In contrast, if the individual is subject
to (full) competition neglect, she does not take into account the choice made by the
competitors and considers the unconditional probability that her competitor is of type
5 Of course, this is a very strong assumption that is made to keep the analysis as simple as possible.
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θH , q̂j = Pr(θj = θH) ∈ [0; 1]. It follows that q̂j < qtruej , which in turn leads to a decrease
in the cutoff value: q∗(q̂j) < q∗(qtruej ).
Prediction 4.3. Competition neglect leads to overentry into competition.
This simple model sketch illustrates the argument central to this paper, namely that
overconfidence and competition neglect lead to similar changes in behavior compared
to the rational benchmark – both lead to excess entry into competition. Thus, they
cannot be disentangled by only looking at behavioral outcomes. As a consequence,
both potential mechanisms have to be investigated carefully in an experiment exploring
causes of biased entry. The following section presents the experimental design utilized
in this study in detail. It is designed to help explore the role of overconfidence and
competition neglect for competition decisions.
4.4 Experimental Design
The experiment proceeded as follows: Upon arriving at the laboratory and being ran-
domly assigned to cubicles, participants were given general instructions and told that
they would work on two unrelated parts. They were informed that their payment would
depend on their performance and actions in the experiment, but that only one of the
rounds or choices in each of the two parts would be paid out. To ensure incentive com-
patibility, participants would only be notified of the payoff-relevant rounds, decisions
and performance at the very end of the experiment. Then, the main part of the ex-
periment started immediately. In each of several rounds, participants had to work on
different tasks: They performed a real-effort task under varying incentive schemes and
had to answer several belief elicitation questions. In the last of three rounds, partici-
pants also had to make a choice between individual and competitive pay. Beliefs were
elicited in every round. To experimentally vary overconfidence and competition neglect,
I included two types of between-subject variation: depending on treatment, participants
either received performance feedback or not, and either faced a random competitor or
one that chose to compete. A summary of the procedure of this part is shown in Figure
4.1, and details about the different elements of the main part of the experiment are
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Figure 4.1: Experimental procedure in the main part of the experiment
provided in the following subsections.6 After completing this part, risk preferences of
participants were elicited as these have been shown to be an important determinant of
selecting into competitive environments. This was done using the standard choice list
procedure following Holt and Laury (2002). After this second part was completed, par-
ticipants were informed about their performance and payoffs and had to answer some
general socio-economic questions.7
4.4.1 Real-Effort Task
In the real-effort task, participants had to correctly add as many blocks of five two-digit
numbers as possible in three minutes. This task is commonly used in the experimental
literature because it is easy to explain and produces substantial variation in individual
performance (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Subjects were not allowed to use a cal-
6 Note that the experiment also incorporated a fourth round, which required subjects to choose be-
tween incentive schemes, but based on past rather than future performance. This round was con-
ducted for robustness only and is thus not included in the main part of this paper. The results are
qualitatively similar for those of round three. For the interested reader, a short description of this
round and results are provided in Appendix D.4.
7 These included gender, age, field of study, math grade as a crude proxy for general mental ability,
familiarity with experiments, and mood.
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culator, but were given a pen and scratch paper that they were welcome to use. In each
round of the real-effort task, five randomly selected two-digit numbers were depicted
on the screen in a row, with an additional field for the solution. Upon typing in their
solution, participants had to confirm by clicking a "Submit" button and were then given
the next five numbers. In contrast to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), subjects were
not forced to try one problem until they got the answer right, and they were not in-
formed about the number of problems they had already solved correctly in that round.
This was mainly done because this way, there is a greater scope for overestimation of
own performance.8 In addition to staying close to the related literature, I chose this
task because it can be seen as ego-relevant for a student subject pool and is therefore
more likely to produce overly favorable judgments (Grossman and Owens, 2012) and
because it has been argued in the literature there should not be a significant gender gap
in performance in this task (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Buser et al., 2014).
4.4.2 Incentives and Reference Group
After being told that they would have to work on the real-effort task and being given
one minute to practice, participants faced three rounds with the same basic setup: In the
beginning of each round, participants were informed about the payment rules. Then,
performance beliefs were elicited before the actual task was conducted.
The rounds mainly differed in incentives. More specifically, following Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007), in the first round, all subjects received a piece rate of 0.50 e for
every correctly solved item. In the second round, all subjects then faced a competitive
pay: they received a higher piece rate of 1.00 e per correctly solved item, but only if
their performance in that round was higher than that of a randomly chosen opponent
from the reference group. For round three, participants then could choose between the
lower piece rate of 0.50 e and the competitive payment scheme.
Here, it is important to note that the reference group for this and every other competi-
8 In addition, the authors also state that they chose to force participants to answer a problem correctly
before being able to proceed to prohibit them to skip hard problems and search for easy ones. In my
case, there was no subject showing this behavior.
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tive incentive scheme as well as for the corresponding belief elicitations explained in the
following subsection did not consist of the other participants of the same experimental
session, but of participants of a past session. This was mainly done for two reasons:
On the one hand, it ensured that it was possible to inform participants about choices of
the reference group before they had to make their own choices, and on the other hand,
this way every observation in one session can be treated as an independent observa-
tion, which substantively increases the statistical power of the analyses. In addition,
individual behavior could not affect others’ payoff, ruling out any influence of social
preferences on competition choices.
4.4.3 Treatment Variations
To get at overconfidence and competition neglect, two treatment variations were imple-
mented in the main part of the experiment: First, to address overconfidence, feedback
on own and others’ performance was given between rounds two and three in half of the
sessions. More specifically, participants in the feedback condition were told the number
of items they had solved in round two as well as the average number of items solved
and the whole performance distribution in the reference group. Second, the possibil-
ity for competition neglect was manipulated by design as in half of the sessions, the
competitive pay was dependent on the performance of a randomly drawn participant
of the reference group, while in the other half, the competition group in rounds three
and four only consisted of participants of the reference group who had also chosen to
work under the competitive incentive scheme in that round. This way, participants in
the selection condition also had to factor in that they were facing a selected sample of
better-performing individuals. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the treatment conditions.
Taken together, these treatment variations make it possible to explore how feedback
about own and others’ performance affects participants’ beliefs and choices, if and how
strongly participants are able to factor in the selectiveness of their competitors, and how
this can be influenced by feedback as well.
9 Treatment conditions are named according to the addressed mechanism. Hence, in Selection, com-
petition neglect is eliminated while overconfidence is not addressed, and in Overconfidence, overcon-
fidence is tackled by feedback while the possibility for competition neglect persists.
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Table 4.1: Overview of the treatment conditions 9
Competition Group
Selected Random
Performance Feedback
No None Selection
Yes Overconfidence Both
4.4.4 Belief Elicitation
Because belief elicitation is crucial for addressing my research questions, beliefs are
elicited in every round rather than at the very end of the experiment. In addition,
instead of only eliciting participants’ subjective ranks, I ask a total of three questions
to get at the different facets of errors in beliefs and, in this way, at overconfidence and
competition neglect.
First, it is important to keep in mind that concerns have been voiced that "overconfident"
behavior is consistent with Bayesian updating in many cases. According to Benoît and
Dubra (2011), this can be tracked back to the fact that the conventionally used research
methodology does not allow to disentangle true overconfidence from rational informa-
tion processing. Merkle and Weber (2011) identify aggregation of beliefs as greatest
concern and show that eliciting belief distributions allows to rule out rational belief up-
dating as explanation. I address these concerns by eliciting the whole belief distribution
for own performance in the task as well as performance of a randomly drawn individual
of the reference group. To do so, I implemented the procedure proposed by Harrison
et al. (2015, 2017). More specifically, beliefs were elicited using a range of possible
responses that were presented as ten intervals. Subjects then could allocate a total of
100 tokens according to their subjective beliefs. The allocation translated into payoffs
according to the quadratic scoring rule with a maximum payoff of 2 e per question.
Harrison et al. (2017) show that using this approach allows to elicit distributions while
keeping the bias caused by risk aversion minimal.10 Thus, I use these two questions to
10 Subjects were given detailed instructions explaining that the allocation of tokens to intervals com-
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assess absolute and relative overconfidence reflected in performance beliefs.
Second, I elicited participants’ subjective probability of performing better than a ran-
domly chosen participant of the reference group using a reservation probability or
crossover mechanism as first proposed by Ducharme and Donnell (1973) and imple-
mented in variants by Möbius et al. (2014), Buser et al. (2016) or van Veldhuizen
(2017), among others.11 In particular, subjects had to indicate the probability ps that
made them indifferent between receiving either a price of 2 e if their performance is
better than that of a randomly drawn opponent or 2 e with that probability. Then, a
random number z was drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1] and sub-
jects received 2 e with probability z if z > ps and 2 e if their performance was better
than that of a randomly drawn opponent otherwise. This procedure makes stating the
true probability incentive compatible.12 This question functions as compound measure
for overconfidence and competition neglect.
4.5 Results
The experiment was conducted at MELESSA, the experimental laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Munich, in June of 2017. A total number of 240 participants were recruited using
Orsee (Greiner, 2015) and took part in 10 sessions (two for deriving the performance
of the reference group, and eight main sessions) which each lasted about 70 minutes.
The following analyses focus on the eight main sessions. In total, 192 subjects took
part in these sessions. Apart from one subject who tried to use a cell phone calculator
to solve the task, all participants with a performance of more than 20 correctly solved
items per round were excluded from the analysis to eliminate outliers. This leaves 189
subjects (96 men and 93 women) for the analysis.
First of all, I check for pre-treatment differences between the treatment groups by per-
prised a trade-off between payoffs and risk. The full instructions can be found in Appendix D.5.
11 See Schlag et al. (2015) for an overview of this and other belief elicitation mechanisms.
12 Again, subjects were given detailed instructions and had to answer several control questions to
make sure that they understood that they would maximize their expected payoff by choosing their
subjective probability of winning as the threshold value.
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forming Kruskal-Wallis tests on observable characteristics to test whether the samples
are drawn from the same distribution. The tests detect no significant differences on
observables except for biased beliefs about others’ performance in rounds one and two
(χ2=8.24, p=.0413 and χ2=11.56, p=.0009).13 However, this means that results with
respect to beliefs about others’ performance can only be interpreted with caution.
In addition, I assess whether there is productivity sorting of the reference group (i.e.,
whether the performance of the selected sample is indeed better than the performance
of the random sample) by calculating a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of dis-
tribution functions between the groups, which turns out to be significant (D=0.35,
p=.086), indicating that there is indeed productivity sorting in my sample. Individuals
facing the selected sample should factor that in when making competition decisions.14
Having established these preliminaries, I now turn to investigating the effects of over-
confidence and competition neglect in my sample. I do so in two steps: First, I focus
on beliefs, give an impression of how they look like in my sample and show how they
are affected by the treatment variations. Then, I turn to entry decisions by again first
presenting the general pattern and then addressing treatment effects.
4.5.1 Beliefs
In the following paragraphs, I take a closer look at participants’ beliefs across rounds.
Despite having elicited whole belief distributions, I first calculate expected values of
performances and focus on these. To arrive at a measure for subjects’ overconfidence,
I then compute the difference between expected and actual number of correctly solved
items. Positive values indicate that own performance is overestimated, while negative
values indicate that it is underestimated. Analogously, the difference between expected
and actual number of correctly solved items of a randomly drawn individual from the
competition group is calculated. For subjective winning probability, I compute the actual
probability of winning for every number of correctly solved items based on reference
13 The averages of observable characteristics (age, risk aversion, performance and beliefs in rounds one
and two) can be found in Table D.1 in Appendix D.2.
14 Note that productivity sorting can also be seen in the main sessions (D=0.38, p<.001).
124
OVERCONFIDENCE, COMPETITION NEGLECT, AND COMPETITION ENTRY
Figure 4.2: Average bias in beliefs
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Notes: Upper row depicts average bias in beliefs about own performance (left panel), ref-
erence group performance (middle panel) and winning probability (right panel) in rounds
one and two in the main sessions. Lower row depicts average bias in beliefs about own per-
formance (left panel), reference group performance (middle panel) and winning probability
(right panel) by Treatment in round three in the main sessions. Calculations are based on
189 observations. Means are depicted as bars, 95% confidence intervals as error bars.
group performance and subtract this from participants’ stated winning probability. This
procedure results in three values for erroneous beliefs per round.
First, I explore how accurate beliefs are and how they are distributed in my sample.
To this end, Figure 4.2 depicts average deviations in beliefs from actual scores. Here,
two things are especially noteworthy. First, the upper row clearly shows that on aver-
age, participants in my sample have very accurate beliefs by round two: while there
is overestimation of own and (less drastically) also of others’ performance as well as
overestimation of the chances of being better than a randomly drawn individual from
the reference group in the first round, none of these statements holds true for average
beliefs in round two. In addition, the lower row of Figure 4.2 shows that in round three,
there are differences in beliefs between treatments: underestimation of others’ perfor-
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Figure 4.3: Beliefs and overestimations by actual performance in round two.
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Notes: Upper row of figure depicts beliefs about own performance (left panel), reference
group performance (middle panel) and winning probability (right panel) depending on ac-
tual performance in round two of the main sessions. Lower row depicts bias in beliefs about
own performance (left panel), reference group performance (middle panel) and winning
probability (right panel) depending on actual performance. Calculations are based on 189
observations.
mance and overestimation of winning probability is stronger when facing the selected
than when facing the random competition group, providing evidence for competition
neglect. Interestingly, this difference is more pronounced when no feedback is provided.
Next, I explore heterogeneity in beliefs. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, there is systematic
heterogeneity even in round two. Plotting beliefs and overestimation values by actual
performance, it is evident that low-performing subjects are more prone to overestimate
themselves while underestimating the reference group as well as overestimating their
chances of performing better than a randomly drawn individual from the reference
group.15
15 One might argue that this effect is at least partly mechanic as high-performing individuals have
little scope to overestimate and much scope to underestimate themselves, while for low-performing
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Having established how participants’ beliefs behave, I now investigate whether they are
influenced by giving feedback and by the composition of the reference group to see
whether the treatments worked as expected. This way, exploring changes in subjects’
assessments serves as a prerequisite for identifying the effect of competition neglect and
overconfidence on choices. Thus, I explore determinants of changes in beliefs between
rounds two and three in various specifications in Table 4.2.
First, to see whether competition neglect is reflected in participants’ beliefs, focus on the
coefficient for the selected competition group when change in winning probability is the
dependent variable, which is insignificant regardless of specification; thus, compound
beliefs are not adjusted more strongly when facing the selected competition group.
Second, I investigate whether absolute and relative overconfidence are ameliorated by
providing feedback. The first thing to note is that the coefficient for feedback is in-
significant regardless of specification. However, since it might be important to account
for the fact that subjects receiving feedback have better information, I additionally look
at the interaction between feedback and round two performance. As can be seen in
columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.2, the positive effect of previous performance on belief
changes is indeed higher when performance feedback is provided. In columns (7) to
(9) of Table 4.2, I include round two overestimations and interactions with feedback to
explore whether subjects exhibiting higher pre-treatment overestimation correct their
estimations more strongly. This would mean that changes in beliefs are sensible, that
is, feedback ameliorates perception biases. Indeed, round two overestimations of own
and others’ performance have a negative influence on changes in beliefs, meaning that
stronger round two overestimations are associated with changes towards lower perfor-
mance beliefs. When feedback is provided, this negative influence is even stronger. For
winning probability, previous overestimation only has a significantly negative influence
on belief changes when feedback is provided.
individuals, the opposite is true. However, this does not apply to beliefs about others as these should
be independent of own performance. In addition, the relationship between actual and overestimation
of own performance and winning probability is still significantly negative if overestimation is not
considered continuously, but as binary variable (point-biserial correlations are r=–.37, p<.001 for
own performance, and r=–.66, p<.001 for winning probability).
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Table 4.2: Determinants of changes in beliefs between rounds two and three
DV: Changes in (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
beliefs about... Self Others Probability Self Others Probability Self Others Probability
Feedback = 1 -0.237 -0.225 -0.359 -0.292 -0.195 -1.013 0.0129 0.00671 0.446
(0.200) (0.193) (1.698) (0.191) (0.188) (1.628) (0.115) (0.147) (1.413)
Selection = 1 -0.140 -0.0784 -1.592 -0.196 -0.0485 -2.260 0.0113 0.200 -3.088**
(0.193) (0.190) (1.699) (0.186) (0.183) (1.646) (0.107) (0.133) (1.385)
Previous Performance 0.538*** -0.160 3.230*** 0.257** -0.0101 -0.106
(0.119) (0.112) (0.941) (0.103) (0.114) (0.795)
1.feedback 0.590** -0.315 7.018***
#c.Score_pre (0.233) (0.225) (1.473)
Previous overestimation -0.294*** -0.143*** -3.118
(0.0382) (0.0504) (3.552)
1.feedback -0.401*** -0.511*** -37.89***
#c.overestimation_pre (0.0529) (0.0719) (5.375)
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.00727 0.0783 0.175 0.0172 0.159 0.730 0.462 0.365
Notes: Table reports results of OLS regression. Controls include risk aversion, gender, age, an indicator for field of study, and math grade.
Previous score is standardized. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 4.4: Changes in beliefs by overestimation in round two
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Notes: Figure depicts changes in beliefs about own performance (left panel), reference group
performance (middle panel) and winning probability (right panel) between rounds two and
three depending on overestimation in round two of the main sessions. Calculations are
based on 189 observations.
The benefiting role of performance feedback on performance beliefs is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.4. Here, it can be seen clearly that while there is some adjustment in beliefs, it is
not perfect (if it was, observations would lie on the inverse 45 degree line). For over-
estimation of own and others’ performance, there is adjustment even without feedback
(dark dashed lines do not overlap with horizontal line), while this is not true for win-
ning probability. More importantly, the adjustment is stronger if feedback is provided,
as the comparisons of dark and light dashed lines in all three graphs indicate. Thus,
providing feedback leads to sensible changes in beliefs.
To sum up, the analysis of individuals’ beliefs demonstrates that there is systematic het-
erogeneity in beliefs about own performance, others’ performance, and winning prob-
ability. While changes in beliefs are not influenced by the composition of the reference
group, revealing competition neglect, they are positively affected by performance feed-
back, revealing overconfidence that can be ameliorated. Hence, these results establish
that both of the mechanisms that are discussed to influence competition entry are preva-
lent in this experiment.16
16 Note that in contrast to what other studies find, there are no gender differences in beliefs. For the
interested reader, analyses of gender differences are provided in Appendix D.3.
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4.5.2 Competition Decisions
After having explored individuals’ beliefs, I now turn to the main dependent variable,
decisions to compete, and thus to the main focus of this paper, namely how overconfi-
dence and competition neglect influence selection into competition. Again, I investigate
this question by first providing a general impression of competition decisions in my
sample before systematically investigating determinants of competition choices.
To start, I assess whether there is excess entry in my setup. Across all treatments,
33.33% of individuals choose the competitive incentive scheme. Considering the actual
distribution of performances in the reference group, a payoff-maximizing individual
should choose competition if her round three performance equals at least eight correctly
solved items.17 Assuming that performances in rounds two and three are equal, 35.98%
of individuals have higher expected earnings when choosing competition. Thus, I do
not find excess entry compared this benchmark in my sample.
However, these comparisons are based on the assumption of payoff-maximization and
thus are rather strict. Therefore, I next explore competition decisions depending on
round two performance and beliefs about winning probability. The left panel of Figure
4.5 depicts the proportion of participants selecting into competition by performance
quartile in the initial competition. Contrary to what Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)
find, there is a positive relationship between performance quartile and proportion of
competition decisions. The right panel of Figure 4.5 depicts the proportion of partici-
pants selecting into competition by subjective probability of winning. There is a positive
relationship between beliefs and the proportion of subjects selecting into competition
that is even stronger than for previous performance. Thus, individuals’ competition
decisions in my sample are closely tied to their previous performance and beliefs.
To answer my central question whether competition decisions are influenced by over-
confidence and competition neglect, I explore competition decisions by treatment; if
competition neglect plays a role, differences between the None and Selection as well
17 Figure D.1 in Appendix D.2 plots actual chances of winning depending on performance. It can be
seen that the winning probability exceeds 50% for more than seven correctly solved items.
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Figure 4.5: Competition choices by previous performance and beliefs
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Notes: Figure depicts fractions of individuals choosing the competitive incentive scheme in
round three of the main sessions by performance quartile in round two (left panel) and
subjective winning probability (right panel). Calculations are based on 189 observations.
Figure 4.6: Competition choices by treatment
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Notes: Figure depicts fraction of participants choosing the competitive incentive scheme in
round three of the main sessions by treatment condition. Calculations are based on 189
observations.
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as between the Overconfidence and Both treatments should be smaller than expected.
If errors in performance beliefs influence decisions, this should be reflected in the dif-
ference between treatments with and without feedback as well as in the influence of
beliefs. The fraction of individuals selecting the competitive incentive scheme by treat-
ment as well as the fraction of individuals for which it is the payoff-maximizing choice
are depicted in Figure 4.6. Apart from the fact that absolute ratios of subjects decid-
ing to compete seem pretty low when compared to previous literature18 and are lower
than the payoff-maximizing benchmark, there are no striking differences in competition
rates between the treatments. Testing for gender differences within treatment and for
treatment differences with Fisher exact tests does not detect significant effects.
Next, I take a closer look at determinants of competition decisions. The results of lin-
ear probability model estimations with decisions to compete as dependent variable are
shown in Table 4.3. First, it can be seen that the main effects for performance feedback
as well as for facing the self-selected competition group are nonsignificant, which is not
surprising given Figure 4.6. Second, as indicated by Figure 4.5, previous performance
has a positive effect on the probability to choose the competitive incentive scheme. Ad-
ditionally, while the gender and competition literature has established that there is a
gender difference in competitiveness (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011), I find no effect
of gender in my sample, while risk aversion has a significantly negative effect on se-
lection into competition.19 In columns (3) and (4), performance beliefs are included
in the model. Now, the coefficients for all three performance assessments are signifi-
cant, indicating that these beliefs influence competition decisions beyond performance.
More specifically, holding actual round two performance constant, participants are more
likely to select the competitive incentive scheme if they believe to have a higher perfor-
mance, if they assess their competitors’ performance to be lower, and if they believe to
have a higher probability of winning. Thus, overly optimistic beliefs indeed influence
participants’ competition decisions.
18 In Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), 73% of men and 35% of women enter. While their setup is
slightly different from mine as participants have to outperform three others, studies also employing
the two-person competition with a randomly drawn competitor find similar entry rates; for instance,
in Berlin and Dargnies (2016), 63.2% of men and 35.1% of women initially chose to compete.
19 A separate analysis of treatment effects for men and women is provided in Appendix D.3.
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Table 4.3: Determinants of competition choices
DV: Competition (Y/N) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback = 1 -0.00974 0.00317 0.00333 0.00785
(0.0634) (0.0656) (0.0591) (0.0598)
Selection = 1 -0.0519 -0.0582 -0.0311 -0.0357
(0.0627) (0.0665) (0.0567) (0.0584)
Previous performance 0.0581*** 0.0613*** -0.0266 -0.0255
(0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0235) (0.0234)
Own performance belief 0.107*** 0.112***
(0.0306) (0.0313)
Others’ performance belief -0.0797*** -0.0799***
(0.0271) (0.0291)
Subj. winning probability 0.628*** 0.620***
(0.168) (0.176)
Female = 1 -0.0346 -0.00442 0.0294 0.0538
(0.0659) (0.0694) (0.0587) (0.0606)
Risk Aversion -0.0438** -0.0424** -0.0305* -0.0291*
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0163) (0.0166)
Constant 0.259* 0.750*** 0.112 0.433
(0.156) (0.262) (0.190) (0.276)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 189 187 189 187
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.151 0.306 0.304
Notes: Table reports results of linear probability estimations. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Estimations are based on round three. Controls include age, an indicator
for field of study (business, economics, STEM, humanities, law, psychology, other social
sciences, other), and math grade. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Regarding the central question asked in this paper, the following conclusions can be
drawn based on the experimental results: as the proportion of participants selecting
into the competitive incentive scheme does not depend on the composition of the com-
petition group, competition neglect increases entry into competition. In addition, I also
find evidence for the positive influence of absolute and relative overconfidence on entry
into competition. Performance feedback does ameliorate bias in performance beliefs,
but does not influence competition decisions directly.
4.5.3 The Effect of Pre-Treatment Belief Elicitation
In light of the vast literature on competitiveness, where competition rates are exces-
sive and overconfidence is prevalent on average, it is surprising that in my setup, belief
calibration works reasonably well, and that competition decisions are tied closely to
performance and expectations. However, one clear point of departure of the present
study is that the belief elicitation is conducted with three questions and that the be-
lief questions are asked before the task in every round, making them salient. In this
way, participants are forced to think very carefully about how they perceive their per-
formance in the task relative to others, while other studies rely on eliciting the beliefs
only after participants have made their decisions. Put differently, the belief elicitation
procedure itself could cause subjects to think deliberately about the aspects relevant
to the decision while not asking allows them to make intuitive "gut decisions". This
is in line with dual-process theories of higher cognition in psychological research (see
Kahneman, 2011; Evans, 2008; Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
To address the fact that competition decisions in the main sessions looked starkly differ-
ent from the findings in the literature and to explore whether the belief elicitation pro-
cedure in itself might already change the way the competition decision is approached,
I conducted four additional sessions. These sessions have the exact same setup as the
main sessions, with the exception that the belief elicitation in rounds one and two is
dropped so that beliefs are now elicited for the first time only after the competition
choice is made. However, note that the sessions conducted so far only yield 69 addi-
tional observations (44 women and 25 men). Thus, the results presented in this Section
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Figure 4.7: Competition choices in additional sessions
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Notes: Figure depicts fraction of men and women choosing the competitive incentive scheme
in round three of the additional sessions by round two performance quartile (left panel) and
by Treatment (right panel). Calculations are based on 25 men and 44 women.
are preliminary and have to be interpreted with caution.
Of course, this change in procedure makes it impossible to explicitly investigate changes
in beliefs as the pre-decision measures are missing. However, I am still able to investi-
gate the relationship between competition decisions and performance and to compare
competition decisions across treatments. These relationships are illustrated in Figure
4.7. As can be seen in the left panel, exploring competition choices depending on previ-
ous performance reveals a different picture than in the main sessions: there is no clear
positive relationship between performance quartile and the proportion of individuals
selecting into competition.
In a next step, the fraction of individuals selecting into competition depending on the
treatment conditions is depicted in the right panel of Figure 4.7. Again, there is less
entry than would be payoff-maximizing, and the general pattern suggests that over-
confidence as well as competition neglect influence choices. Giving feedback seems to
reduce the fraction of individuals selecting the competitive incentives, and the com-
position of the competition group does not have a clear effect – while there is a slight
increase from None to Selection, the opposite is true for Overconfidence to Both. However,
the fraction of payoff-maximizing competition entries does vary substantively, making
clear statements about overconfidence and competition neglect difficult. While this
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seems puzzling, keep in mind that treatments were between-subject and the sample
size is rather small, making differences between the groups more likely. This is also
why I refrain from investigating determinants of competition choices using a regression
framework for now.
Finally, to investigate whether the results obtained in these additional sessions are in-
deed closer to the competition patterns that are found in the literature, I compare selec-
tion into competition by men and women. Overall, 44% of men choose the competitive
incentive scheme, while only 20.45% of women do, making the difference in choices
more extreme compared to the sessions with belief elicitation in every round. Indeed,
the difference in competition choices between men and women is significant for the
additional sessions (two-sided Fisher exact test: p=.054). In Selection, which is closest
to the setting used in the gender and competition literature, the difference is even more
pronounced: 66.67% of men choose to compete while only 30% of women do.20
To sum up, the additional sessions conducted without belief elicitation before the com-
petition choice provide preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that the belief elicitation
procedure itself might lead to changes in the way individuals process the decision.
4.6 Discussion
In this paper, I presented the results of a laboratory experiment designed to explore two
distinct mechanisms underlying perception biases that influence selection into compe-
tition: overconfidence with respect to own and others’ performance and competition
neglect. In my setting, I find that there is systematic heterogeneity in perception bi-
ases, with low-performing individuals overestimating their own performance and their
chances of success while underestimating performance in the competition group, while
the opposite is true for high-performing individuals. These biases in performance beliefs
are ameliorated by feedback; however, individuals persistently disregard the composi-
tion of the competition group they face. Investigating determinants of entry decisions to
20 This is quite close to the 73% and 35% in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and the 63.2% and 35.1%
in Berlin and Dargnies (2016).
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tackle the key question of this paper whether competition neglect and overconfidence
influence entry into competition, I find that both matter. However, decisions are closely
tied to previous performance and assessments, and there are no gender differences.
Based on these findings, I argue that eliciting subjects’ beliefs pre-treatment might have
changed their mode of thinking, inducing them to think about the relevant evaluations
more carefully rather than making intuitive decisions. Results from additional sessions
where I refrain from eliciting subjects’ beliefs pre-treatment are closer to the existing
literature: in these sessions, there is a much more pronounced difference between com-
petition choices of men and women, and choices are not as closely tied to performance.
However, this comparison implies that in the main sessions, competition neglect persists
even though the belief elicitation procedure points individuals to the fact that they
should evaluate their own as well as competitors’ performance and factor those into
their chances of winning. While this changes their choices and ties them closer to
performance, it does not help to address competition neglect, which appears to be a
persistent phenomenon. Hence, educating individuals about the aspects that matter
for their decision does lead to less excessive entry, but does not ameliorate competition
neglect. To address this bias, other, more direct ways of educating decision makers
have to be applied. While this paper has mainly established competition neglect as a
relevant bias in a laboratory setting, it is up to future research to come up with ways to
specifically address this bias and to explore its impact in real-world settings.
On a more general note, based on these results, it seems important to keep in mind the
mode of thought in which competition decisions are made. One might argue that while
decisions made in the laboratory involve small stakes and are thus more prone to be gut
decisions, decisions like career choices naturally involve more careful thought and are
thus more closely tied to actual performance. Hence, laboratory findings might overesti-
mate the differential in competitiveness between women and men. However, to be able
to make detailed statements about the importance of the role of the mental resources
deployed for decision making, one would have to design a mechanism experiment that
explicitly manipulates the mode of processing. I leave this for future research.
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Appendix A
Complementarities of HRM Practices: A Case
for a Behavioral Economics Perspective
A.1 Detailed Exposition of the Model
Benchmark case
The principal faces the following optimization problem when implementing aH:
max
w,b,â
(1− πH) (q1 − w) + πH (q2 − w − b)
s.t. (1− πH)w + πH(w + b)− c+ η [(1− π̂)w + π̂(w + b)− c(â)]ER(aH)
≥ 0, (IR)
(1− πH)w + πH(w + b)− c+ η [(1− π̂)w + π̂(w + b)− c(â)]ER(aH) (IC)
≥ (1−πL)w + πL(w + b) + η [(1− π̂)w + π̂(w + b)− c(â)]ER(aL),
and â = aH . (EB)
The first and second constraint represent the standard individual rationality (IR) and
incentive compatibility (IC) restrictions, respectively. The third constraint represents
the restriction that beliefs have to be in equilibrium (EB). More precisely, this means
that the agent can reasonably expect the kindness of the proposed contract offer as his
expected rent when choosing action â. Thus, destructive and “babbling” equilibria are
ruled out. However, note that it is sufficient to assume (EB) and solve to implement
â = aH (cf. the discussion in Englmaier and Leider, 2012a).
139
COMPLEMENTARITIES OF HRM PRACTICES
For deriving the optimal contract, it is helpful to first think about the properties of the
constraints at the optimum. Considering (IR), it is straightforward to see that this con-
straint has to be binding: suppose (IR) was slack.1 Then, the principal could decrease w
by the amount ε > 0. If ε is small enough, the principal still manages to fulfill (IR) and
at the same time increases her expected outcome without violating the (IC), because the
(IC) depends on the bonus b (and thus on the wage spread between the states) which
does not change. Thus, (IR) cannot be optimally slack.
Since (IR) is binding, the agent does not receive a rent, i.e., the reciprocal part of his
utility is equal to zero and hence drops out of the problem. Thus, the optimal contract
can easily be derived by solving the constraints of the standard problem for w and b.
Now, consider the (IC). It can easily be seen that since the agent is risk-neutral and does
not care about the wage spread, there exist an infinite number of optimal contracts
implementing aH at first-best cost for the principal as long as b ≥ c/∆π, where ∆π =
πH − πL. For reasons of simplicity and to make the first and second best solutions
comparable, we focus on the case that the wages are set to solve (IC) with equality.
Limited liability
Now, the optimization problem of the principal implementing aH (when again assuming
(EB) and solving to implement â = aH) takes the following form:
max
w,b
(1− πH) (q1 − w) + πH (q2 − w − b)
s.t. (1− πH)w + πH(w + b)− c+ η [(1− πH)w + πH(w + b)− c]ER(aH)
≥ 0, (IR)
(1− πH)w + πH(w + b)− c+ η [(1− πH)w + πH(w + b)− c]ER(aH)
≥ (1−πL)w + πL(w + b) + η [(1− πH)w + πH(w + b)− c]ER(aL), (IC)
and w ≥ w. (LL)
1 Note, when we add limited liability as a source of inefficiency into the model below, (IR) may be
optimally slack, as in Englmaier and Leider (2012a).
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It is immediately clear that the principal is not able to implement the first best contract
in this case because she would have to set w < 0, which would violate the limited
liability constraint (LL). Thus, we have to derive the second best contracts, which we
do by considering two cases – selfish and reciprocal agents.
Selfish agent. First, consider the optimal contract for a selfish agent (η = 0). Then, the
optimization problem boils down to the standard case. Again considering the properties
of the constraints in the optimum, it is easy to see that (LL) binds at the optimum. Ad-
ditionally, (IC) is binding, which provides us with two equalities to solve for the optimal
contract. The properties of this contract are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition A.1. Under hidden action with limited liability (w ≥ w ≥ 0), the risk-neutral
principal proposes the following contract to the risk-neutral, selfish agent (η = 0):
w = w, b =
c
∆π
, and â = aH .
In doing so, she can induce the agent to exert aH , but only at implementation cost
BSB(aH) = c+ w +
πL
∆π
c.
The agent receives a limited liability rent:
U(aH) = w +
πL
∆π
c.
In this case, the first-best solution can no longer be employed. The (LL) constraint limits
the range of possible wage payments. Comparing the boni in the first and second best
cases reveals that they do not differ (b = c/∆π in both cases), which makes sense when
considering that the (IC) is binding in both cases and thus the wage spread cannot be
reduced further; however, the principal cannot charge negative wages, thus she has to
increase the base wage w and consequently pay a rent to the agent. In other words,
while the principal is able to use both carrot and stick in the first best case, she loses the
opportunity of using the stick with limited liability and has to rely on the “carrot” only
to incentivize the agent.
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Reciprocal agent. Now, consider a reciprocal agent with η > 0. We first illustrate
this situation by a verbal argument: since the agent is not only motivated by monetary
incentives, but also by the reciprocal part of his utility that is triggered when he receives
a rent exceeding his outside option, the principal has an additional instrument to induce
aH . Stated differently, the limited liability rent has an additional incentive component
and helps the principal to align the agent’s interests to some degree with her own.
Indeed, solving the optimization problem in the same fashion as the standard limited
liability problem yields the same base wage w, but the bonus payment b, and thus also
the wage differential between the states of the world, are reduced.2
A.2 Additive Formulation of Worker Type and HRM Practices
Consider a simple, linear relationship between inherent and influenceable reciprocity:
η = η1 + η2. Then, one can simply exchange η in Proposition 1.2 and again derive
the comparative statics of the optimal bonus payment to see how an increase in η2, for
instance by investment in team building, influences b:
∂b
∂η2
= − ∆π∆ER
(∆π + (η1 + η2) ∆ERπH)
2
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)
< 0.
The second derivative as well as the cross-derivative are globally positive, indicating
diminishing marginal returns of an increase in η:
∂2b
∂η22
=
∂2b
∂η1η2
=
∆π (∆ER)2 πH
(∆π + (η1 + η2) ∆ERπH)
3
(
w +
πL
∆π
c
)
> 0.
In this case, the two components of the reciprocity term act as substitutes, i.e., the firm
can lower the bonus either by hiring workers with an inherent concern for reciprocity in
the first place, or by triggering reciprocal concerns later on through investments in HRM
practices. This relationship can also be seen in the plot of the optimal bonus dependent
on η1 and η2 in Figure A.1.
2 Note that the bonus is decreasing in η. Assuming c ≥ w is sufficient to ensure a positive b.
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Figure A.1: Optimal bonus dependent on η in additive model
Notes: The figure depicts the optimal bonus as function of η1 and η2, the parameters captur-
ing the innate reciprocal inclination of a worker and the HRM policies targeted at increasing
this reciprocal inclination towards the firm, for an additive formulation η = η1 + η2.
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Appendix B
What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal
Provision of Incentives over the Course of Ca-
reers
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Plugging the agent’s optimal effort choice, e∗ =
√
b+ ηwθ, into the principal’s
profits gives the Lagrange function L =
√
b+ ηwθ (θ − b)−w+λbb+λww and first order
conditions
∂L
∂b
=
1
2
√
b+ ηwθ
(θ − b)−
√
b+ ηwθ + λb = 0
∂L
∂w
=
ηθ
2
√
b+ ηwθ
(θ − b)− 1 + λw = 0
We first show that bonus and wage payments are not used simultaneously. To the
contrary, assume this as the case, i.e. that λb = λw = 0. Then, first-order conditions are
1
2
√
b+ ηwθ
(θ − b)−
√
b+ ηwθ = 0
ηθ
2
√
b+ ηwθ
(θ − b)− 1 = 0
Second-order conditions will not hold in this case, though.
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The Hessian matrix of second-order partial derivatives equals − (b+ηwθ)−3/24 (θ − b)− 1√b+ηwθ − (b+ηwθ)−3/2ηθ4 (θ − b)− ηθ2√b+ηwθ
− (b+ηwθ)
−3/2ηθ
4
(θ − b)− ηθ
2
√
b+ηwθ
−η
2θ2(b+ηwθ)−3/2
4
(θ − b)
 ,
yielding a determinant equal to −3
2
ηθ < 0. Hence, either w = 0 or b = 0.
First, assume that w = 0 and b > 0, i.e., λb = 0 and λw > 0. Then, only the principal’s
first first-order condition is relevant and yields b = θ/3. Furthermore, effort is e∗ =√
θ/3, profits are π = 2θ
3
√
θ
3
, and the agent’s utility equals u = 2θ
9
√
θ
3
> 0.
Now, assume that w > 0 and b = 0, i.e., λb > 0 and λw = 0. Then, only the principal’s
second first-order condition is relevant and yields w = ηθ3/4. Furthermore, effort is
e∗ = ηθ2/2, profits are π = ηθ
3
4
, and the agent’s utility equals u = ηθ
3
4
+ η
3θ6
12
> 0.
Note that the second-order conditions hold in both cases.
Profits using a wage contract are higher than using a bonus contract, if η2θ3 ≥ 64
27
, hence
the proclaimed threshold η exists, with η =
√
64
27θ3
.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. If the (DE) constraint does not bind in a period t, the principal maximizes profits
πt = e
∗
t θ −
(
(e∗t )
3/3− ηwte∗t θ + 2/3
(√
ηwtθ
)3)− wt, subject to wt ≥ 0.
The Lagrange function equals Lt = e∗t θ− (e∗t )3/3 + ηwte∗t θ− 2/3
(√
ηwtθ
)3 −wt + λwtwt,
where λwt ≥ 0 represents the Lagrange parameter for the agent’s limited liability con-
straint, giving first order conditions
∂Lt
∂e∗t
= θ − (e∗t )2 + ηwtθ = 0
∂Lt
∂wt
= ηθ
(
e∗t −
√
ηwtθ
)
− 1 + λwt = 0
First, we show that λwt = 0. To the contrary, assume that λwt > 0 and hence wt = 0.
Then, e∗t =
√
θ and πt = 23
(√
θ
)3
. In this case, a small increase of the wage would raise
profits: dπt
dwt
|wt=0=
√
η2θ3 − 1 > 0, since η > η implies that η2θ3 > 64/27 > 1.
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Since λwt = 0, the first order conditions allow us to obtain the values for effort and wage,
yielding wt =
(η2θ3−1)
2
4η3θ3
and e∗t =
1+η2θ3
2ηθ
. wt > 0 because η > η implies η2θ3 > 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Taking the (DE) constraint into account, the Lagrange function of the principal’s
maximization problem in a period t becomes Lt = e∗t θ−(e∗t )3/3+ηwte∗t θ−2/3
(√
ηwtθ
)3−
wt + λDEt
[
δ
(
Πt+1 − Π̃t+1
)
− 2
3
(√
ηwtθ
)3 − (e∗t )3/3 + ηwtθe∗t], where λDEt ≥ 0 repre-
sents the Lagrange parameter for the principal’s dynamic enforcement constraint, and
where we omit the agent’s limited liability constraint and show ex-post that is satisfied.
First order conditions are
∂L
∂e∗t
= θ − (e∗t )2 + ηwtθ + λDEt
[
−(e∗t )2 + ηwtθ
]
= 0
∂L
∂wt
= ηθe∗t − ηθ
√
ηwtθ − 1 + λDEt
[
−ηθ
√
ηwtθ + ηθe
∗
t
]
= 0,
yielding wt =
(η2θ3(1+λDEt)−1)
2
4η3θ3(1+λDEt)
2 and e∗t =
1+η2θ3(1+λDEt)
2ηθ(1+λDEt)
. wt > 0 for λDEt ≥ 0 because
η > η implies η2θ3 > 1. Finally, it is straightforward to show that for λDEt > 0,
(η2θ3(1+λDEt)−1)
2
4η3θ3(1+λDEt)
2 >
(η2θ3−1)
2
4η3θ3
and
1+η2θ3(1+λDEt)
2ηθ(1+λDEt)
< 1+η
2θ3
2ηθ
.
Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. The (DE) constraint in period T − 1 (where on- and off-path continuation profits
are ΠT = ηθ3/4 and Π̃T = 2θ3
√
θ
3
, respectively) equals (e∗t )
3/3−ηwtθe∗t ≤ δ
(
ηθ3
4
− 2θ
3
√
θ
3
)
−
2
3
(√
ηwtθ
)3. For first-best effort and wage levels wt = (η2θ3−1)24η3θ3 and e∗t = 1+η2θ32ηθ , it be-
comes
3η2θ3 − 1
6η3θ3
≤ δ
(
ηθ3
4
− 2θ
3
√
θ
3
)
.
By assumption (η > η), both left and right hand side are strictly positive. Therefore, the
constraint is violated for first-best effort and wage levels if δ → 0.
To investigate the first part of the Lemma, rewriting the (DE) constraint gives
3− 1
η2θ3
6η
≤
δ
√
θ3
(
η
4
−
√
4
27
)
. Therefore, the left hand side is decreasing and the right hand side
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increasing in η and θ.
However, we have imposed the assumptions θ < 3 and ηθ
2
2
< 1 in order to guarantee
an interior solution. This gives an upper bound for η, η = 2
θ2
. Plugging this upper
bound into the constraint yields 12−θ
48
θ ≤ δ
(
1
2
− 2
3
√
θ
3
)
. This is satisfied for any positive
δ provided θ is sufficiently small. Finally, note that in this case, the condition η > η also
holds for θ sufficiently small. Plugging the upper bound η = 2
θ2
into this condition (i.e.,
η >
√
64
27θ3
) yields 27 > 16θ.
Concerning the second part, recall that the equilibrium is sequentially efficient, hence,
the principal’s maximization problem is equivalent to maximizing πt = e∗t θ − b∗t − wt
in every period t, subject to the (DE) constraint (e∗t )
3/3 − ηwtθe∗t ≤ δ
(
Πt+1 − Π̃t+1
)
−
2
3
(√
ηwtθ
)3. Defining ∆t ≡ Πt − Π̃t, implementable effort in period t is ceteris paribus
strictly increasing in ∆t+1, whereas per-period profits πt are consequently weakly in-
creasing in ∆t+1. Furthermore, per-period profits in periods t < T can solely be ex-
pressed as functions of ∆t+1, i.e. πt(∆t+1), with π′t ≥ 0.
The profit-maximizing spot reciprocity contract is the principal’s optimal choice in the
last period T , hence πT = ΠT = ηθ3/4. In all previous periods, the principal still has the
option to implement the spot reciprocity contract (by setting b∗t = 0 and wt = ηθ
3/4),
therefore πt ≥ πT ∀t. In addition, off-path profits are determined by a bonus spot
contract, hence π̃ = 2θ
3
√
θ
3
in every period.
Now, we can apply proof by induction to verify that ∆t−1 > ∆t. We start with the last
periods in order to show that ∆T−1 > ∆T :
∆T−1 = πT−1 − π̃ + δ∆T ≥ πT − π̃ + δ∆T = ∆T (1 + δ) > ∆T .
Now, assume that ∆t > ∆t+1. Since π′t(∆t+1) ≥ 0, πt−1 ≥ πt. Therefore, ∆t−1 =
πt−1 − π̃ + δ∆t ≥ πt − π̃ + δ∆t > πt − π̃ + δ∆t+1 = ∆t, which completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. In Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, we established that wt =
(η2θ3(1+λDEt)−1)
2
4η3θ3(1+λDEt)
2 and e∗t =
1+η2θ3(1+λDEt)
2ηθ(1+λDEt)
, where λDEt is the Lagrange parameter associated with the (DE) con-
straint in period t. Hence, wt = wt−1 and e∗t = et−1 if λDEt = λDEt−1 = 0. By
Lemma 2.3, if λDEt−1 = 0 but λDEt > 0, then wt > wt−1 and e
∗
t < et−1. Finally,
assume that λDEt−1 > 0. First, we show that in this case also λDEt > 0: Plugging
wt−1 =
(η2θ3(1+λDEt−1)−1)
2
4η3θ3(1+λDEt−1)
2 and e∗t−1 =
1+η2θ3(1+λDEt−1)
2ηθ(1+λDEt−1)
into the binding (DE) constraint
for period t− 1 yields
3η2θ3
(
1 + λDEt−1
)
− 1
6η3θ3
(
1 + λDEt−1
)3 = δ (Πt − Π̃t) .
By the implicit function theorem,
dλDEt−1
d(Πt−Π̃t)
=
2δη3θ3(1+λDEt−1)
4
1−2η2θ3(1+λDEt−1)
< 0 (since η > η implies
η2θ3 > 1). Hence, Lemma 2.4 yields λDEt−1 < λDEt, which implies λDEt−1 > 0⇒ λDEt >
0. Furthermore, if λDEt = 0 in a period t, this also holds for all previous periods.
The wage schedule is increasing in periods t < T since ∂wt
∂λDEt
=
(η2θ3(1+λDEt)−1)
2η3θ3(1+λDEt)
3 > 0,
whereas the effort path is decreasing because of ∂e
∗
t
∂λDEt
= −1
2ηθ(1+λDEt)
2 < 0. Finally, wage
and effort in period T are e∗T =
ηθ2
2
and wT = ηθ
3
4
, respectively. e∗T < e
∗
t for all t < T
follows from ηθ
2
2
<
1+η2θ3(1+λDEt)
2ηθ(1+λDEt)
(⇔ η2θ3 (1 + λDEt) < 1 + η2θ3 (1 + λDEt)). wT > wt for
all t < T follows from ηθ
3
4
>
(η2θ3(1+λDEt)−1)
2
4η3θ3(1+λDEt)
2 (⇔ 2η2θ3 (1 + λDEt) > 1), which completes
the proof.
Proof of Prediction 2.4
Proof. An agent’s utility in a period t < T is
Ut = wt + bt −
e3t
3
+ ηwte
∗
t θ
=
(2 + λDEt) + 3η
4θ6 (1 + λDEt)
3 − 3η4θ6 (1 + λDEt)
2 + η6θ9 (1 + λDEt)
3 − 3η2θ3 (1 + λDEt)
12η3θ3 (1 + λDEt)
3
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∂Ut
∂η
=
3η4θ6(1+λDEt)
2λDEt+3(η6θ9(1+λDEt)3−1)+3(1+λDEt)(η2θ3−1)
12η4θ3(1+λDEt)
3 > 0 yields that more reciprocal
agents are more satisfied with their jobs.
∂Ut
∂λDEt
=
3(η4θ6(1+λDEt)2−1)+2(1+λDEt)(3η2θ3−1)
12η3θ3(1+λDEt)
4 > 0 (because η > η implies η2θ3 > 1) yields
that job satisfaction increases over time. Concerning the last period T , recall that in a
spot reciprocity contract, U = ηθ
3
4
+ η
3θ6
12
.
This is larger than the utility in previous periods if
(1 + λDEt)
(
3η2θ3 − 1
)
> 1− 3η4θ6 (1 + λDEt)2
which always holds.
∂2Ut
∂λDEt∂η
=
(1+λDEt)(η2θ3−1)
2
+η4θ6(1+λDEt)λDEt+(4+λDEt)
4η4θ3(1+λDEt)
4 > 0 yields that the positive effect of
reciprocity on job satisfaction increases over time.
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B.2 Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: Interaction coefficients in overtime regressions
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Notes: Figure plots coefficient estimates of interaction between positive reciprocity and being
at least the threshold value of years old. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.2: Interaction coefficients in satisfaction regressions
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Notes: Figure plots coefficient estimates of interaction between positive reciprocity and being
at least the threshold value of years old. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Table B.1: Effect of reciprocity on unpaid overtime
DV: Unpaid Overtime DV: Uncompensated Overtime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall
Age Retirement
Overall
Age Retirement
cutoff propensity cutoff propensity
Positive reciprocity 0.00879 0.00973 0.00883 0.00507** 0.00494* 0.00504**
(0.00652) (0.00653) (0.00652) (0.00246) (0.00253) (0.00246)
Age (in years) -0.00744*** 0.000507
(0.00171) (0.000712)
Age ≥ 60 -0.0749** 0.0145
(0.0328) (0.0142)
Age ≥ 60# Reciprocity 0.0861*** 0.0144
(0.0316) (0.0122)
Retire = 1 -0.0580** -0.0348
(0.0292) (0.188)
Retire # Reciprocity 0.0566** 0.00137
(0.0276) (0.0104)
Observations 7,019 7,019 7,019 7,019 7,019 7,019
Pseudo R2 0.0794 0.0786 0.0782 0.1824 0.1829 0.1826
Notes: Estimations are based on the 2005 survey wave of the SOEP. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at household
level. Table reports marginal effects at means after logit regressions with marginal effects for interactions reflecting the difference
in slope for reciprocity between the groups. Reciprocity measure standardized. Controls include years of education, gender,
years of full time and part time work experience (linear and squared terms), a dummy for part-time employment, job tenure in
current position (linear and squared), indicator variables for industry sector (services, agriculture, energy or mining, manufacturing,
construction, trade, transport, bank or insurance) and firm size (less than 100, 100-199, 200-1999, more than 2000 employees),
and an indicator variable for occupation status (white collar, blue collar, public sector). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure B.3: Predicted marginal effects for unpaid and uncompensated overtime
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Notes: The figure plots predicted average marginal changes of the propensity to work unpaid (upper panel) and uncompensated
overtime (lower panel) at different levels of positive reciprocity depending on age group and a high vs. low propensity to retire
within the next two years. Estimations are based on the 2005 survey wave of the SOEP. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Table B.2: Effect of reciprocity on overtime hours
DV: Total Hours DV: Unpaid Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall
Age Retirement
Overall
Age Retirement
cutoff propensity cutoff propensity
Positive reciprocity 0.0973*** 0.0871*** 0.0898*** 0.0637** 0.0536** 0.0553**
(0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0252)
Age (in years) -0.0178*** -0.0188***
(0.00568) (0.00695)
Age ≥ 60 -0.245** –0.327**
(0.116) (0.130)
Age ≥ 60 # Reciprocity 0.283** 0.306**
(0.119) (0.125)
Retire = 1 -0.246** -0.281**
(0.107) (0.116)
Retire # Reciprocity 0.157 0.224*
(0.106) (0.115)
Observations 6,976 6,976 6,976 6,864 6,864 6,864
Pseudo R2 0.0111 0.0110 0.0110 0.0132 0.0133 0.0133
Notes: Estimations are based on the 2005 survey wave of the SOEP. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at household
level. Table reports coefficients of negative binomial regressions. Reciprocity measure standardized. Controls include years of
education, gender, years of full time and part time work experience (linear and squared terms), a dummy for part-time employment,
job tenure in current position (linear and squared), indicator variables for industry sector (services, agriculture, energy or mining,
manufacturing, construction, trade, transport, bank or insurance) and firm size (less than 100, 100-199, 200-1999, more than
2000 employees), and an indicator variable for occupation status (white collar, blue collar, public sector). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table B.3: Effect of reciprocity on effort (2005, 2010, and 2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV: Overtime (Y/N) Overall
Age cutoff Age cutoff
RE: Overall
RE: Age RE: Age
= 60 = 55 cutoff = 60 cutoff = 55
Positive reciprocity 0.00852** 0.00850** 0.00859** 0.00802** 0.00794** 0.00812**
(0.00348) (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00330)
Age (in years) -0.00284*** -0.00267**
(0.00108) (0.00105)
Age cutoff = 1 -0.0808*** -0.0219 -0.0776*** -0.0184
(0.0178) (0.0137) (0.0175) (0.0134)
Age cutoff # Reciprocity 0.0149 0.0156* 0.00821 0.0108
(0.0136) (0.00870) (0.0130) (0.00824)
Observations 25,653 25,653 25,653 25,653 25,653 25,653
Groups 18,128 18,128 18,128
Notes: Estimations are based on the 2005, 2010, and 2015 survey waves of the SOEP. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at household level. Table reports marginal effects at the mean of pooled logit regressions in columns (1) and (2) and
coefficents of RE logit estimations in columns (3) and (4). Controls include years of education, gender, years of full time and
part time work experience (linear and squared terms), a dummy for part-time employment, job tenure in current position (linear
and squared), indicator variables for industry sector (services, agriculture, energy or mining, manufacturing, construction, trade,
transport, bank or insurance) and firm size (less than 100, 100-199, 200-1999, more than 2000 employees), an indicator variable
for occupation status (white collar, blue collar, public sector), and indicator variables for birth years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B.4: Effect of reciprocity on overtime hours (2005, 2010, and 2015)
DV: Total Hours DV: Unpaid Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall
Age cutoff Age cutoff
Overall
Age cutoff Age cutoff
= 60 = 55 = 60 = 55
Positive reciprocity 0.147*** 0.136*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.0986*** 0.0797**
(0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0264) (0.0297) (0.0300) (0.0323)
Age (in years) -0.0515*** -0.0530***
(0.00706) (0.00855)
Age cutoff = 1 -0.645*** -0.542*** -0.739*** -0.507***
(0.130) (0.0974) (0.142) (0.110)
Age cutoff # Reciprocity 0.359*** 0.188*** 0.404*** 0.218***
(0.128) (0.0701) (0.133) (0.0764)
Observations 15,883 15,883 15,883 15,771 15,771 15,771
Pseudo R2 0.0149 0.0143 0.0143 0.0170 0.0165 0.0164
Notes: Estimations are based on the 2005, 2010, and 2015 survey waves of the SOEP. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at household level. Table reports coefficients of negative binomial regressions. Reciprocity measure standardized. Controls
include years of education, gender, years of full time and part time work experience (linear and squared terms), a dummy for part-
time employment, job tenure in current position (linear and squared), indicator variables for industry sector (services, agriculture,
energy or mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, transport, bank or insurance) and firm size (less than 100, 100-199, 200-
1999, more than 2000 employees), and an indicator variable for occupation status (white collar, blue collar, public sector). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix C
Individual Differences and Contribution Sequen-
ces in Threshold Public Goods
C.1 Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: Distribution of HEXACO scores
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Figure C.2: Distribution of SVO angles
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
-25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 45 55 65
SVO angle
Figure C.3: Distribution of trust and reciprocity scores
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Table C.1: Balancing table
Baseline No Info
High Pro-
Combined Chi2
vision Point
Gender 0.66 0.56 0.50 0.61 5.75
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Age 26.78 23.82 25.36 25.71 5.85
(8.56) (3.73) (3.84) (6.61)
Student 0.85 0.93 0.96 0.89 6.73*
(0.35) (0.26) (0.20) (0.32)
Openness 3.70 3.62 3.54 3.65 4.87
(0.64) (0.60) (0.52) (0.70)
Conscientiousness 3.77 3.69 3.74 3.74 1.83
(0.63) (0.58) (0.57) (0.65)
Agreeableness 3.07 3.16 3.30 3.06 7.23*
(0.62) (0.68) (0.55) (0.65)
Extraversion 3.45 3.48 3.56 3.41 1.89
(0.68) (0.66) (0.59) (0.67)
Emotionality 3.21 3.15 3.10 3.20 2.95
(0.74) (0.65) (0.58) (0.65)
Honesty 3.25 3.33 3.37 3.31 0.80
(0.75) (0.71) (0.64) (0.79)
SVO angle 16.39 17.87 19.28 15.95 3.78
(12.83) (12.99) (12.17) (12.77)
Risk aversion 6.52 6.49 6.38 5.99 5.26
(1.56) (1.40) (1.44) (1.60)
Trust 3.07 3.25 3.31 3.30 5.82
(0.88) (0.93) (0.88) (0.91)
Negative reciprocity 2.57 2.51 2.54 2.56 0.13
(0.96) (0.84) (0.90) (0.98)
Positive reciprocity 4.40 4.44 4.44 4.46 2.33
(0.52) (0.56) (0.64) (0.61)
Observations 144 72 72 72
Notes: Table reports variable means by treatment. Standard deviations are reported in
parentheses. Column "Chi2" reports Kruskal Wallis test statistics / Chi2 test statistics for
binary variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.2: Pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables
OP CO AG EX EM HH SVO Risk Trust Neg.
CO 0.059
AG 0.115∗ -0.065
EX 0.256∗∗∗ 0.089 0.199∗∗∗
EM -0.024 0.064 -0.112∗ -0.199∗∗∗
HH 0.169∗∗ 0.029 0.257∗∗∗ 0.096 0.175∗∗∗
SVO 0.077 0.014 0.050 0.019 0.105∗ 0.221∗∗∗
Risk 0.044 -0.009 -0.136∗∗ -0.040 0.107∗ 0.066 -0.008
Trust 0.215∗∗∗ -0.112∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ -0.096 0.240∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ -0.105∗
Neg. -0.174∗∗∗ -0.100 -0.421∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.459∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ 0.112∗ -0.335∗∗∗
Pos. 0.219∗∗∗ 0.074 0.180∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.062 0.183∗∗∗ 0.072 0.003 0.188∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗
Notes: Table depicts pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables. Abbreviations: OP = Openness to experience, AG
= Agreeableness, EX = Extraversion, EM = Emotionality, HH = Honesty-humility, SVO = Social value orientation, Risk = Risk
aversion, Neg. = Negative reciprocity, Pos. = Positive reciprocity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.3: Implementation success dependent on treatment condition
DV: implementation success (1)
High PP = 1 -0.459**
(0.197)
No Info = 1 -0.151
(0.206)
High PP # No Info -1.375***
(0.296)
Observations 450
Pseudo R2 0.282
Notes: Table shows coefficients after probit regression of implementation success on indi-
cators for institutional conditions on the group level. Controls include period fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C.2 Factor Analysis
Albeit the root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] of .060 as well as the
standardized root mean residual [SRMR] of .080 indicated an acceptable model fit, the
comparative fit index [CFI] of .594 is fairly low, which can be troublesome (Bentler and
Bonett, 1980; Brown, 2006). This finding, however, is not unique to our setting, but has
been reported for other measures of personality like the five-factor model. As a conse-
quence, the usefulness of CFA to assess the factor structure of personality measures has
been questioned (Hopwood and Donnellan, 2010; McCrae et al., 1996; Oswald et al.,
2013; Raykov, 1998). However, as a six-factor model yielded significantly better fit than
a one-factor model (∆χ2 = 2041.12, p < .01), we decided to follow the approach sug-
gested by Ashton and Lee (2009) and conducted an item-level factor analysis applying
principal axis extraction with varimax rotation of six factors. The eigenvalues of the
first eight factors derived from the 60 items exceeded the value of 1 and specifically
were 5.14, 3.81, 3.43, 2.58, 1.98, 1.84, 1.39, and 1.13. There is suggestive evidence
for a six-factor solution, as the eigenvalue decreased rather sharply from 1.84 for fac-
tor six to 1.39 for factor seven. A varimax rotation ensured that item loadings of all
items were primarily on the factor defined by the other items of the respective scale and
revealed that the primary item loadings replicated the basic structure of the HEXACO
model. Regarding individual factor loadings, one item showed a slightly higher loading
on a different factor than proposed by the manual. This was “I worry a lot less than
most people do”, which loaded higher on conscientiousness than on emotional stabil-
ity. Apart from item 19, 37, and 49 connected to the openness dimension, and item 5
connected to emotional stability, all primary loadings exceeded the value of .30. As this
is in line with what has been found in research on HEXACO personality in general and
average scores, standard deviations and interrelations between dimensions are compa-
rable to those reported by Moshagen et al. (2014), we decided to keep the original item
structure.
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C.3 Instructions
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not speak with the other participants from now on. Please remain silent
throughout the course of the experiment.
This experiment is designed to evaluate economic decision-making behavior. You will
be able to earn money which will be paid to you after the experiment privately and in
cash.
The entire experiment will last for about 70 minutes and consists of 3 parts. At the
beginning of each part you will receive detailed instructions. The parts of the experi-
ment are independent of each other, i.e., decisions in one part do not have any impact
on your earnings in the other parts. The sum of your earnings from all parts will be
added to your total earnings in this experiment. The total earnings will be paid to you
upon completion of the final part, individually and in cash. If there are any questions
concerning the instructions or during the experiment, press the red button on your key-
board (F11). One of the experimenter will come to you and answer your questions in
private. During the experiment, you will be asked to make several decisions. Some of
them will be made in interaction with other participants. This means that both your
own decisions and those of the other participants may determine your payoffs.
Payoff During the course of the experiment, payoffs are calculated not in Euros, but in
Experiment Points (EP). At the end of the experiment, the sum of your earned EP will
be converted to Euros. Here, the following exchange rate applies: 100 EP = 1 e.
In addition to the income that you can earn during the experiment, you receive 4 e
for your punctuality and 0.50 e for each page of the questionnaire at the end of the
experiment.
Anonymity None of the other participants will be able to observe your choices in this
experiment. In addition, the data from the experiment will be evaluated anonymously.
At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a receipt for the income you have earned
during this experiment. This is only due to accounting issues and cannot be used to as-
sociate your personal information with your decisions. Your name cannot be combined
with your behavior in the experiment at any time.
Rounds Part 1 consists of a number of mutually independent rounds. In each round,
you have between 60 and 90 seconds to make your decision. Each round lasts at least
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60 seconds; after this the end of the round is equally likely at any second. A clock will
inform you on elapsed time during the first 60 seconds.
Groups In each round, you form a group with seven other participants. The allocation
to those groups is random. The groups are dissolved after the end of each round and
re-formed randomly. None of the participants will be informed about the identity of the
other members of her group.
Decision Task At the beginning of each round, each of the eight members of a group
receives an initial endowment of 100 points. During the course of the round each
participant can decide freely to keep this amount in her personal account, or to invest
it in the group account. As soon as at least five of the eight members of the group have
decided to invest their initial endowment in the group account, the investment pays off
and grants a profit of 2800 points, which is distributed evenly across all eight members
of the group. If fewer than five group members have decided to invest until the end of
the round, the investment does not pay off. In this case, the investments in the group
account are lost. Each group member then receives only the points from her private
account.
During each round, every group member can anonymously follow the decisions of all
other group members on the screen.
Earnings You can decide in each round if you want to invest your initial endowment
in the group account. This decision you can make at any time the current round by
selecting your contribution and click "OK". If you choose to keep your initial endowment
and not to invest in the public account, there are two possible results:
• If at least five of the eight members of the group have decided to invest their initial
endowment in the group account, in addition to your initial endowment you will
receive one eighth of the profit of 2800 points. Overall, your payoff in this case
equals 100 + 2800 ÷ 8 = 450 points.
• If by the end of the round fewer than five group members have decided to invest
their initial endowment in the group account, all you get is your initial endowment
of 100 points. If you decide to invest your initial endowment, there are also two
possible outcomes:
• If at least five of the eight members of your group have decided to invest their
initial endowment in the group account, you will receive one eighth of the profit
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of 2800 points. Overall, your payoff in this case equals 2800 ÷ 8 = 350 points.
• If by the end of the round fewer than five group members have decided to invest
their initial endowment in the group account, you do not earn anything in this
round.
At the end of the experiment, one of the rounds you played will be randomly selected
and paid out.
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Appendix D
The Influence of Overconfidence and Competi-
tion Neglect on Entry into Competition
D.1 Proofs
Existence of q∗
Proof. First, it is straightforward to see that the denominator is always > 0. In addition,
keeping in mind that ξ > 1 and qj ∈ [0; 1], one can see that the numerator is ≥ 0 as long
as s ≤ 2 (and thus, q∗ ≥ 0 as well): 2 − (1 − qj)s ≥ 0 ⇔ s ≤ 21−qj . This condition is
strictest if qj = 0, when it becomes s ≤ 2. On the other hand, the numerator is smaller
or equal than the denominator (an, in turn, q∗ ≤ 1) as long as s ≥ 2
2−qj . This is strictest
for qj = 1, when it becomes s ≥ 2. Thus, for s = 2, q∗ ∈ [0; 1] for all possible values of qj
(and ξ).
Uniqueness of q∗
Proof. First, note that due to the common knowledge assumption, q∗ is symmetric. For
uniqueness, that is, for q∗ to be a global threshold, one needs to show that ∀i ∈ N ,
q′i < q
∗ ⇔ ENC(q′i) > EC(q′i) and q′′i > q∗ ⇔ ENC(q′′i ) < EC(q′′i ). To see this, plug q′i
into ENC > EC . Solving for q′i yields q
′
i <
2−(1−qj)s
ξ[s(2−qj)−2]−[(1−qj)s−2] , which equals q
′
i < q
∗.
Similarly, plugging q′′i into ENC < EC and solving for q
′′
i yields q
′′
i >
2−(1−qj)s
ξ[s(2−qj)−2]−[(1−qj)s−2] ,
which equals q′′i > q
∗. Thus, q∗ is unique.
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Comparative statics of q∗
∂q∗
∂s
= −
(
(1− qj)
ξ[s(2− qj)− 2]− [(1− qj)s− 2]
+
[2− (1− qj)s]× (ξ(2− qj)− (1− q))
{ξ[s(2− qj)− 2]− [(1− qj)s− 2]}2
)
To see that this is < 0, note that the denominators of both fractions are > 0. Then, the
first fraction is ≥ 0 because (1− qj) ≥ 0. The numerator of the second fraction consists
of two parts. As established in the existence proof, the first, [2 − (1 − qj)s], is positive.
The second, (ξ(2− qj)− (1− q)), is > 0 as long as ξ > 1−q2−q , which is satisfied for ξ > 0.5.
Thus, the whole second fraction is > 0. Finally, the whole expression is < 0 (and not
≤ 0) because even if the first fraction = 0, which happens for qj = 1, the second fraction
is > 0.
∂q∗
∂ξ
= − [2− (1− qj)s]× [s(2− qj)− 2]
{ξ[s(2− qj)− 2]− [(1− qj)s− 2]}2
To see that this is < 0, note that the denominator is > 0. The first part of the numerator
is again > 0, as established in the existence proof. The second part of the numerator is
positive as long as s ≥ 2
2−qj , making the whole expression negative.
∂q∗
∂qj
=
s
ξ[s(2− qj)− 2]− [(1− qj)s− 2]
+
[2− (1− qj)s]× (ξ − 1)s
{ξ[s(2− qj)− 2]− [(1− qj)s− 2]}2
Again, both denominators are > 0. Thus, the first fraction is also > 0 as s is positive
by definition. The numerator of the second fraction again consists of two parts, with
[2− (1− qj)s] being positive. As ξ > 1, the second part is positive as well, which means
that the whole expression is > 0.
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D.2 Figures and Tables
Figure D.1: Actual chance of winning by round three performance
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Notes: Figure depicts the actual chances of winning given reference group performance when
the competition group consists of the whole reference group (solid line) and when the compe-
tition group consists of self-selected individuals only (dashed line). Calculations based on 48
individuals in the reference group, of which 21 chose the competitive incentives.
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Table D.1: Balancing table
None
Overcon-
Selection Both Chi2
fidence
Gender 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.23
(0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51)
Age 23.69 23.17 23.30 24.15 3.03
(3.07) (4.70) (3.60) (5.75)
Risk aversion 5.67 5.94 6.30 6.38 3.34
(2.00) (2.23) (1.76) (1.55)
Round 1
Score 5.73 6.27 6.30 5.55 3.62
(2.95) (2.81) (2.74) (2.88)
Overestimation 1.23 1.79 0.32 1.47 5.24
of self (2.96) (3.61) (2.70) (3.49)
Overestimation 0.66 1.88 0.50 0.64 8.24∗∗
of others (3.03) (2.97) (2.42) (2.56)
Overestimation 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.16 5.76
of probability (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.24)
Round 2
Score 6.40 7.08 6.93 6.32 2.55
(3.06) (3.00) (3.06) (3.14)
Overestimation -0.16 0.51 -0.15 0.13 3.69
of self (2.17) (2.28) (1.72) (2.44)
Overestimation -0.49 0.75 -0.13 -0.17 11.56∗∗∗
of others (2.33) (1.85) (2.12) (1.77)
Overestimation 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.07 3.29
of probability (0.30) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27)
Observations 48 48 46 47
Notes: Table reports variable means in the main sessions by treatment. Standard deviations
in parentheses. Estimations are based on round three. Column "Chi2" reports Kruskal Wallis
test statistics / Chi2 test statistic for binary variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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D.3 Gender Differences
In this section, the analyses of beliefs and competition decisions are done separately for
men and women to investigate whether the established difference from the literature
are prevalent in my sample as well and whether the influence of competition neglect
and overconfidence on competiton decision is different for men and women.
Beliefs
Figures D.2 and D.3 are similar to Figures 4.2 and 4.3 in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4, but
depict beliefs split up by men and women. It can be seen that the patterns for men
and women are more or less the same, and that there are are no significant differ-
ences between men and women in overconfidence in my sample. This is surprising as
previous literature on gender differences in competitive environments has established
heterogeneity in overconfidence as one important driver of gender differences in com-
petitiveness. For instance, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that 75% of men and
43% of women believe to have the highest performance in a four-person group.
Competition Decisions
Now, I analyze how competition decisions and the effects of competition neglect and
overconfidence differ for men and women.
An important condition to being able to compare competition decisions of men and
women directly is that there are no gender differences in performance – in this case,
the money-maximizing choice is the same for both genders and, normatively speaking,
competition decisions should not differ. This is also an important assumption under-
lying arguments for acting against gender inequality in labor markets and calls for an
increased number of women in competitive professions. Thus, Figure D.4 depicts aver-
age performance by round and gender in the main sessions of the experiment. While
in most papers, no significant difference in performance between men and women is
found for this task, I find that in my sample, men on average solve 1.28 items more
than women in round one, 0.98 items more in round two, and 0.80 items more in
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Figure D.2: Average bias in beliefs
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Notes: Upper row depicts average bias in beliefs about own performance (left panel), ref-
erence group performance (middle panel) and winning probability (right panel) in rounds
one and two in the main sessions. Lower row depicts average bias in beliefs about own per-
formance (left panel), reference group performance (middle panel) and winning probability
(right panel) by Treatment in round three in the main sessions. Calculations are based on
189 observations. Means are depicted as bars, 95% confidence intervals as error bars.
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Figure D.3: Beliefs and overestimations by actual performance in round two.
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Notes: Upper row of figure depicts beliefs about own performance (left panel), reference
group performance (middle panel) and winning probability (right panel) depending on ac-
tual performance by men and women in round two of the main sessions. Lower row depicts
bias in beliefs about own performance (left panel), reference group performance (middle
panel) and winning probability (right panel) depending on actual performance by men and
women in round two of the main sessions. Calculations are based on 96 men and 93 women.
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Figure D.4: Average performance by gender across rounds
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Notes: Figure depicts average number of correctly solved items by men and women across
rounds in the main sessions. Calculations are based on 96 men and 93 women. Means are
depicted as bars with 95% confidence intervals.
round three. Thus, they perform significantly better than women in all rounds of the
experiment (two-sided Mann-Whitney tests yield z=2.43, p=.0148, z=1.98, p=.0476,
and z=1.75, p=0.0803).1
Next, cosider entry rates. When considering average entry across treatments, contrary
to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and most of the literature, there exists no significant
gender gap: 38.54% of men and 27.96% of women chose the competitive incentive
scheme (two-sided Fisher’s exact test yields p=.165).
Figure D.5 depicts the proportion of participants selecting into competition by perfor-
mance quartile in the initial competition. Contrary to what Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) find, there is a positive relationship between performance quartile and propor-
1 Note that while some studies have indicated that there might be an adverse effect of having to
work under competitive incentives for women Gneezy et al. (2003), I find the opposite. Of course I
cannot disentangle these effects from learning; however, the fact that womens’ average performance
improves more strongly between rounds one and two than mens’ average performance speaks against
a strong negative effect and a strong positive of the competitive incentives for women and men,
respectively.
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Figure D.5: Competition choices by previous performance and beliefs
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Notes: Figure depicts fractions of men and women choosing the competitive incentive
scheme in round three of the main sessions by performance quartile in round two (left
panel) and subjective winning probability (right panel). Calculations are based on 96 men
and 93 women.
tion of individuals selecting into competition for both men and women. In addition,
the relationship looks rather similar for men and women, with the exception of sub-
jects in the lowest quartile: among these, competition rates for men are higher than
for women, indicating that there is more overcompetition of low-performing men than
women. The right panel of Figure D.5 depicts the proportion of men and women se-
lecting into competition by their subjective probability of winning. There is a positive
relationship between beliefs and the proportion of subjects selecting into competition
that is even stronger than for previous performance. Interestingly, however, there is
a small percentage of women who enter the competition even though they think that
their probability of winning is below 25%.
The fraction of men and women selecting the competitive incentive scheme by treat-
ment is depicted in Figure D.6. Apart from the fact that absolute ratios of subjects
deciding to compete seem pretty low when compared to previous literature, it can also
be seen that while more men than women decide to compete without feedback, gender
differences seem to be ameliorated when feedback is available in round three. Com-
peting against a selected or a random sample does not seem to make a difference to
men and to women only if combined with feedback; thus, subjects appear to exhibit
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Figure D.6: Fraction of individuals selecting into competition by treatment
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Notes: Figure depicts fraction of men and women choosing the competitive incentive scheme
in round three of the main sessions. Calculations are based on 96 men and 93 women.
competition neglect. Testing for differences between genders within treatment and for
differences between the treatments with Fisher exact tests does not detect significant
differences, however.2
To explore whether there are differential effects of the treatments for men and women,
I build on the regression specification shown in Table 4.3 and include interactions of the
treatment conditions with gender. The results are shown in Table D.2. It can be seen that
while the main effect of gender still is insignificant and previous performance and beliefs
still have significant influence, there is an additional effect in the full model: when
controlling for beliefs and positive performance, the interaction between the feedback
indicator and gender is significant. Hence, providing feedback increases the probability
that women select the competitive incentive scheme.
2 Note that while the sample size does not allow to detect differences in this experiment, the number of
subjects would have been sufficient to detect gender differences based on previous results. As ex ante
power calculations were based on competition ratios in existing experiments, this was unexpected.
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Table D.2: Determinants of competition choices
DV: Competition (Y/N) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback = 1 -0.106 -0.0950 -0.113 -0.0965
(0.0944) (0.0937) (0.0860) (0.0843)
Selection = 1 -0.00256 -0.0198 0.0308 0.0200
(0.0929) (0.0991) (0.0845) (0.0875)
Feedback # Female 0.196 0.208 0.240** 0.223*
(0.127) (0.132) (0.112) (0.117)
Selection # Female -0.100 -0.0803 -0.124 -0.114
(0.127) (0.139) (0.115) (0.125)
Previous performance 0.0581*** 0.0602*** -0.0262 -0.0256
(0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0236) (0.0235)
Own performance belief 0.110*** 0.115***
(0.0317) (0.0323)
Others’ performance belief -0.0870*** -0.0866***
(0.0273) (0.0297)
Subj. winning probability 0.621*** 0.602***
(0.168) (0.175)
Female = 1 -0.0820 -0.0692 -0.0278 -0.00136
(0.115) (0.129) (0.0971) (0.107)
Risk aversion -0.0449** -0.0434** -0.0316* -0.0307*
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0165) (0.0170)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 189 187 189 187
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.156 0.320 0.314
Notes: Table reports results of linear probability estimations. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Estimations are based on round three. Controls include age, an indicator
for field of study (business, economics, STEM, humanities, law, psychology, other social
sciences, other), and math grade. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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D.4 Analysis of Round 4: Competition Based on Past Performance
In the experiment, an additional round was included after the three rounds described in
the paper, the difference being here that in round three, participants made the choice on
their subsequent performance while in round four, they were again paid based on their
performance in round two. This was done to address the fact that factors like differing
attitudes against the act of competing or ambiguity attitudes are discussed to influence
competition decisions (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011).
First, there is even less of a gender difference in competition entry than in round three:
while 35.42% of men chose the competitive incentive scheme, 29.03% of women do.
Considering actual performance in the reference group, a payoff-maximizing individual
should choose competition if her round-two performance is at least seven without and
eight with selection in the competition group. Based on round two performances, this
applies to 46.81% of men and 35.42% of women.
Figure D.7: Competition choices by performance and treatment in round four
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Notes: Figure depicts fraction of men and women choosing the competitive incentive scheme
in round four of the main sessions by performance quartile (left panel) and by treatment (right
panel). Calculations based on 96 men and 93 women.
Exploring competition decisions based on actual performance and by treatment in Fig-
ure D.7, it can be seen that as in round three, there is a positive relationship between
performance quartile and proportion of individuals selecting into competition that looks
similar for men and women. With respect to treatment variations, it can be seen that
there are roughly similar entry ratios for men facing the random and the selected sam-
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ple of competitors, while entry ratios for women are lower when they have to compete
against competitors who themselves self-selected into the competitive incentive scheme.
Feedback is associated with lower entry rates for both men and women.
D.5 Instructions
General Introduction
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not speak with the other participants from now on. Please remain silent
throughout the course of the experiment.
This experiment is designed to evaluate economic decision-making behavior. You will
be able to earn money which will be paid to you after the experiment privately and in
cash.
During the experiment, you will be asked to make several decisions. Some of them will
be made in interaction with other participants. This means that both your own decisions
and those of the other participants may determine your payoffs.
The entire experiment will last for about 60 minutes and consists of two parts. At the
beginning of each part you will receive detailed instructions. The parts of the experi-
ment are independent of each other, i.e., decisions in one part do not have any impact
on your earnings in the other parts. The sum of your earnings from all parts will be
added to your total earnings in this experiment. The total earnings will be paid to you
upon completion of the final part, individually and in cash.
Payoff During the course of the experiment, payoffs are calculated not in Euros, but in
Experiment Points (EP). At the end of the experiment, the sum of your earned EP will
be converted to Euros. Here, the following exchange rate applies: 100 EP = 1 e.
In addition to the income that you can earn during the experiment, you receive 5 e for
your punctuality.
Anonymity None of the other participants will be able to observe your choices in this
experiment. In addition, the data from the experiment will be evaluated anonymously.
At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a receipt for the income you have earned
during this experiment. This is only due to accounting issues and cannot be used to as-
sociate your personal information with your decisions. Your name cannot be combined
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with your behavior in the experiment at any time.
Permitted aids There are a pen and notepaper located on your desk. Please leave them
on the table after the experiment.
If you have any questions after the instructions or during the experiment, please press
the red button on the keyboard (F11). One of the experimenters will then answer your
question in private. If you do not need help any more, please press the red button again.
Introduction of Part 1 Procedure
In this part of the experiment, you will go through four rounds. In every round, you
will have to work on two different tasks: a sum-calculation task and an estimation task.
Sum calculation In this task, you are requested to calculate sums of five random two-
digit numbers. You will have a time window of three minutes for calculating as many
sums as possible. It is not allowed to use a calculator, but you can use the provided
notepaper.
Your screen is built up as follows: On the left side, you are going to see the five two-
digit numbers you should add up. On the right, there is a text box where you enter the
solution. Then, you press “OK” ( on the far right) to submit your answer and going to
the next calculation. On the top right side you can check the time you have left in this
round.
– Participants have one minute to get accustomed to the screen for the sum calculations –
Payment rules You are paid according to different rules in every round. At the begin-
ning of each round, you are informed about how your earning is determined.
In some rounds, your payment can also depend on the performance of other partici-
pants. In this case, this does not apply to the performance of the other participants
sitting in the lab with you right now, but participants of a past experiment. These were
selected in the same way as you, have worked on the same tasks and made the same
decisions as you. Therefore, these participants are comparable to you and the other
participants of this session. In the following, whenever you read about the "reference
group", these comparable participants of an earlier session are meant.
Estimation task In this task you are requested to give your own estimation. This will
be explained more in detail in the following rounds.
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Summary of rounds In summary, all rounds are going to follow the same procedure:
• You are informed about the payoff rule for this round
• You do the estimation task
• You have three minutes to finish the sum calculations
At the end of the experiment, one out of the four rounds will be chosen randomly and
your earnings from that round paid together with the 5 e show-up fee and your payoff
from Part 2.
Explanation of Estimation Task
Estimation Task 1 In the following you are asked two questions. You are asked to state
what you think the correct answer to the respective question is.
For each question, you can allocate a total of 100 points to 10 possible categories. To do
so, select the check box below the particular category and type in how many of your 100
available points you want to allocate to that category. By pressing "show distribution"
you can see your chosen distribution of points between the categories looks like (bars
on the upper part of the screen). You have to allocate the total amount of 100 points
available to you. Once you are satisfied with the distribution, press "submit" to get to
the next screen.
In total, you can earn up to 200 EP in each question. For this, the points you have
distributed are converted into EP in consideration of the full distribution. The EP you
earn when you submit the currently chosen distribution are displayed to you as as bars
and in numbers above the check boxes as soon as you click on "show distribution".
How much points you should allocate to each category depends on your estimation of
the correct answer to the question asked. To illustrate this point, consider the following
example:
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How high was the official unemployment rate in the US in February 2003?
You can now freely choose how you want to spread your 100 points. The figure shows
you two exemplary options.
• Left distribution: Assume you think it very likely that the true answer is slightly
under 5%. Then you could allocate 50 points to the category “4 to 5.9%”, 40
points to the category “2% to 3.9%”, and the remaining 10 points to the category
“0-1.9%”, for example.
Your payoff for this question is determined by the amount of points you have al-
located to the category that contains the true unemployment rate. If it is actually
between 4 and 5.9%, you earn 158 EP. If it is between 2 and 3.9%, you receive
138 EP, and if it is between 0 and 1.9%, you receive 78 EP. For each other true
unemployment rate you receive with this distribution 58 EP. Thus, your finally
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payoff depends on your given estimation and the correct answer to the questions.
You can change the allocation of your points as much as you want to such that it
represents your personal estimation as well as possible. As the actual unemploy-
ment rate in the USA in February 2013 was 7.7%, you would have earned 58 EP
with the left distribution.
• Right distribution: Assume you had allocated all your available points on one cate-
gory, for example on the category “4% to 5.9%”. Then, the distribution of possible
earnings for this question would look as follows: If the true unemployment rate
lies between 4 and 5.9%, you would earn the maximum payoff of 200 EP for this
question. However, since the true unemployment rate is 7.7%, you would not
have earned anything with this distribution of points.
How you find a trade-off between the precision of your estimation and the risk that you
are wrong is up to you. Keep in mind the following three important things:
• Your assessment of the right answer to the question is a personal estimation which
is based on the information you have.
• Depending on your decision you can earn up to 200 EP per question.
• Your decisions can also depend on your willingness to take risks. The estimations
you are going to make now are individual.
Estimation Task 2: Winning Probability Now we would like you to give an estimation
of how likely it is that you are going to solve more calculations correctly that a randomly
chosen participant from the reference group.
As a reminder: The reference groups consist of participants of a past date which have
solved the same tasks you will solve now.
Your earnings from this estimation are affected by the precision with which you specify
the probability that your performance is above the performance of a randomly chosen
participant from the reference group. The payoff is constructed such that you have the
highest chance of earning money if you indicate your actual assessment. The mecha-
nism works as follows: You indicate your estimated winning probability. In addition,
the computer draws a number X between 0 and 100. Every number between 0 and 100
is drawn with the same probability.
A comparison of these two values determines according to which of the following crite-
ria you are paid for your estimation.
185
OVERCONFIDENCE, COMPETITION NEGLECT, AND COMPETITION ENTRY
• Option A: you receive 200 EP if you solve more calculations correctly than a ran-
domly chosen participant of the reference group
• Option B: you receive 200 EP with probability X
The option according to which you are paid is selected as follows: If X is higher than
your indicated winning probability, option B is chosen and you receive 200 EP with
probability X. If X is lower than your indicated winning probability, option A is selected
and you receive 200 EP if your performance in this round is better than the one of a
randomly chosen subject of the reference group.
This means that you maximize your chance of winning the price of 200 EP by indicating
your actual estimation of how likely you think it is to be better than a randomly chosen
subject of the reference group.
An example: You think that you can solve more calculation tasks correctly that a ran-
domly chosen person of the reference group with a probability of 62%.
• If you truly state this estimation, you are paid according to option A if X is lower
than 62, which gives you a higher winning probability (namely 62%) than option
B (X%). If X is higher than 62, you are paid according to option B, which gives
you a higher chance of winning (namely X%) that option A (62%). Regardless
of which number X is drawn randomly, you are always paid according to the rule
that gives you a higher chance of receiving 200 EP.
• If you state another probability, for example 10%, you are paid according to option
A if X is smaller than 10, which gives you a higher winning probability (namely
62%) than option B. If X is higher than 10, you are paid according to option
B, which possibly gives you a lower winning probability than option A. If X is
between 10 and 62, you are paid according to option B, although with option A
you would have had a higher winning probability of 62%. In this case, stating a
false probability reduces your chance to receive 200 EP.
The logic of this example applies to all other probabilities as well. Whatever you think
how likely it is that you are going to solve more calculations correctly than a randomly
chosen subject from the reference group, you maximize the chance of receiving 200 EP
by giving your best possible estimation.
Payment Descriptions
Round 1 You receive 50 EP for each correct calculation.
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Round 2 The performance of an individual from the reference group in this round is
chosen randomly. Remember: the reference group consist of participants of a past date
who solved the same tasks you are solving now. If you solve more calculations correctly
than this person, you receive 100 EP per correct calculation; otherwise, you do not get
any payoff for this round. If you solve the same number of calculations correctly as the
randomly selected reference person, the computer will randomly choose a winner.
Round 3 In this round, you can choose how you want to be paid.
• Option A: As in round 1, you receive 50 EP for each correct calculation.
• Option B: As in round 2, the performance of an individual from the reference
group in this round is chosen randomly. If you solve more calculations correctly
than this person, you receive 100 EP per correct calculation; otherwise, you do
not get any payoff for this round. If you solve the same number of calculations
correctly as the randomly selected reference person, the computer will randomly
choose a winner.
If the competitor was drawn from the selected competition group, the following sen-
tence was added to Option B: In contrast to round 2, the person is selected only among
the other participants in the reference group who have chosen option B.
Round 4 In this round, the number of correct calculations will again determine your
payoff. However, in contrast to the previous rounds, you are not going to work again
on the task. Instead, your performance in round 2 determines your earnings. You can
choose how you want to be paid.
• Option A: As in round 1, you receive 50 EP for each correct calculation.
• Option B: As in round 2, the performance of an individual from the reference
group in this round is chosen randomly. If you solve more calculations correctly
than this person, you receive 100 EP per correct calculation; otherwise, you do
not get any payoff for this round. If you solve the same number of calculations
correctly as the randomly selected reference person, the computer will randomly
choose a winner.
If the competitor was drawn from the selected competition group, the following sen-
tence was added to Option B: In contrast to round 2, the person is selected only among
the other participants in the reference group who have chosen option B.
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Feedback
This translates to: "In this task, you solved X sum correctly.
In the reference group, an average number of Z calculations were solved correctly. The
distribution of performances looks as follows"
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